Price of Anarchy measures the welfare loss caused by selfish behavior: it is defined as the ratio of the social welfare in a socially optimal outcome and in a worst Nash equilibrium. A similar measure can be derived for other classes of stable outcomes. In this paper, we argue that Pareto optimality can be seen as a notion of stability, and introduce the concept of Price of Pareto Optimality: This is an analogue of the Price of Anarchy, where the maximum is computed over the class of Pareto optimal outcomes, i.e., outcomes that do not permit a deviation by the grand coalition that makes all players weakly better off and some players strictly better off. As a case study, we focus on hedonic games, and provide lower and upper bounds of the Price of Pareto Optimality in three classes of hedonic games: Additively separable hedonic games, fractional hedonic games, and modified fractional hedonic games; for fractional hedonic games on trees our bounds are tight.
Price of pareto optimality in hedonic games
FLAMMINI, MICHELE
2016
Abstract
Price of Anarchy measures the welfare loss caused by selfish behavior: it is defined as the ratio of the social welfare in a socially optimal outcome and in a worst Nash equilibrium. A similar measure can be derived for other classes of stable outcomes. In this paper, we argue that Pareto optimality can be seen as a notion of stability, and introduce the concept of Price of Pareto Optimality: This is an analogue of the Price of Anarchy, where the maximum is computed over the class of Pareto optimal outcomes, i.e., outcomes that do not permit a deviation by the grand coalition that makes all players weakly better off and some players strictly better off. As a case study, we focus on hedonic games, and provide lower and upper bounds of the Price of Pareto Optimality in three classes of hedonic games: Additively separable hedonic games, fractional hedonic games, and modified fractional hedonic games; for fractional hedonic games on trees our bounds are tight.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
---|---|---|---|
2016_30thAAAICon_Elkind.pdf
accesso aperto
Descrizione: Articolo principale
Licenza:
Accesso gratuito
|
662.25 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri |
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.