Building on the closed creativity tasks of Charness and Grieco (2019, 2023), we investigate whether introducing financial incentives for sharing creative ideas undermines intrinsic motivation for group collaboration. We develop a theoretical model contrasting intrinsic and extrinsic motivation in idea sharing. We conduct a theory-driven experiment to test our hypotheses regarding the potential crowding-out effect when idea sharing is rewarded through the redistribution of individual earnings from one’s own task. Our experimental design features four treatments: a control condition, where participants complete their tasks in isolation, and three group treatments, where members can share ideas on each other’s tasks. The group treatments differ in whether extrinsic incentives are introduced for within-group cooperation (sharing rewards) or for within-group competition over those rewards. The experiment was conducted with two distinct subject pools: undergraduate students and professionals with proven expertise in the creative field. Results show that group settings generally enhance creativity relative to individual work – except when explicit financial incentives for cooperation are introduced – supporting the hypothesis that individual creativity shaped by group context does not require further incentivization through within-group rewards. Consistent with our model, this effect is significantly stronger among experts than among students. Our findings complement those of Charness and Grieco (2019), by highlighting the relevance of individual incentives for competition also within groups, and those of Charness and Grieco (2023), by indirectly suggesting that, to enhance group creativity through group incentives, explicit group output and between-group competition may be required.
Intrinsic vs. extrinsic motivators on creative collaboration: The effect of sharing rewards
Attanasi, Giuseppe
;Urso, Giulia
2026-01-01
Abstract
Building on the closed creativity tasks of Charness and Grieco (2019, 2023), we investigate whether introducing financial incentives for sharing creative ideas undermines intrinsic motivation for group collaboration. We develop a theoretical model contrasting intrinsic and extrinsic motivation in idea sharing. We conduct a theory-driven experiment to test our hypotheses regarding the potential crowding-out effect when idea sharing is rewarded through the redistribution of individual earnings from one’s own task. Our experimental design features four treatments: a control condition, where participants complete their tasks in isolation, and three group treatments, where members can share ideas on each other’s tasks. The group treatments differ in whether extrinsic incentives are introduced for within-group cooperation (sharing rewards) or for within-group competition over those rewards. The experiment was conducted with two distinct subject pools: undergraduate students and professionals with proven expertise in the creative field. Results show that group settings generally enhance creativity relative to individual work – except when explicit financial incentives for cooperation are introduced – supporting the hypothesis that individual creativity shaped by group context does not require further incentivization through within-group rewards. Consistent with our model, this effect is significantly stronger among experts than among students. Our findings complement those of Charness and Grieco (2019), by highlighting the relevance of individual incentives for competition also within groups, and those of Charness and Grieco (2023), by indirectly suggesting that, to enhance group creativity through group incentives, explicit group output and between-group competition may be required.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.


