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Governing the gap. Strategies and Instruments for the Territorial Development in European Cities

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ABSTRACT

This thesis addresses the topic of how strategies of urban spatial development act through existing urban planning institutional contexts. The research has roots in strategic planning and spatial planning theory but pertains to the interdisciplinary field of urban studies and therefore is at the edge between policy analysis, urban planning and social studies. In this work, strategic planning is defined as a set of methodological approaches and instruments that contributes to the management of change. The change I refer to is the shift towards different forms of urban development and governance in European cities, happening at the turn of the century and largely debated by urban studies academia. Although this change concerns all the areas of public policies, I have focused my interest on spatial-related decisions and strategies and developed my observations on three different scales. The three levels of analysis (European networks level, urban level, and urban projects level) are linked to three different indicators of strategies embeddedness: international transfer mechanisms, existing planning cultures and local institutional constraints. To each of them, I have dedicated one chapter of the thesis. In the first chapter, through a socio-graphical report of strategic planning emergence and dissemination in Europe, I have defined my entry point in the existing literature and exposed the need to re-establish a sound comparative attitude according to this broader definition of strategic planning. In the second chapter, I have looked at the strategic planning-related discourses and diachronic innovations (between the beginning of the '90s and the end of the 2000s) in three European capital cities – Rome, Vienna and Paris. My aim has been: to reconstruct the infrastructural organization on which the governments have embedded their objectives; and to identify the adjustments operated on the institutional settings related to spatial planning culture. The result of this analysis questions the existence of a unique model of strategic planning institutionalization, despite the convergence of related narratives and expected governance models. In the third and last part of the thesis, I have analysed the development of the polycentric urban strategy, pursued by the centre-left “reformist” municipalities in Rome, between 1993 and 2008. In this dig at the local scale, I have elaborated on the link between strategies and strategic projects, to obtain information on how the existing instruments and institutional structures determine the absorption of strategies at the implementation level. My results relate to the need to consider these normative and cultural constraints when looking for indicators of strategic planning manifestations. In other words, the institutionalisation of strategies characterises contemporary strategic planning models in distinctive ways, related to implementation instruments inertia.

INTRODUCTION

Urban development strategies in Europe

Around the turn of the century, European cities have changed. Cities' international competition, the trends and possibilities of neoliberal economic policies and the sustainable development challenges entered urban agendas gradually. New challenges, backed up by new theories, engendered the production of trials, instruments, alliances, and participated to the formation or modification of planning and decision making paradigms. A grand discourse of urban competitiveness and accelerated change has progressively unfolded, influencing all aspects of metropolitan action.

In parallel, urban institutions and local governments have tried to adapt their agenda, tools and representations. Among the various agents of this modification, or rather re-organisation, I decided to focus on public local governments and their spatial policy-making procedures. Two of the offsprings of the expanding discourse of those years are of interest here: strategic planning and territorial governance (Healey, Albrechts & Kunzmann 2003). In a sense, strategy and governance shaped progressively the new planning and decision making paradigms, affecting how urban problems are appreciated and local solutions are conceived. Though the two are strictly intertwined, I have focused on the first and I have formulated an integrated definition, using selected European urban contexts, that allows me to partially investigate the second: strategic planning is here intended as a source of change management and governance organisation.

The starting point in my dissertation is the assumption that urban actions in these years are related to these changing paradigms. As a common point, they reflect the specific conditions of European cities (Newman & Thornley 1996, Lefevre 1998, Healey 1998, Healey et al. 1999, Salet, Thornley & Kreukels 2003, Cremaschi 2005, Rivolin & Faludi 2005, Borraz & Le Galès 2010) and are exposed to models and best practice diffusive phenomena. However, the actions related to these spatial planning and territorial governance paradigms generate different political and physical results in the cities. Certain mechanisms that guide the rearrangement of cities' position in the global background, therefore, affect several urban institutions, in particular the spatial planning culture and instruments, the government of territorial networks, the urban policies implementation process. These mechanisms of diffusion (Dolowitz & Marsh 2000, Dumoulin & Saurugger 2010, Beal & Pinson 2014) and translation (Czarniawska 2002, Latour 2005) can therefore help in dissecting the apparent similarities in the discourses and in the problems exposed by the local governments, aimed at pushing forward the development machine and the political struggle. The motivations and conditions that characterise each large urban and metropolitan physical intervention, since the end of the '80s, have been framed, in particular, in strategic planning paradigm.

A non-normative analysis of the strategic planning paradigm

In this research, the literature on strategic planning has been useful in exploring how the related urban policies and practices show themselves through a specific geographic, political and economic momentum of the cities. This happens in different modalities. My scope is to underline the discursive dimension of the strategic planning paradigm diffusion and how it is embedded in different cultural and institutional urban contexts.

A first, literature-derived, definition describes strategic planning as a set of procedures, in which different public and private actors are included, aimed at the formulation of shared representations and objectives for the city (Mintzberg 1994, Innes 1996, Healey 1998, Albrechts 2001). Those ideals, and the resources put at disposal by the stakeholders, are then gathered in the Strategic Plan. Usually, the strategic plan is an official document promoted and then adopted by the government as a guide for implementing policy choices and selecting policy instruments. Its rationale is to increase the coherence and integration among different areas of action (economic, spatial, environmental, etc.). It bears also a specific concern for the economic development.

The strategic plan is defined thus at the crossroad between public policy making plan making and participative processes. However, the scope of this new planning tool and of its related process has evolved in time. In the last 20 years, strategic planning efforts have moved away from an earlier version insisting upon a structured and efficiency-aimed linear procedure, to a later more substantial model, leaning to fostering incremental changes in spatial planning and in managing sustainable development. Of late, a stream of normative and descriptive researches have tried to identify the possible effects of this practice (Healey 2006, Florio 2010, Kornberger 2012, Olesen & Richardson 2012, Balducci & Albrechts 2013, Mantysalo 2013, Balducci 2015). Moreover, planners and politicians have participated in strategic planning reinterpretations in practice, using its principles to update the traditional spatial planning processes, or taking advantage of strategic plans communicative and political dimension.

Converging or diverging cities?

There is a European governance model related to strategic-led spatial transformations. It reflects the ideals of participative and inclusive democracy, but also the expectations of more effective public-public and public-private collaborations. In modifying organisation and procedures, especially towards a metropolitan shift, the cities adapt their governance's interpretation, in parallel with the absorption of regeneration, sustainability, cohesion and participation concepts. The convergence in the policy formulation phase, in which best procedures and narratives are partially transferred, is evident when the paradigmatic dimension of strategic plan-making activity is tracked. This condition, though, overshadows a diversification and a complexity of the processes that are observable only through a comparative effort dedicated to implementation phases. In respect to the strategies, this phase also includes the spatial planning traditional activity of localisation of projects and functions. Large projects of spatial transformation are in fact the visible counterpart of strategic will. Famous cases of strategic planning are usually complemented with consistent spatial renovations efforts; this happens despite strategic plans do not necessarily give indications on strategic projects. The link between strategic efforts in the city regards the elaboration of strategies of development and plans' principles are operationalised in the different policy areas with different instruments.¹ In these moments of translation, the share of responsibilities and the power balances between actors necessarily evolve, passing from a phase of narrative construction, through the argumentative decision making arenas, to a bargaining phase, made of small, but discriminant, adjustments. The goal of these strategic planning trials, becomes to build a stable structural agreement. This agreement aims at determining the feasibility of certain actions and not at the improvement of the process towards participative democracy and contrasts avoidance.

¹ In this sense, my analysis is necessary partial: I have decided to observe strategic planning from the spatial planning point of view, according to my interests and background as urban planner.

The final definition of strategy that I embraced in this research is therefore twofold. On one hand, I use spatial strategies referring to the adoption of a model of urban development; on the other, I write about governments' strategic behaviours when the activities of spatial policy making and planning are backed with the creation of a governance decision system, aimed at a stable multi-actor agreement as well as at a management of change. The idea of assessing the "performance" and not the "conformance" (Mastop & Faludi 1997 Albrechts & Balducci 2013), although valid when applied to plans, doesn't necessary work for this kind of segmented and evolving strategic effort. Initial objectives will change along the way, and the main dimension of strategic planning, that is introducing flexibility in consequential chains of actions, is actually incompatible with the aspiration to coherence "in principles". The ideal situation implies therefore that the objectives would change according to public interest. This means that the public should have a strong ability to steer other actors at the same time bargaining with them. The trade-offs, both when dealing with external global pressures and with internal actor networks, are fundamental. According to my research, they equally depend on transfer mechanisms, planning cultures and institutional constraints.

Therefore, if it is true that an overall change is happening in cities' approach to development, the paradigmatic turn in spatial planning, according to the principles of strategic planning, is in practice leading to very different arrangements. The literature on the topic is locked up in specific models and examples, despite every story of strategic plan-making analysed is different, though told with very similar words. The theoretical background on which the research is found is therefore not only evolving, but often needs a "re-examination" (Albrechts 2004).

The success of strategies is therefore measured by the ability to elaborate and monitor a coherent governance (with the instruments and the spatial model) that only to some extent overlaps with European trends and EU expectations. Capacities to read the opportunity, to choose the right instruments and to choose the right actors' structure are strictly link to territorial construction (notwithstanding a neoliberal, social-welfare based or "in between" urban political project). The broadening of strategic planning analysis to governance and policy-making innovation examples has allowed me to observe the path that links general concepts to actions through a double phase of transfer: from the overall procedural and academic conceptualisation towards the urban contexts, and from the political and discursive level towards the implementation path. This process is paved with institutional changes, in balance between innovation and path-dependency, conscious turning points and unexpected lateral effects.

This kind of analysis encompasses a pragmatist-constructivist approach to urban policies (Crosta 1998) and an institutionalist point of view (Powell & Di Maggio 1991, Salet 2000, Jessop 2001, Lascoumes & Le Galès 2012,). These approaches see the single actors' behaviours as situational and fragmented, and therefore difficult to be grasped and squeezed into substantial political and cultural behaviours. This impasse suggested me to condense the expression of personal interests and actions in the context of social and political constructs (Lascoumes & Le Galès 2012, p.88), such as government procedures, spatial planning traditions, administrative organisations. My interest has focused, in particular, on the activity and choices of public actors. Moreover, I used an institutionalist point of view to consider the external and internal pressures generating changes in the system in which the public actors move, mixing therefore a traditional approach with more recent reflections on urban resilience and system complexity (Calafati 2014).

Beyond the strategic plans

In the first part of my thesis, I analyse how this practice has spread in European cities, trying to select some basic models and interpretations representative the the

broad literature on the topic; moreover, I have depicted some of the mechanisms that could have allowed the filtering of the practice in cities governmental activities. What I assume as useful for the further steps of the research, is that these mechanisms could engender a sort of de-responsibilisation of the governments, in respect to a top down absorption of the concepts.

The first chapter tries thus to observe an ongoing process of institutionalisation of the strategic planning approach, that I have narrated with the use of meso-sociologic theories (Powell & di Maggio 1991, Lascoumes & Le Galès 2012) and through sociographic representations. I did not assumed the presence of a “proper” way to do things, and I considered at the opposite that a phase of selection and interaction is unavoidable in all political decisions (Crosta 1998). I used the contents of normative literature on strategic planning as a start to choose objects and scales of study. Strategic planning literature paradigmatic cases testify in fact innovation efforts in European cities development approach but the related mechanisms and results, nonetheless, are still unclear.

A further insight in the case studies is necessary to observe the obduracy of existing institutions, the embeddedness of the strategies and the strategic planning processes in the planning and decision-making practices and the subtle use of new conceptualisations. For this aim, a leap from a theoretical to a comparative approach is needed.

In the second part of this work, I state that strategic planning has gone beyond the production of strategic plans. As a process of rethinking the institutional roles and public resources, it can, depending of the case, help urban government in facing and managing internal and external changes. Moreover, it is used to construct valid argumentation and stable coalition for the development of cities along metropolitan and international challenges. Therefore, it has been fundamental to identify the characters of the changes that the cities had to face, as well as the impacts on different local planning and government institutions, and the governments’ answers. I have selected three case studies: two cities, Rome and Vienna, on which I had realised previous inquiring, which are usually left aside in the literature on strategic planning or city strategies; and an exceptional third benchmark – Paris. The period of the analysis reflects strategic planning theories diffusion, but I have also tried to identify political-economic turning points specific for each city. The three cases assume different weights in this comparison.

Rome, being exposed, in the period between 1993 and the first years of 2010s, to legislative delays, internal political struggles and alternate economic fortunes, represents a case of contested transformation. Nonetheless, this period has also seen the new urban spatial masterplan construction and the creation of a “Rome model” of development, based on an innovative mix of social and economic instances.

The Viennese case mirrors, instead, an example of urban renaissance, profiting of the opportunities coming from a new setting of Central European countries and new national priorities. The city has experienced, starting from the mid-90s, a period of exceptional economic development, facing political destabilisation and neoliberal pressures. The two examples show enormous differences, both reporting characters of exceptionality. The general positive narrative on Vienna reflects an uncontested political continuity, meanwhile Rome’s failure narrative has caused a difficulty in objectively observing mechanisms of internal renewal.

The case of Paris, a city that is more linear in its development and nonetheless more exposed to geographic and economic turns, helped me in identifying generalizable characteristics. There, I could grasp similar behaviours, especially in the areas of spatial planning, territorial development governance and urban policies implementation.

With these insights, I was able to identify the presence of strategies inside traditional, spatial plans; moreover, I could observe that the economic renovation passes through the spatial transformation, in a period when the real estate market and construction sector is still fundamental in European cities' economy base. Eventually, I have looked for the capacity to build a new public management, a concept traditionally important for central-right parties, but observable here in three leftist governments.

Does the in-between way, that tries to manage market pressures combining existing and new instruments with a different governmental steering style, produce a real change? Following this question, I have pushed further the comparative perspective, selecting indicators for a tentative qualification of the cities' experience. The conclusion I have pursued is not related to the spatial and economic effects, although these are the general objects of strategy-making, but regards the procedural choices, and their compatibility with the exposed objectives. Differences in the governance of implementation of the spatial projects testify an ongoing evolution of means and resources that tell us more about effective strategies than the initial narratives of the governments.

Through this analysis, I have made a step forward in picturing reasons and ways to fill the gap between strategies and actions, although not going in depth in the actual implementation phases. To do that, I have decided to limit the research to one case and a specific strategy applied to spatial planning. The case of Rome, in this sense, appeared the most interesting because of its problematic characters. Cities, in fact, produce strategic plans and strategies as well as strategic instruments. In certain cases, instruments and strategies are codetermined and coherent (as the case of Vienna testifies); in other situations, strategy and instruments are evolving, although at different speeds (for instance in Paris); eventually, they can be totally disjointed, as the example of Rome seems to expose.

The complexity of implementation

In Rome, the expected changes are diluted or even hindered by the difficulties to govern large projects.

Rome spatial development strategies have in fact a contested story. After an early period of apparent renaissance for the city, during the two central-left mayors' governments in the 90s, several critiques have in part subverted the assessment on the related decisions, and fostered a negative representation, backed by incoherent results. The inconsistencies between strategies and built environment have been visible especially when the new masterplan for the city, produced in the meantime, was published. The large projects implementation difficulties influenced strongly the further management of the city. The apparent lack of strategies and strategic choices has delayed, according to this narrative, the economic development of the city. What is put into question by the observers is the innovation capabilities of Rome's administration, however, in respect to a predictive rationality (the choices were wrong, because the effects are wrong). In particular, I have considered the discussion and first implementations of the new polycentric spatial model for the city (also contained in the 2008 new masterplan). This helped me to reconstruct the turning points and lateral effects that shaped the strategy along its implementation, a strategy that appears very clear in its narrative dimension, both in spatial terms and in defining a new governance approach.

What I tried to unpack is the incremental transformation of certain decisions – notwithstanding political alternation, financial crisis, organisational challenges – to observe how the selected instruments and procedures have participated in modifying and lead apparently inertial processes. In particular, the implementation of large projects embeds the main challenges of roman territorial government and land development, with complex bonds between actors and spatial decisions. Why

have things gone differently from the initial expectations? I have tried to demonstrate that is not much a question of coherence between strategies and results, but a unity between strategies and instruments, between narratives and effective governance resources. Rome case, in particular, shows the difficulties of the government to build a stable agreement between actors and, therefore, to manage intermediate, complex, bargaining. Moreover, it might confirm the loss of appeal of large development projects as we have observed them, both contingently (in Rome and during the financial crisis period) both in the broader urban planning policies.

What appears from this picture is that the conditions for processing strategies in Rome have diverged: while transfer mechanisms have acted to import main discourses on the possibilities of large events' organisation, tertiary poles construction, rescaling and metropolisation, during a reformist window of opportunity, the national planning culture has hindered the update of planning instruments and the weight of institutional constraints has grown heavier. Nonetheless, trade-offs between private actors and public interests could have profit of a new political leadership. The governments, though, have not considered enough the urge to codetermine strategies and institutional infrastructure (normative, contractual and qualitative tools, in relation to planning activity). My reference to institutional infrastructures, in this sense, does not claim for a path-dependency recognition, that would actually contrast with my affirmation of an existing change in Roman strategies. Instead, I recognise the strings of a "bounded rationality" in relation to public actors' actions, leaving untouched all the possible explanations of failure in Roman policies, linked to individual behaviours – as proposed by urban regime theories (D'Albergo & Moini 2013).

Explaining the gap between strategies and actions does necessarily pass for the recognition of the role of the instruments in determining or hindering (with their inertia) decisions. The initial polycentric strategy in Rome is not just wrong, or doomed. Actually, it remains central in the objectives of administration and practitioners.

In this sense, although partially, I have approached Mazza and Bianconi (Mazza & Bianconi 2014) claim for a planning research that stimulates the debate on "substantial knowledge", also understood as urban forms and design principles. The use of "procedural knowledge"² cannot be independent. It must be used, being a "trans-disciplinary knowledge sitting at the crossroads between territorial governance and spatial planning" (Ib. p. 526), in order to stimulate a further inquiry in the updating of models and principles of the planning discipline. Thus, while approaching the implementation phases more closely, I have used the instruments analysis to deconstruct the political and social behaviours and interests of public governments, depicting certain political representations of problems.

Structure and method

To grasp this complexity, I have started an "incremental" analysis. I have structured my work in three papers, to be able to include, besides strategic planning literature, further streams of study concerned with European cities: the diffusion theory analysis and argumentative planning theories (Fischer & Forester 1993, Hajer & Wagenaar 2003), the comparative governance analysis (Pierre, 1999, 2015, Savitch 1994, Savitch & Kantor 2004, Gonzalez & Healey 2005, Storper 2015), large project management (Fainstein 2008, Gualini & Majoor 2007, Salet & Gualini 2006,

² "The definition and management of the planning machinery, to the tiers of government and their competences, to the relationship between different kinds of tools and strategies, and to the relationships these entertain with other sectoral policies and regulatory frameworks" (Mazza & Bianconi 2014, p.525)

Swyngedouw, Moulaert & Arantxa 2002, Newman & Thornley 1996) and instruments analysis (Lascoumes & Le Galès 2009, Van den Broeck 2008, de Maillard & Le Goff 2009). Also, my sources have increased and changed along the three parts.

In the first paper, I have built my arguments on the literature on strategic planning and strategic plan-making and elaborated a geo-historical model on the European case studies.

In the second paper, I have explored the primary (official documents, unstructured interviews) and secondary (literature, newspapers) sources on two cities and combined my knowledge with the scholars' viewpoints on Paris.

The last chapter has been realised using a further theoretical insight coordinated with an indepth analysis of three specific urban projects in the city of Rome. I therefore used a more variegated set of sources, besides open interviews and literature, including direct observation of the sites and access to administrative documents (administrative contracts, ordinances, operative plans). I have also diversified the instruments of analysis, processing data through maps and tables.

Moreover, I have been able to deal with three different scales of urban comparative work, which I have used to reply to different questions. However, the research allowed me to propose some transversal results, with the elaboration of an analytical definition of strategic planning and of a tentative description of diverging models of governance of large territorial transformations.

Strengths and weaknesses: path the way for further research

As any research effort, this work is still open. The priority given to the analysis of documents and administrative instruments was needed in order to explore the process of rearranging the spatial planning governance. There are, nonetheless, more explored path, still fruitful, related to actors' preferences, urban regimes, social and economic analysis, which could prove or deny my hypothesis. However, the instruments analysis has constituted an enlightening theoretical background that I have tried to combine with a broader, and sometimes redundant, literature on strategic planning and governance. At the same time, I am aware of having lost many pieces of the context, both limiting a direct confrontation with non-institutional sources, and shrinking the historical, geographical and theoretical point of view. Moreover, dividing my work in three parts, I could not always conduct a proper insight for all of my objects of analysis (as testified by the limited use of the Paris case).

Despite these necessary limitations, all of my tentative conclusions relate to the link between strategies and actions, and "why" and "how" cities have managed to govern this gap. My interest, in this sense, was more on the recognition of mechanisms and variables than on the formulation of normative advices or city ratings. Therefore, I value comparison as the main value of my work. The "urban stories" collected in this work allowed me to question the validity of certain models and objectives in determined contexts. Reconstructing the phenomena happening decades ago, we must ask if the changed conditions have hindered the value of conventional instruments in addressing territorial development. The example of Rome, in particular, testifies this continuous delay of public policies in recognising and dealing with the present.

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CHAPTER 1

Spatial Strategic Planning as a moving paradigm: An instrumental map of the diffusion in Europe

ABSTRACT

Strategic planning is a specific approach to planning and spatial policies that has gained a growing attention in Europe during the last 25 years, especially at the local, urban and metropolitan level. Together with the formation of the governance paradigm, its spread participated to the shift towards collaborative and argumentative forms of decision making, and to the development of new scales of government. The supposed ability of strategic planning, as a flexible process and bargaining platform, to deal with uncertain diagnosis, incomplete information and multiple actors' governance made its use particularly welcome in a period of scalar restructuring, economic and industrial reorganisation. Most of all, its narrative dimension affected urban discourses transition from a place to another. An inquiry in the literature shows the need to reformulate its objects and characteristics in respect to European cities' planning cultures and processes of transfer. Through a collection of the cases analysed in the strategic planning literature, I have built a representation of the diffusion of the phenomenon in Europe, informed by the cities external influences and internal expectations on the practice. Three different sets of maps show the temporal and spatial distribution of the activity in Europe between the 1985 and the 2015. The result is an introduction to strategic planning mechanisms of institutionalisation, paving the path for a further insight.

INTRODUCTION

The literature on strategic planning has focused on theoretical and analytical studies to recognise different patterns, definitions and objectives of an innovative trend in planning and governance. This attention has its roots in the traditional planning criticalities (changing role of the planner, inadequacy and backwardness of spatial transformation tools and rigidity of the normative approach). At the same time, it is fuelled by the dissatisfaction, rising in those years, about politics and bureaucracy (weak accountability of the public, new roles and responsibilities of the administrations, lack of participative procedures, lack of actors' coordination and of stages for confrontation).

Strategic planning definition, as the methodological and substantial representation of this trend, has evolved in time, embedding several transformations. The process of strategic-plan making has become a different, although complementary, activity that nonetheless can help observing the path of a more diverse and unstable process of paradigmatic change. The literature has underlined the discursive and collaborative efforts linked to strategic planning, though underestimating the importance of the interplay between strategies – and strategic tools – and the local planning institutions (normatives, planning culture, planners' role, decision-making platforms).

My research focus is on the institutional side of the paradigm change in planning, often overlooked by the literature that gives more prominence to strategic plans' characterisation and plan-making procedures. The challenge is to understand the reasons and mechanisms of the spread in Europe (from the '90s until today), a single flow defining different non-independent trials. Although recognising the influence, in the opening of new degrees of freedom for urban planning practices, of the city network organisational logic (Camagni 1993), strategic planning literature, in fact, has not inquired in the ongoing mechanisms of diffusion and transfer of policies. This approach allows me to track the manifestations of this phenomenon. On this background, the articulations of the different cases can be explained on three levels of analysis: the geo-political position; the position of strategic planning in the national institutional context; the local planning culture and economic situation. More than asking "why?" these cities have engaged in strategic planning, I observed the constrictions and pushes that could explain "how?" the inclusion of strategic planning dimensions in their relative planning systems has been realised in a particular way.

In the first part of the article, I briefly reconstruct the innovations coming from strategic planning diffusion, also in respect to traditional planning, distinguishing specific periodisation and definitions. By using a sample of cases, I have realised a map illustrating the use of strategic plans in Europe in the last two decades. To form my sample³, I have collected all the known case studies in the strategic planning

³ My cross section counts 105 administrative entities that have used strategic planning in the period between 1989 and 2015 [see APPENDIX].

literature, which have been somehow included in the narration of what a strategic city, a strategic plan and a strategy are. At the same time, they are part of several European and global networks sharing experiences and objectives related to best practices, usually linked to “strategic behaviours”. From this analysis, I have gathered information about size, rhythm and scale of the strategic planning episodes. The visual representation I have elaborated is a proxy for the spread of the practice in Europe and allows me to open a discussion on the related characters and periodisation. In the second part, I have linked the resulting picture to possible characters of strategic planning transfer, using a comparative description of “nodal” cases pinned on secondary sources.

My contribution ends with the application of four transfer mechanisms to explain strategies and strategic planning diffusion ongoing in Europe.

METHODOLOGY

INTERNATIONALISATION AND POLICY TRANSFER

Global phenomena and discourses developing in these two and a half decades, fostered by the European Union and the other international organisations, have been pointed at as influencing the spread of strategic planning, feeding it with new challenges. The emerging institutionalist approach in planning theory and practice, as Healey (in Healey, Khakee, Motte 1997, but also Salet 2000) underlines, has partly captured the development of the strategic planning concept. It gives importance to the local histories and geographies as much to the external forces, to understand the approach as contingent, although “shaped by wider relations of power” (p.21).

The chaotic post-deindustrialisation, with the pressures for power rescaling and neoliberalisation of real estate policies; cities’ new responsibilities and new resources to plan and construct their trajectories (Brenner, 1999; Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Le Galès, 2006; Savitch & Kantor, 2002; Storper, 2013); the parallel development of the European Union project, with the flourishing of a European stream of research on the cities that encompasses the different economic, political and planning contexts (Dabinett & Richardson, 2005; Hull, 1996): these systemic changes have affected administrations’ choices. Moreover, they have pushed the local institutions to build alliances, increase their relational networks and improve “strategic” decisions (Dabinett & Richardson, 2005; Healey, 2004). The goal is to enhance city’s “resilience”, intertwining local decisions with the possible reactions of the external environment. As Beal and Pinson (Beal & Pinson 2014) affirm, ’80s and ’90s witnessed a proliferation and diversification of cities’ international activities. Collaborative lobbying activities, visiting stays, best practices sharing activities, mayors’ meetings and international events organisation started to qualify transnational networks. These links resulted, according to the authors, in a shift in cities’ international strategies, both in terms of general orientation and in terms of actions.

To work on this hypothesis, one should consider the field of analysis of policy transfer studies. This stream of research assumes the existence of patterns of diffusion of policies, narratives and instruments, with different mechanisms and reasons to explain the interactions among cities. These studies focus on the processes through which the transfer happens in different contexts. According to the synthesis made by Dumoulin and Saurugger (Dumoulin & Saurugger 2010), this process is never linear but it is based on an interdependency between the entities forming the network. The transfer mechanisms are untied from the “sequential and mechanistic” approach; on the contrary, the best policies are used to define problems and to select the legitimate agent and the corresponding scale of action. The analysis of policy (or any socio-political dispositive) diffusion includes the recognition of an exogenous and endogenous dimension of the change. The aim is to avoid the prejudice given by historical facts and show the process of hesitation and mislearning in the diffusion.

Political pressures, historical relations and dependencies, form stronger coercion links; cultural factors application, learning and emulation, are some of the voluntary engines identified by researchers as strong incentives for the adoption of similar policies in different places. The methodology to unveil these mechanisms is still in an ongoing process of definition. In this work, I have used the existence of those engines as a starting hypothesis that allows me to treat strategic planning as a unique set of objects travelling in European cities. "Strategic cities" network, in fact, has become a sort of brand, used by administrations to enhance their image. The link are, nonetheless, not well defined and not necessarily bidirectional. Although not going in depth in the dynamics of these networks, I have tried to define some nodes and come out with possible "textile" characteristics.

I could use the literature on strategic planning as a pattern of different manifestations of the same thing. In particular, I have used strategic planning literature in two ways: to reconstruct the evolving definition of the concept of strategic planning in time as a paradigmatic evolution; to build my sample, collecting the cases of cities that have engaged in strategic planning.

To observe the phenomenon I had to use a certain level of approximation in the definition of the level of analysis, collecting all strategic planning manifestations available. Through the juxtaposition of three set of elements - a sociographic set of maps, showing effective diffusion of traditional strategic plan-making in time, and the reflection on sample cases' normative and geo-economic contexts - eventually allowed me to interpret some common mechanisms for strategic planning diversification and evolution in Europe.

LITERATURE REVIEW

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In the '80s, the adjective "strategic" was linked to the private sector vocabulary and to management activities. Its initial use in public organisations is accompanied by a procedural restructuring of the administrative organisations in the direction of increasing efficiency and internal coordination. This improvement effort, based on a businesslike rationality, is a first answer to the need of redefining the urban policies practice. This ambition follows the Europe-wide processes of counter-urbanisation and the crisis of traditional industry that redefined, at national, regional and local level, the social and economic domains (Gibelli, 1996). These initial strategic planning innovations are linked to the coeval experiments of New Public Management (NPM) – a general re-organisation of bureaucratic and administrative organisation according to private company efficiency-led structures. However, planners start in parallel to link the formula to a holistic approach to spatial planning (Albrechts, 2004). This point of view signs a definitive detachment of the adjective "strategic" from procedural and organisational techniques at bureaucratic level and declares its intermingling with the spatial planning discipline. In this sense, Albrechts observes a revival of strategic planning at the end of the last century, late in the 1990s. The enlargement of urban agendas marks a return to a more literal "strategic thinking" (intrinsic in spatial planning), fundamental in order to fulfil the new role and responsibilities that cities have to cover. These new duties range from the enhancement of local economic self-sufficiency to the taking over the management of environmental challenges to, eventually, assuming new responsibilities to contrast land exploitation. Contemporary expectations on cities are usually summarised referring to the sustainable development concept, the uncontested protagonist of strategic planning approaches.

So-called strategic plans have an important role in this change. Gibelli (1996) and Martinelli (2005) use a distinction between a first and second generation of plans. The first includes the comprehensive plans (coming from US and UK experiences), in which a de-regulative and business-like component (with tools like SWOT analysis and financial plans) prevails, giving new impulse to big interventions of urban re-valorisation. From the 90s, second generation plans function as a general framework for sectoral policy agendas, with the main objective to build shared visions among stakeholders.

The research in between these two characterisations contains many other nuances of the practice. To enter the discussion, it is useful to focus on the points of contact between the traditional planning and the strategic spatial planning, as they are developing in these years.

STRATEGIC PLAN AND STRATEGIC PLANNING IN EUROPE

The physical and spatial contribution of strategic planning is usually recognised in the production of integrated representations. The recognition of strategic areas and systems of the city often matches with the re-elaboration of the territorial scale for different actions integration. The strategic plan is the document in which the governance actors develop these representations and main objectives and gather expectations about desired futures. The main steps further and the main interventions are expressed in the form of a development narrative – the strategy. So conceived, the functional borders between the strategic plans and the traditional spatial plans stand up to examination. The spatial agenda represents just one of the many sectors (together with the cultural, social, environmental and economic ones) interested by the strategy suggestions. The traditional planning keeps its normative and strictly spatial concern. Nonetheless, in certain European experiences in these years, the traditional plans start to embed the strategies as an introduction for their recommendations. At the same time, the strategic planning characters – the flexibility between planning and implementation phases, the discursive approach, and the participative modalities in plan-making – have gained institutional recognition through their fragmented application in statutory tools. On the other side of the relationship, the term “plan”, used to refer to strategic documents, has eased, in some cases, an identification of the strategic plan with the possible new plan for the city. The resulting hybrids have developed, in more or less formal solution, within national and local traditions and have entered the hierarchies of planners’ and governments’ tools. In this sense, as Mantysalo underlines (Mantysalo et al. 2015) strategic planning is not a codified method or instrument, with specific aims and characters, but is related to the managing of the existent planning tools⁴. This late interpretation does not recognise only the procedural change but underlines its asymptotic character: the strategic “way to do things” does not reach for a determined model and set of goals, but rounds off a betterment of the practice in several ways according to the contingent needs and resources.

A PARADIGM CHANGE

This tool-related drift in the practice has matched with the already mentioned discussion contained in the spatial planning literature. The struggling with administrative anachronisms (rigidity, clientelism) and the will of introducing more degrees of freedom in the planning process has pushed planners to search for effective scales of intervention, fostering the integration of policies and resources.

⁴ “Strategic planning does not reside at a certain level of the statutory planning hierarchy; it is about managing strategically the use of the planning hierarchy itself.[...] the strategic character of plans themselves, whether “strategic” or “statutory”, is not key, since [...] strategies do not “live” inside them. What is crucial is the ability to bring the capacity of strategic creativity and judgment to our everyday planning work and related interaction. In such conditions we can find ways of using our planning instruments strategically” (Mantysalo et al. 2015, pp.180-181).

Analysing the terminology and toolbox of planners, “acting strategically” and having a “strategy” are not novelties in planning, but its late interpretation can be read on the forefront of an argumentative turn in the discipline (Fischer, Forester 1993, Hajer and Wagenaar 2003). As we have said, in the realm of planning, intended as the management of the physical city acting through “things” – objects, buildings, norms, procedures, instruments (Beauregard 2012) – the strategy can be intended as a discursive construction (Healey 1993, Vaara, Sorsa, Pälli 2010). Formulating strategies helps in the selection of these “things” and puts them in order of importance in respect to an envisioned state of the city. In this way, the concept of strategy in spatial planning should help combine the heterogeneous expectations of the different actors, working as a “boundary object” (Balducci 2015). The related objectives, as well as the needs expressed in the integrated agendas, become the outcome of a compromise between private actors and public government. The work of planners as technicians should, therefore be limited; meanwhile, the political, argumentative, communicative and visionary dimensions of their work are prioritised. This collaborative process, although normally managed by the public local administration, often crosses the procedural limits of public decision-making activities and intersects many possible combinations of power balance.

The role that strategies have in determining those equilibria in planning activity is emphasised when observed through the lens of contemporary planning hybridisation. The differences at the level of national regulations, related to intervention scales and tools, are partly overcome when trending bits and pieces of procedure, best practices, narratives and slogans are imported or exported – a phenomena happening in planning as much as in the realm of politics and economics. The contribution to the change is heterogeneous and unsettled, related to the efforts of actors in transferring and elaborating the contents.

These considerations allow the recognition of strategic planning as a possible change in the paradigm of planning. The first argument for this reading is the inherent representation of the problem – the “need” of change – that the strategic planning experiences contain. A need of change that is also presented in European Union statements and has its base on the global and neoliberal economic pressures and in the related discourses. This attention elevates a reflection on planning to the scale of an economic and political response. It is a change in the “stage” of the planning action and it is fundamental to recognise the supporting structure.

The second argument of this interpretation is given by the active creation, through networks of best practices diffusion, university courses, assessment reports and informal meetings, of methodologies and examples – specific procedures and specific cities (for instance: Barcelona, Lyon, Turin). Those references multiply and fix coexisting features of the practice, underlying the selection process that the paradigm undergoes.

The third and last argument in the definition of the strategic planning as a change in the paradigm is, in fact, the issue of the problematisation, or re-problematisation, of the urban sphere. The specific reasons and aims of urban strategic planning travel as well among cities and the selection happening at local level is complementary to that at the European level. Paradigms deal, by definition, with solvable problems: the embracing of strategic planning method implies therefore the depicting of which problems planning shall solve.

A SOCIOGRAPHIC READING OF THE DIFFUSION

GEOGRAPHIC DIFFUSION

To date this evolution, I have used the date of adoption of a strategic document as indicative of the engagement of the city in the process, although, it has to be considered a very instrumental proxy. Literature on strategic planning, in fact, despite broadening the definition of its object of study, has continued to use, as empirical manifestations, strategic plan-making processes and documents.

Evenly, according to the sources, I have collected cases of cities that have “engaged” in strategic planning, but do not have a proper strategic plan. In other cases, the cities had started the process without being capable of carrying it on.

My collection of cases dates the appearing of the strategic planning “symptoms”⁵ at the 1989 Barcelona’s first strategic plan approval [FIGURE 1 a-b]. In the map, different frames of the paradigm in motion are recognisable – as Mazza says (Mazza 2004), the strategic plan is a moment of “suspension” of the strategic planning process. According to my set of case studies, strategic planning has spread from the north-west of Europe – initially in the UK and France, then Holland, Belgium and Spain in the ‘90s, then Germany and Italy – toward the rest of Europe, reaching more recently to the East European countries [FIGURE 3]. Observing the time series, we can infer that the majority of the selected administrations has adopted strategic plans in the period between 2000 and 2010, with a peak in 2006. The “rhythm” in the diffusion is fluctuating. Before 1990, only a few experiments were ongoing, followed, in the next five years, by a doubled number of similar, neighbour cities. In the first decade of the 2000s, then, a broader diffusion is visible, including the majority of cases. More than twice the number of plans approved in the previous decade spread in new countries and started to consolidate in Italy, Germany and the Balkans, with some cases, in the period 2000-2005, in Eastern European capitals. In 2005-2010, and in the following recent years, slightly fewer cities started the process, but many of those that had already one, or more, strategic plans produced updates. Obviously, this is valid the more we observe earlier adopters. These updates usually concern revisions of the plan or the production of parallel documents, with different normative weights or dedicated to a specific area of management. Barcelona, Cambridge, Bruxelles and, later, London, have approved more than three strategic documents, meanwhile the majority of the cities – especially the Spanish ones – have had between two and three plans. Another reason explaining the updates is the change of scale of the city’s administration, or rather of the government tier in charge of producing the plan – it has happened, for instance, in Barcelona, where the local government shifted from an urban body to a metropolitan one. Several plans are realised by the metropolitan, or “urban region” authority – Lyon, Paris or London -, or by departmental organs – for

⁵ The literature on strategic planning has often used the starting moment of strategic plan-making process to indicate the engaging of an administration with the practice, but this option was not available for all the cities of my sample.

instance in the UK, Germany and Switzerland. Sometimes, the scale of the envisioned actions crosses the administrative borders of influence and requests the collaboration of different governments or of multiple governments' tiers. This collaboration is usually realised through the enhancement of a specific policy platform. In all the cases, the administration of the central municipality has a primary role in leading and managing the process of strategies transfer to the subordinated implementation tools.

Because of these oscillations, there is not a unique scale of reference for the cities. According to their core size⁶, the sample of cities can be divided as follow (excluding the 12 regions, meaning the 9% of the total):

- 19 below 50.000 (15%)
- 20 between 50.000 and 100.000 (15%)
- 21 between 100.000 and 250.000 (16%)
- 18 between 250.000 and 500.000 (14%)
- 18 between 500.000 and 1 million (14%)
- 22 over 1 million (considering the greater or metropolitan areas) (17%)

[FIGURE 2]

The size division mirrors the actual variety of the European urban pattern⁷ of cities but also the cross-section in the use of strategic planning that invests almost every city capital and can be found everywhere in Europe. If we then sort the metropolitan areas as recognised at European level⁸ [FIGURE 4], those (nowadays) represent around 40% of my sample but only around 10% of those started the process at regional scale, and only around 9% at metropolitan scale. According to the same classification, 30% of the cities exceed one million inhabitants. Nonetheless, some countries, like Germany, Croatia and Sweden, show a concentration of strategic planning efforts in towns and villages, coordinated by the county/province or just initiated with a regional initiative (Saxon-Halten region, for instance). In other areas, like France and Spain, the strategy making spread primarily in big cities. In Germany and Sweden, big cities have engaged in strategy making earlier than smaller towns. In Italy, on the contrary, the extremely thick network that links strategic cities also contains towns which have started their process before the big ones. The main Italian cities – Rome, Naples and partially Milan⁹ – in fact, did not concluded the process of plans adoption. Meanwhile, also

⁶ I have used for my work the data from Eurostat and OECD statistics, and other sources (national statistics) when the data were not available. The data refer to cities and greater cities; according to the EU and OECD definition, "a city" must have, among other features, an urban centre population of more than 50.000 inhabitants.

⁷ I have followed Le Galès identification of "typical" European city as the group between 200.000 and 2 million inhabitants (Le Galès 2006,p.62).

⁸ OCSE data on metropolitan areas. URL: <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CITIES> (last visit: 10/03/2017).

⁹ The Milan comprehensive experimental plan, documento di inquadramento, "Ricostruire la Grande Milano", written by Luigi Mazza in 2000, is not properly a strategic plan, but has influences the development of the city in the last decade. Like for the other metropolitan Italian areas, which institutional status has been defined with a recent decree (Legge Del Rio, 2014), a new strategic plan is in phase of preparation.

because of the incentives given by ad hoc regional decrees, the number of strategic towns is high in Sardinia and Trentino Alto Adige.

The regional cases concentrated in, but not limited to, the north of Europe, account for the different range of duties under the jurisdiction of the regional administrations, depending on the specific country's normative.

From this first observations, it is possible to highlight the persistent (if not growing) usefulness, or either consideration, paid to strategic plans in European cities context and the variety of scales of their applications.

As Mantysalo (Mantysalo 2014) underlines, though, there is a main differentiation of strategic planning tools manifestations (intended not just as plans, but also official reports, development schemes, ideas competitions, etc.) linked to the degree of their formalisation. As said, the opposition to statutory spatial planning has pushed strategic efforts in practice to find their way either modifying existing planning infrastructures, acting on planning dispositives in a more or less incremental way; either constituting an autonomous basis for decision making outside the institutional hierarchy – posing important questions of legitimacy (Mantysalo 2014).

As far as concerns this exploratory work, a state of the art of existing institutionalisation efforts and spaces for strategies formulation in European national planning contexts is useful to further characterise the paradigm's declinations.

NATIONAL INSTRUMENTS HIERARCHIES

In France, the *strategie urbaine* are formulated and listed in the *Schéma de Cohérence Territoriale* (Scot). Scot represents one of the first codifications (in 2000) of the strategic, long-term planning activity, at the administrative and normative level. Actually, French cities represent the first examples of European re-elaboration of strategic planning. At the end of the '90s, following an administrative reform toward devolution and decentralisation, Lyon and Lille started their strategic planning activity. This envisioned a shift in planning from the previous hierarchical approach, in which local administration had to apply central government decisions, toward an institutional process (Motte 1995) based on the cohesion among local actors on territorial representation and economic priorities. In Germany and Austria there is a distinction between the *Strategie Plan* and the *Stadt Entwicklung Konzept* (STEK) (called *Stadt Entwicklung Plan* (STEP) in Vienna and other German cities). STEK and STEP are normative and more traditional instruments, focusing on the spatial and physical context and intended to define the operative actions on the city. This kind of document, though, usually entails participative and consultation processes and has a long-time forecasting approach. We can see it as a first effort in the strategies application, an intermediate level between strategic comprehensive plans and sectoral and operative plans. The Strategie Plans, on the contrary, are integrative plans, less focused on the spatial issues and more brief in the selection of priorities and indicators. Their aim is

communicative, they do not have compulsory powers - meanwhile STEK and STEP are embedded in traditional instruments hierarchy and have normative power.

In the United Kingdom the level concerned with spatial strategies has traditionally been the national one and, since the beginning of the 2000s, the regional one. With the 2011 reform of planning law, though, the regional level has been cancelled, leaving the national government again in charge of proposing spatial policies for the lower level of administration. Consequently, the local levels (metropolitan and non-metropolitan cities, counties and districts) are now in charge of adapting their operative spatial plans to the new directives. The adoption of strategic plans, in this context, is not compulsory but is entrenched in the shift toward localism advocated by the coeval central government coalition. London metropolitan area is an exception: the Greater London Authority requires the city's mayor to periodically formulate a spatial development strategy, updating the London Plan. The Scottish major cities, too, have a specific mandate, from the National Planning Framework for Scotland, to produce a normative strategic development plan.

In Denmark, strategic local planning is embedded in the institutionalised planning since 2000: every municipal council publishes a strategy for municipal planning within the first 2 years of the municipal election period. This includes the municipal council's political strategy for development and selected information about the planning initiatives occurred since the last time the municipal plan was revised. Many municipalities link spatial strategies to propositions on other policy areas, such as business development, culture and health. In Copenhagen, for instance, besides the municipal general strategy, there has been an effort to produce environmental and climate change plans, which reflect and implement the national directives on the topics.

In Spain, the so-called strategic plans are of municipal authority/government concern. They are intended primarily as complementary to traditional spatial plans and regulations. According to the objectives, they can have a more or less comprehensive focus and a flexible scale of territorial intervention, thanks to their guideline dimension. The economic and cultural networking as well can play a role in the determinations of these documents (Zaragoza's plan, for example, regards the municipal area but includes projects of collaboration with South American actors). Regional authority, though, can recognise the need for and suggest the adoption of local strategic plans, especially in the context of infrastructural interventions at regional or inter-municipalities levels.

In Italy, the approach to strategic planning is similar to the Spanish one. Only recently, with del Rio Law (56/2014), the national government has made strategic plans compulsory for metropolitan cities. Moreover, in Italy, the absence of an updated urbanistic national law (the actual one dates back to 1942) has generated several bottom-up variations of the statutory general regulatory plan (the *Piano Regolatore Generale*). The *piano strutturale* and *piano operativo* combination, for instance, entrusts the strategies formulation to the first document, leaving the second in charge of projects specifications and zoning rules.

In the Netherlands, strategic planning showed up, for what concerns our definition, with the outset of its revival at the end of the '80s, changing in form and level of application in time. In the 2008 the strict hierarchy of plans, allowing only the national level to produce key strategies for the other territorial levels, has been removed, with the Dutch Spatial Planning Act, allowing all government tiers to

make their own strategic and structural plans. These documents are binding only for the government in charge and can be assimilated to a political agenda. Lately, Dutch legislation has also introduced the concept of “spatial vision”: “Spatial planning decisions are made at the national, regional and local levels. The spatial visions of the government, provinces and municipalities describe the spatial developments they expect as well as how these developments will be directed or implemented. Spatial visions are policy papers that have replaced the key planning decisions (of the government), the regional plans (of the provinces) and the structure plans (of the municipalities)”¹⁰.

Those variations testify the diverse level of absorption, use and interpretation of the practice, at least at the institutional level. The path of the strategic planning in Europe proceeds as a variegated change in multiple doctrines, facing different planning cultures. The quality of the intertwining depends on the government type, the planning traditions and the political heritage; for these reasons, it is subjected, at the local level, to unstable actors’ networks, to economic pressures and historical events at the structural level. Those dimensions can be exemplified reporting the related information coming from the paradigmatic examples provided by the literature.

SOME PARADIGMATIC EXAMPLES

“Une innovation ou une solution d’action publique n’est pas transférée parce qu’elle est plus efficace ou parce que les acteurs sont dans la recherche d’une plus grande efficacité. C’est dans le cadre d’un processus d’innovation ou de construction de l’action publique que des traductions sont opérées lesquelles peuvent conduire à des changements qui seront ensuite analysés comme plus ou moins efficaces en fonction justement de leur capacité à s’imposer.”¹¹

In this view, the innovations, or policies, or methods, do change in the process of their diffusion. What is missing in the discussion on strategic planning spread is an understanding of which characteristics of the variegated practice persist in local contexts, and which not. It is not about a consequential diffusion, because many acquisitions happen in parallel, but about a complexification and stabilisation of the paradigm in time. A recognition of the causes of its use, especially in earlier cases, is useful when checking the possibilities of filtering in the existing infrastructures. The classic literature on strategic planning recognises a link between the early ’80s examples in the US, like the paradigmatic case of San Francisco, and the European ones. The UK examples share with the American administration the aim to enhance the “effectiveness” of the process, based on cultural and institutional similarities (the liberalist and entrepreneurial approach to local development). On the contrary, the French and the Spanish examples can account for an exchange of

¹⁰ From the Dutch Government website: <https://www.government.nl/topics/spatial-planning-and-infrastructure/contents/spatial-planning-in-the-netherlands> (last visit: 16/06/2017)

¹¹ Dumoulin and Saurugger 2010, p.11.

knowledge and expertise that has produced very diverse outcomes (Camagni 1993).

An Anglo-Saxon approach, in the interpretation and assimilation of the process, is related to the political pressures to restructure the planning activity and devolve/decentralise powers at the local level. The first English examples, like Birmingham and Solihull cases, can still be linked to the tradition of the structural plan, a “plan of messages than of conversations” (Healey 1993), fulfilling an inward and top-down communicative aim direct to citizens and developers. The national government level has still the most representative strategic role, although focusing on specific areas and topics of intervention – in the '80s on the top-down revitalisation of distressed areas, and, later on, on the sustainability issue.

The decentralising pressures, coming from national administrative reforms, though, are happening in parallel in many of the European countries in the period we are analysing, generating problems but also opportunities. As many have observed, the governance shift has happened at different times and degrees in all European countries, where public-private collaborations, in all stages of policy making, gained ground in a dominant neo-liberal economic background. Strategic planning has started to be used at the crossroads of the assimilation of these changes. French cases follow this rationality, passing through different steps of the rescaling process, differently in respect to the well-known UK right parties' reforms of the '80s. Lyon, for instance, being one of the first and most cited examples (see Autran 2008; Booth et al. 2001; Bourdin, Prost 2009), adopts a strategic planning approach in a season of institutional, supra-metropolitan bodies proliferation, aimed at the identification of new territorial scales of action. The particularity of the Lyonnaise case is in the updating of a national, traditional instrument – the *Schema directeur d'agglomération urbaine* (SDAU). The transformation in a modern strategic document for the regional development revolves around the creation of a strong consensus on Lyon's government decisions. The institutional complexity of the public authorities at the metropolitan-regional level and the political and ideological differences among the SEPAL actors (a specific body of locally elected representatives) were respected and balanced in the process. This balance and dialogue has created a myth, an often-cited narrative about the experience. The consensus concerns first the very necessity of revising the SDAU to overcome the economic difficulties that the area is experiencing. The occasion is the transfer of State's responsibilities to the locally elected representatives that use this process of update as a platform to gain electoral support (as it is happening meanwhile in Italy). One of the principle was therefore to assure in the envisioned policies the minimum legal constraints for the private developers. The outcome is a pragmatic economic-led document, elaborated with the strong influence of engineers. Its main aim is the positioning of the city in the national and international background according to future development possibilities. Concise, strictly economic measures are directed in favour of private enterprises, with the goal to mask the reality of the economic decline of the city and to replace the latent negative factors with positive opportunities. The challenge is to attract innovative activities in an international economic context. The SDAU, when it was approved in 1992, was not seen any more as a reflection on the purpose of planning or as a response to administrative mutations, but as a boost to the internationality of the city. The notion of European metropolis or Eurocity (soon mimicked in Lille) was

then introduced for the first time, with the detailed definition of activities, infrastructure and services of national and international level. Cross-border actors were the main receivers of the lyonnaise strategies; prestige and fame beyond the national border became the main goal. The European metropolis was a real “consensual myth” (Davezies & Prudhomme 1989, Lavigne 1988, quoted in Motte, Dubois 2008), which permitted to Lyon move from the traditional orientation toward Paris to a new relation with the other European metropolises, notably, Frankfurt, Milan and Barcelona (Motte, Dubois 2008). This early approach had its influence in the melange of the purely economic strategic planning with an entrepreneurial role of the local representatives, with the changing scale of the European city and with the consensus building among different actors. The strengthening of the conservative actors’ power and the link with the neoliberal attitude that we recognise in these cases is mediated by parallel attempts to include a social narration of solidarity in strategic planning efforts and the recognition of territorial unbalances. In contexts of social democratic governments and strong spatial planning traditions, for instance, the intermingling of these trends with the local culture has been variegated.

Early situations, like Marks Kommun, in Sweden (Hull 1996, Healey, Khakee, Motte 1997, Healey, Khakee et al. 1999) and Barcelona, in Spain (Marshall 2000, Monclús 2003 among others), show several pressures at work. Although the degree of autonomy of the municipalities at urban level was already high in these countries at the beginning of the '90s, generating similar expectations as in the UK and France cases, different pushes and opportunities arose in parallel. The need for an economic reorganisation stimulated a reflection on the spatial and welfare policies development and on the rationality of public investments.

The massive use of strategic planning in Spanish cities can be, in this light, intended as a booster for city marketing and tourist economy. The end of the '80s is a period of important economic and industrial reorganisation, which follows the post-Francoist political and social reconstruction. But the case of Barcelona, probably the most recurring inspiration for strategic planning in European cities, is also the best example to show the double-faceted meaning, the misinterpretations and the blurring definition of strategic planning (Casellas 2006; Degen & García 2012; Marshall 2000; Monclús 2003). As Montaner observes, the strategic planning in Barcelona can be defined as “a new shared space to systematise the cooperation between public and privates” (Montaner, Alvarez, Muxi 2012, p. 46), showing the overcoming power of market and elites in respect to the interests of universities, associations and citizens. The innovations in traditional spatial planning and in strategic planning, in fact, had two different paths in Barcelona. The success in terms of social goals, citizens’ participation, wide bottom-up support and physical outcomes of the first cannot be considered without acknowledging the changing fabric of landowners, business and financial actors and corporate entities. Their increasing influence on the city is recognisable in the strategic plan-making characteristics. The goals of strategic planning – the enlargement of the area of action, the inclusion of new actors, the introduction of new planning topics and priorities – mirror the need for more resources to finish the 1992 Olympics Games infrastructures construction. The presence of these private actors (also included in the Games organisation) represents an element of control to the newly settled socialist administration. The strategic plan, in fact, drafted by prominent

economists, is the outcome of national and local elites' collaboration, a mixture between the old regime and the new layout of the national and regional governments. Not surprisingly, the majority of the projects rejected, because of the speculative risk, in the transition period from the Francoist regime, reappeared as "strategic" suggestions for the Olympic Games preparation (Acebal in Montaner, Alvarez, Muxi 2012, p. 53). Hence, although elements of originality are visible in the management of planning instruments and spatial projects, it is possible to affirm that the main "innovations" in concertation initiatives and public-private economic collaborations reflect the intertwining of path-dependant choices and foreign examples (from the UK and the US, in particular). Concertation is used to face the difficulties of a newly formed semi-federal state, with shared concurring powers; public-private partnerships, instead, are useful to overcome scarcity of resources and entrepreneurial inefficiency of the local administration. Contrary to strategic planning expectation, the practice has been a mean for the empowerment of economic elites and for the representation of private sector's enlarged interests (Acebal in Montaner, Alvarez, Muxi 2012), in minor part also in the further experiences of Barcelona strategic plan making. Nonetheless, the model of Barcelona's strategic planning has overlapped with the successful spatial and architectural results, the outcome of Spanish planners spatial planning efforts.

This detour on Barcelona's example clarifies its role as a "pioneer borrower", as Marshall defines it (Marshall 2000, p. 312), from the North European and US ideas, but also as an example for the following Spanish, South American and Mediterranean cases. The UK Labour party itself uses the case as inspiration, "seeking reform of local government (for example via directly elected mayor)" (Marshall 2000, p. 299) – although, as Marshall continues, Barcelona has never actually had a directly elected mayor: a typo "in cross-cultural learning and mislearning" (Ibidem).

Italian government shares the UK praise of direct local elections and in 1993 enacts an electoral reform in this direction. The reform appears fundamental for the next steps of assimilation of strategic planning in the country. In the new political setting, in fact, the strategic plan is proposed as the "mayor's plan", a political agenda including an inherent break with the previous administration. The reference to Barcelona, in particular, is omnipresent. At the spatial level, the network of practitioners, mainly architects, welcome the new freedom and new possible basin of resources that increase the expectations on spatial agendas. The discussion on collaboration and participation, in particular, emerges in Turin, an economically declining city, with a political arena affected by a socialist/elitist polarised history (see Pinson 2002). Turin becomes the Italian blueprint for strategic planning, getting inspiration from Barcelona's experience in event organisation. The occasion to produce a strategic plan, in fact, is the preparation of the Winter Olympic games of 2006, a combination that generated a long-lasting link between strategic planning and city's eventification. Nonetheless, Turin experience should be valued especially for its communicative planning achievements. The goal has been to elaborate a positive representation of the city that is far from the industrial image and the shrinking population reality and, instead, is able to take advantage of the emerging alternative urban culture. Of course, the example of Lyon (with which the city shares economic investments and a fast train international project) matters in Turin choices. It generates expectations on the role for

European medium-sized cities and has a special appeal in Italy, where administrative decentralisation reforms are ongoing.

Turin communicative planning approach is shared also by the City of Vienna, a city with a similar political tradition (after the Second World War), and with the same need to reconstruct its international image. Also due to the corporative character of planning in the Austrian capital, the strategic plan production becomes an integrative activity of monitoring and influencing socialist long-standing government (Hamedinger 2007). Strategic planning is, in fact, the initiative of a conservative party councillor, in the first coalition government of the city. The plan-making process happens in 1995-2000 period, in parallel with the writing of the new spatial development plan – one of the traditional tools of Austrian planning, a sort of comprehensive planning document. Despite a clear spatial strategy explained in the new development plan, an economic and political leverage is missing. The will to become an example and a guide for Eastern-European cities, and the pressures by Western European institutions and investors stress the need for the metropolisation and commercialisation of Vienna's image.

The spatial contribution of strategic planning is therefore conceived to be strongly evocative, including an enlargement of the territorial influence across the region's and country's borders (Musil 2009, Novy et al. 2013). This operation uses both historical references, both infrastructural and commercial existing and forthcoming networks, fostering inter-regional agreements and several participations to European projects. In these initiatives, Vienna is always the leading partner. Nonetheless, the creation of this strong and shared representation is also part of the reconstruction of the local government legitimacy and a mode to de-politicise – or re-politicise, in respect to development expectations – certain issues and behaviours. The dynamic of change that the strategic planning and the strategy making processes shall produce, hence, passes in Vienna through the reinterpretation of its past – practice that many Eastern European cities had to engage with, to align with the overwhelming European dynamics (also Budapest and Prague, for instance, are early adopters of strategic planning practices).

DIFFUSION CHANNELS AND STRATEGIC PLANNING CONTENTS

Until the second half of the '80s, cities were practically inexistent in European governance (Le Galès, 2006, p. 68). In the 2000s, the institutionalisation of Europe as a governance tier has given cities the possibilities to inscribe their activities and achievements in the European context. The European discourses and policies, through the structural funding, started to exercise their arbitration on the urban issues activities of the Union's states. The funding system rewards the formulation of strategies and policies for sustainable development (for instance, the Agenda 21 funds) and envisioning cross-border, transnational and interregional collaborations (since 1997 structural funds tranche onward).

The imposition of international pressures on urban regulations passes also for the EU supportive statements in reference to specific strategic planning processes and contents. Newly introduced, or reposed, priorities, like the environmental protection, the infrastructures provision, the polycentric development and the regeneration of lagging behind areas – like Italian southern cities or former Eastern Germany areas – appear in strategic plans in a discursive form, without a real assessment of their mutual compatibility. Moreover, the use of indicators, thresholds, borders, expected goals in figures and long-run deadlines introduces a level of “soft” planning that has developed the idea of strategic planning as a non-normative step of decision making. This character is in line with European Union documents style. Also according to Stead and Cotella (Stead & Cotella 2011), the innovations at the level of spatial planning (in Italy, in their example, but also in many other countries, according to different aims given to strategic planning) are linked more to the voluntary adoption of the European discourses and instruments through practices at the local level, than to the national legislation updating. The supra-national level, thus, with the progressive formation and later enlargement of the European Union, participates actively in these changes, introducing a discursive and methodological link between the practices.

As already said, strategic planning has been linked in its contents to the all-encompassing sustainable development discourse. The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) guidelines affirm to support “sustainable urban development through strategies to set out integrated actions” and that “sustainable urban development should be undertaken through integrated territorial investments”. Similar words can be found in the Leipzig Charter, which recommends “integrated development programs” for the “pursuing of strategies for updating the physical environment” of the cities; as well as in the priorities for the Urban Development Network, which rewards “innovativeness” and “transferability” of the solutions for urban sustainability policies. Although strategic planning is not always directly proposed, the crossover between strategic planning narrations and European ideas is constant.

An insight in diffusion theories informs us that it is not possible to explain strategic behaviours as direct acquisitions (or transposition) of EU dictates but they embed an exchange channel between local agendas and EU policies and programs; actually,

Janin Rivolin and Faludi (Janin Rivolin & Faludi 2005), affirm: “European spatial planning can also take shape by passing through the prism of progressive and complex changes in planning practices” (ib. p. 49). Increasingly important is the role of city networks, promoted by the EU to foster territorial cohesion (Scantamburlo 2013). Usually these connections originate from bottom up initiatives and have a role in the spreading of governance trends and in sharing decision-making skills. Their efficacy is valued in the ability to transform in best practices the principles and strategies elaborated at urban level. EU started in the '90s to support these networks (for instance with the Council of European Municipalities and Regions, with Metrex and other initiatives), facilitating contacts and partnerships. Among the goals of these networks, there is the enhancement of administrative efficiency and multi-actors cooperation and the fostering of economic growth, competitiveness and sustainability principles. It is easy to see the forming of city networks as effective in the diffusion of strategic planning, a tool used for the spreading of the very similar narratives and approaches.

For instance, the parallel reorganisation of political influences and commercial relationships, in the years that followed the fall of the Iron Curtain, gives a sound explanation for the appearing of strategic planning initiatives in Eastern Europe in the second half of the '90s and later. The tendencies which had previously spread in Western Europe arrive loaded with the successful models' heritage (of Barcelona, Bilbao, Lisbona, Lille, for instance) and with strong expectations of social and economic renaissance (Altrock 2006; Scott & Kühn 2012; Tsenkova 2007). In particular, this happens for medium-to-big-size cities – in the majority of the cases, in a process of re-establishing their size at the metropolitan level and their influence according to economic and cultural innovations – forming a stable network in these years. One can read in the strategic documents their aspiration of turning from medium-sized cities, with only national influence, into economic drivers at the international level (see the examples of Barcelona, Glasgow, Brno, Turin). The image and traditional-historical heritage of the European cities, fundamental in the political and economic evolution, and, at the same time, fragile in respect of new emerging intercontinental networks of metropolises, participates in the reorganisation of the urban economic base: the “best performing cities” manage to mix city marketing and industrial and service sectors innovation, research and university funding, mega events organisation and green economy.

This climb toward a new, recognisable status in international economy has been challenged by the several economic crises happening in these decades. Also, the strategic planning that in its first examples was linked to big investments in physical restructuring, changed its rationale toward a more considered approach. According to Albrechts (Albrechts 2006), strategic plans and spatial projects never had a specific, consequential relation. They are both part of an intermingling process of decision making, but the economic feasibility of the planned projects rarely passed for a precise and scheduled “business plan” contained in the strategic document. Therefore, it has been possible to channel into strategic plans the reshaping of the expectations about the city's growth with the appropriation of new narratives, of “life quality” and “energy transition”. In Central-North-European cities, like Amsterdam, Copenhagen and Stockholm, the rise of new economic possibilities, linked to the green economy or to the austerity trend, is used for consolidating an already successful image, insisting on well-developed capacities of

the city. At the same time, strategies communication is applied in these contexts to path the way for future investors (Copenhagen strategic Climate Plan is translated in English, Chinese and Russian), depicting a solid and up-to-date economy. Nonetheless, urban strategies, existing also outside strategic plans and strategic narratives and intermingling with political agendas, have invested large urban projects of a persisting role in actualising the declared objectives, especially when confronting the wider electoral arena. Physical projects, in many cases, have been the proof of the strategies “success”, although the effects of strategic planning on urban contexts is presented as going beyond the efficiency enhancement. When narratives, problems or instruments that strategic planning is carrying are useful for urban stakeholders political scheme, then the opportunity arises to engage in the practice and bring forward a set of updates. While the narrative of change and innovation is hardly usable without a future oriented instrument, which avoids acting on the contested present, on the other side strategies raise the discussion about the best practice, proper level of planning or appropriate argumentative arena for the development of the city. One can eventually affirm that strategic planning enacts a pluralisation of the processes that characterise non-strategic planning (Beauregard 2015, p. 32), reinforcing the interplay between the act of planning and its operative instruments.

MECHANISMS OF DIFFUSION

At this level of the analysis, some mechanisms of transfer and diffusion of the concepts, instruments and problems framed by the strategic planning stand out from the heterogeneity of the examples. Borrowing the basic diffusion theory categorisation (Dolowitz, Marsh 2000; Marsh, Sharman 2009), we can distinguish in our analysis four mechanisms:

1-2. Learning/Receiving: despite being at the extreme ends of the transfer mechanisms “scale”, in respect to their degree of voluntarism or coercion of the absorption, the two parallel levels of learning and receiving intermingle when observed in the local governments’ actions. A voluntary and functional mechanism seems to act along the development of cities’ institutions. Cities start to emulate the others’ practices, perceived as more efficient than the local ones (Marsh and Sharman 2009). At the same time, in some countries, more evident is the coercive power of international organisations, acting directly via the funding conditions or indirectly, passing previously for national government regulations. Moreover, after the institution of EU funds and projects for urban development at the beginning of the 2000s (Urbact, UDN, ERDF funded networks), the access to communitarian resources started to be related to the inclusion of new topics and practices in local urban planning. The strategic efforts became an instrument of competitiveness. Nonetheless, the heterogeneity of strategic behaviours and narratives derive also from local entrepreneurialism. Meanwhile, the coercive power of central governments acts on procedures and is limited to the imposition of the use of the instruments. At the same time, international context influence is registered and

reinterpreted when it meets spaces of autonomy, related to the contents and the form of the process. While, in Europe, a “soft” coercion from the international bodies generates a devolution of responsibilities from the central state, a territorial legitimisation rising from the local government is ongoing, generating urban governance hybrids.

3. Mimicking: Along the evolution of strategic planning practice, a change, in the subject (and object) of planning, is visible, within the transfer of symbolic and normative factors. At first, medium cities and regional governments, depending on the national planning tradition, engage in strategic planning to find their own role at the national and the international level and thus balance vertical political powers. Then, the trend sees an overlapping with the metropolitan status claim. At the same time, the literature underlines a shift in the main topics and challenges of the efforts. These changes see the interplay of different actors and competencies reflecting cities’ status evolution. As the learning mechanism, mimicking is connected to the acquisition of legitimacy, but it insists more on the symbolic value of the strategic planning as a progressive practice (therefore used in the most “successful” cities) than on its real efficiency. The effects of the practice are secondary to the discursive elaborations around the city, especially if observed at the level of same size cities or same country cities. The spread, in this sense, may relate on the soft character of the strategic plan, its rhetorical force and marketing appeal. The copying trend, though, risks making the strategic effort irrelevant for the development of the paradigm, partially or totally excluding the selection stage.

4. Filtering: European Union influence is visible, at first sight, in the parallel adoption of strategic planning methods by certain cities, especially in Eastern Europe and in the Balkans. It can be recognised as a mechanism of “soft” coercive transfer as much as a voluntary “negotiating” transfer (Dumoulin, Saurugger 2010). As we have said, the influence of the EU in cities behaviour is nowadays partly based on the competition for financial funds; in the period after the fall of the Iron Curtain, though, the social identities, more than the institutional conditions or the discursive appeal, were underlined in the processes of strategic planning local integration. In defining priorities, representations and models, these processes have balanced the top-down impositions.

These mechanisms represent at the same time the causes and the modalities by which strategic planning travels around in the European cities. All of them can coexist and interact in the single case, although in different measure. Underlying the existence and multiplicity of these mechanisms helps in the reconstruction of the paradigm path and sheds a light on the meaning and direction of strategic planning in its contemporary uses. The more the transfer is selective, the more the innovation filters in the tangles of the planning and governance local practices. Nonetheless, the coercive or mislearning mechanisms do generate some consequences, blocking, steering or slowing down the path of the strategic planning practice.

CONCLUSIONS

The initial aim of this research has been to narrate the development of the strategic planning practice and to reorganise part of the literature on the topic. This aim has been pursued formulating a sociography of this planning phenomenon, as it spread in Europe since the '90s.

I have used several concepts to reconnect the practical experiences, as told by the literature, with a selective analysis of the geographic, institutional and sociopolitical context. I have underlined the importance accorded by planners to discourses and argumentative practices in this period. I have further used the paradigm concept and the policy transfer approach to identify the modalities and mechanisms for studying the diffusion.

My observations highlight the fact that strategic planning introduction in European cities coincides with a period of overall change in their administration. In particular, it is introduced in moments of changing aims, political renovation or economic crisis as a possible process to manage the innovation. In this sense, the strategic plan is a tool to write down those emergencies, while the strategic plan-making procedures are a way to get in contact with emergent governance actors. The change is therefore previous or parallel to strategic planning introduction, before being a consequence; the adoption of a strategic plan or the action on the existing regulations and instruments represent a voluntary endorsement of the government to the cause of planning update and policy making re-consideration.

However, the modification of planning institutions are long and demanding processes that deserve a strong commitment by the political government and a favourable window of opportunity coming from the contingent alignment of different public tiers and private stakeholders interest. The importance of these basic conditions allows a distinction between different kinds of strategic planning approaches. On one side, one can distinguish the existence of long processes of institutionalisation of new tools, and updating of existing ones, in which the normative effort comes contingently to the new needs of the city.

On the other side, an unofficial and more based on argumentative turn and cooperative efforts has take the lead on the typical economic based strategic plan, substituting in contents and modalities an equally unbinding, propositive and informal agenda for the city. Aside this first major difference, we have underlined several mechanisms of diffusion as the cause for explaining different intermingling with existing planning infrastructures.

Nonetheless, to really measure different institutionalisation and permeation of strategic planning principles in urban planning in Europe, a further inquiry is necessary. In the further steps of my research, I will use this first reconstruction to guide my in-depth analysis of some cases of strategic planning and strategy formulation, to observe how this filtering evolves at the level of implementation tools. The final aim, as suggested at the beginning, is to observe more closely the innovative possibilities of strategic planning as a method of argumentative selection that deals with contingency of political relations and with institutional changes. The hypothesis of this paper, eventually related to the transfer policies, allows me to use the background of cities' network to build a sound comparative work.




FIGURE 1a – Cities and regions chronological representation.




FIGURE 1b – Cities and regions chronological representation.




FIGURE 3 – Strategic cities according to their size (in number of inhabitants).




FIGURE 4 - Strategic cities according to date of adoption of strategic documents.




FIGURE 5 – Metropolitan areas among the strategic cities.

APPENDIX

TABLE. 1 Inhabitants, area and strategic planning characteristics of the analyzed cities.

City	City pop 2012	City pop 2000	City pop 1990	Metrop op 2010	Region NUTS 3/2	Reg pop 2014	Reg pop 2000	Reg pop 1990	Nation	Area City Km ²	Area Metro Km ²	Planning process	Planning horizon	Name of strategic plan
Ada	n.	1879 ₂	n.	n.	n.	n.	n.	n.	Serbia	229	n.	2004-		
Amsterdam	755605	731288	695162	2360958	Noord-Holland	2741369	2518354	2376015	Netherlands	n.	2819	1999-2003		
Athens	799979	789166	772072	3563607	Attiki	3863763	3871527	3533023	Greece	n.	1656	2011	2021	
Barcelona	1620943	1496266	1707286	3675206	Cataluña	7416237	6216683	6054382	Spain	n.	1362	1994		Pla Estratègic Barcelona 2000
												2010	2020	Pla estratègic metropolità de Barcelona – Vision 2020 (PEMB)
												1988/1990/2003/2010		Plan Estratégico Económico y Social de Barcelona / Pla Estratègic Barcelona 2000 (poi agglomerament) Plan Estratègic 1994, 1999) / Plan estratègic metropolità barcelona (updates in 2007, 2010, 2014)
Bari	313213	322080	342309	577899	Puglia	4090266	4034887	4013227	Italy	n.	754	2006	2015	Piano strategico BA2015
Benkovac	n.	9786	n.	n.	Jadranska Hrvatska	1405908	n.	n.	Croatia	n.	n.			
Bergen	263762	232989	212944	n.	Vestlandet	875475	785966	754010	Norway	n.	n.	1995		Strategic Plan for Economic Development in Bergen (Bergen Kommune 1995)
Berlin	3501872	3382169	3465748	4374708	/Brandenburg	3421829	2601207	2641152	Germany	n.	6176	2006/2014		
Bilbao	351629	349972	369839	997311	Pais Vasco	2167166	2070279	2114894	Spain	41,25	1141	1989-1993		Bilbao 2010. La Estrategia, 2001

Birmingham UDp*	1073045	978200	1004500	1884199	Birmingham UDP/West Midlands	2791752/5687063	5270792	5245484	UK	267,8	1454	1990 - 2015	
Bologna	380635	372644	404378	745255	Emilia Romagna	4446354	n.	n.	Italy	n.	2036	2012 - 2014	il PIANO STRATEGICO METROPOLITANO DI BOLOGNA un senso al futuro, Una visione condivisa
Brno	378327	n.	n.	n.	Moravia	n.	n.	n.	Czech Republic	n.	2359	2007	Brno City Strategy
Bruxelles	1159448	964405	964385	2485480	Region de Bruxelles	1183841	959318	964385	Belgium	n.	3265	1995, 2002 / 1996-2005 / 2009-2013	plan régional de développement (PRD)/ Plan communal de développement / plan régional de développement durable (PRDD)
Budapest	1712210	1791098	2016774	2846464	Közép-Magyarország	2965413	2845949	2966523	Hungary	n.	6056	1991- (2002?)	"The Program of Mayor Demszky" 1991
Cagliari	149575	168470	204237	n.	Sardegna	1663859	163853	1637940	Italy	n.	n.	2005 / 2007	Piano area vasta / piano strategico metropolitano
Cambridge * region	123867	109100	106700	n.	Cambridgeshire/ East Anglia	635614 / 2433593	549475 / 2165948	499300/2051184	UK	n.	3054	1989 / 1991/1995/2000 / 2003/ 2004 ...	County Structure Plan (CCC) 1989/ East Anglia Regional Planning Guidance 6 (RPG6) 1991/ Structure Plan 1995/ RPG6 2000/ CCC 2003/Regional Spatial Strategy (RSS) 2004

Cascais	n.	170659	153294	n.	Area Metropolitana de Lisboa	2807525	2624511	n.	Portugal	97,4	n.	1996	
												(2013) - 2015	Piano Director Municipal de Cascais
Comuni Copparesti*	n.	n.	n.	n.	Provincia Ferrara/Emilia Romagna	355101/4446354	344933/	363405/	Italy	420	n.	2002 - 2010	Piano Strategico 1909-2009. Sei campanili, ventisei piazze, un'utopia realizzabile, 2004
Cosenza	69065	n.	n.	n.	Calabria	1980533	2028592	2080660	Italy	n.	n.	2009	Piano Strategico Cosenza-Rende e Area Urbana
Cottbus	99974	105954	n.	n.	Brandenburg	2453180	2601207	2641152	Germany	n.	n.	1997 - 2002	City development concept 2010
Cuneo	n.	n.	n.	n.	Piemonte	4436798	4225083	4324173	Italy	119,67	n.	2003 - 2006	Cuneo 2020. Il Piano Strategico della città e del suo territorio. (2006)
Dessau	85488	94608	n.	n.	Sachsen-Anhalt	2276736	264873	2964971	Germany	n.	n.	2010	Dessau-rosslau. Urban core areas - landscape zones
												2011	Integriertes Stadtentwicklungskonzept Dessau-rosslau 2025
Dublin	516255	467788	450254	1650202	Southern and Eastern Ireland	3372718	2781560	n.	Ireland	n.	4767	1997/1999	Dublin Docklands Development Authority Masterplan (1997) / Dublin city development plan (1999)

Göteborg	45928	n.	n.	n.	n.	Thüringen	2160840	2449082	2683877	Germany	n.	n.	end of 1990	
Groningen	175000	n.	n.	n.	n.	Groningen	n.	n.	n.	Netherlands	83,74	n.	1977-2001	2030
Hälsjöfors	6880	n.	n.	n.	n.	Öststrållansverige	1605347	1490348	1445640	Sweden	1157	n.		in process
Hannover	525875	515001	523627	1222773	n.	Hannover district	2099079	2152759	2032401	Germany	2291	3090	1996-2004	Regionale Runderordnungsprogramme 1996 (expired in 2004)
Harlow DDP*	81944	n.	n.	n.	n.	Essex	1759186	1602472	1541122	UK	720	n.	1990 - 2015	
Hordaland County*						Vestlandet	875475	785966	754010	Norway	n.	n.	1992-95	Strategic economic plan for Hordaland County Hordaland Fylkeskommune 1991
Jesi	40554	n.	n.	n.	n.	Marche	1553138	n.	n.	Italy	107,73	n.	2003-2004	Piano strategico Jesi (2004)
Karlskoga	29874	n.	n.	n.	n.	Svealand	n.	n.	n.	Sweden	513	n.	2011	2020
København	559440	495699	464773	1989871	n.	Hovedstaden	1749405	n.	n.	Denmark	n.	4083	1989 - 1995	
													2007	Finger plan 2007
													2010	
Köping	25406	n.	n.	n.	n.	Öststrållansverige	1605347	1490348	1445640	Sweden	645	n.		2014-2025

Kraków	7583 34	7587 15	7466 27	13518 31	Malopolskie	331609 7	321115 1	n.	Poland	n.	3749	1999 / 2003 / 2004	development strategy for the City of Kraków (1) / Local structure plan for the physical development of the City of Kraków / Strategy for the promotion of the City of Kraków
Kungöör	8245	n.	n.	n.	Östman lansverige	160534 7	149034 8	1445 640	Sweden	227	n.	2012- 2035	development strategy for the City of Kraków
La Spezia	9243 9	n.	n.	n.	Liguria	159193 9	158778 7	1694 410	Italy	51,39	n.	1999- 2007	Visioni del futuro. Linee strategiche e strumenti per la città (2001); Patto La Spezia 2012 + Secondo piano strategico (2004); Report (2007)
Lahri	1023 08	n.	n.	n.	Etelä-Suomi	116188 2	113408 9	1165 970	Finland	n.	n.	2004 - 2005	
Lancashire *					Lancashire	146960 3	141249 9	1402 805	UK	n.	3263,2	1993- 1995	
L'Aquila	7300 0	n.	n.	n.	Abruzzo	133393 9	126111 7	1243 014	Italy	n.	n.	2012	
Laxå	5644	n.	n.	n.	Västmanland	192192 4	176224 6	1682 218	Sweden	605	n.	2008- 2014	
Lecce	8959 8	n.	n.	n.	Puglia	409026 6	403488 7	4013 227	Italy	n.	n.	/2005/	Piano strategico / Piano urbano della mobilità per l'area vasta 2005-2015 / Salento 2020: Pianostrategico e Piano urbano mobilità

Leipzig	531809	493208	542512	837610	Leipzig District	986504	n.	n.	n.	Germany	n.	2121	2009 / 1999-2003	2020/2030	Stadtentwicklungskonzept Leipzig 2020 (SEKO) / Stadtentwicklung plan 2030 (Step) Various plans distinguished for topicC
Leleberg	7320	n.	n.	n.	Östrame llansverige	1605347	1490348	1445640	482	Sweden	n.	n.		2013-2035	
Lille	1113813	999797	977917	1349194	Nord-Pas-De-Calais	4058332	3997864	3961703	n.	France	n.	1453	1985-1990		
Lisboa	537412	568444-g.c.1799346	663394	2797612	Área Metropolitana de Lisboa	2807525	2624511	n.	n.	Portugal	n.	3988	1990 - 1994		
Ljubljana	280607	270986	272650	567098	Zahodna Slovenija	981430	908038	898158	n.	Slovenia	n.	3145	2002-2007		Urban Development Strategy: Spatial Development Plan
London	8173941	7104400	6901300	11793530	Outer London	5117623	4417479	n.	n.	UK	n.	6920	2003		London Plan 2003 (On the base of a plan proposed, but never adopted, in the 80s) London plan (Mayor's spatial development strategy)
Ludvika	25912	n.	n.	n.	n.	n.	n.	n.	1657	Sweden	n.	n.		2012-2030	
Lyon	1307101	1428998	1368162	1894945	Rhône-Alpes	6448921	5688524	5346407	47,87	France	2323,8	1981-1993		1981-2010	Lyon 2010: Un projet d'agglomération pour une métropole européenne
Madrid	3233527	2882860	3120732	6507502	Comunidad de Madrid	6378297	5185931	4931541	605,77	Spain	11537	1987-			Madrid Region Metropolitana

Milano	1262 101	1268 062	1369 231	40606 24	Lombardia	997339 7	897114 8	8837 150	Italy	n.	2637	1998- 2000 / 2001-	Documento di inquadramento, Costruire la grande milano / Piano dei servizi
Montpellier	4275 32	4128 91	3531 84	63589 7	Langue doc- Roussil lon	275755 8	232207 2	2115 168	France	n.	2236	2000-	Città di città: un progetto strategico per la regione urbana milanese Schéma de Cohérence Territoriale de Montpellier (Scot)
Munich	1378 176	1210 223	1256 638	28447 49	Oberbay ern- District	446934 2	403364 3	3721 332	Germany	n.	6263	1998- 2001	Schéma de Cohérence Territoriale de Montpellier (Scot) Perspective munich
Nantes	5939 83	5579 47	5066 90	87004 6	Pays de la Loire	368946 5	324899 4	3055 197	France	n.	3143	2010- 2012	Zukunftsschau München 2040 Un projet pour la métropole nantaise
Napoli	9590 52	1007 464	1067 365	35525 68	Campan ia	586996 5	571769 4	5607 965	Italy	n.	1558	2010	Per una napoli competente, ben connessa e creativa
Niš	1875 00	n.	n.	n.	Central Serbia	n.	n.	n.	Serbia	597	n.	2007- 2009	Operational program for 2009- 2012, The City development program
Northern Ireland*					Northern Ireland	183584 7	168117 9	1586 162	UK	n.	14129, 7	1997- 2001	Northern Ireland Regional Development Strategy 2001 (also called "shaping our future")

Novara	1019 33	1009 10	n.	n.	Piemonte	443679 8	422508 3	4324 173	Italy	n.	n.	2005- 2007		
Örebro	1371 21	1242 07	n.	n.	Östergötlands län	160534 7	149034 8	1445 640	Sweden	1621	n.	2010- 2035		
Paris	2249 977	2125 246	2152 423	11693 218	Paris Île de France	12005 077	797388 091101 9991	9554 192/ 1064 4665	France	n.	12089	2015 /2001- 2016	Paris INTELLIGENTE ET DURABLE PERSPECTIVES 2020 ET AU-DELÀ / Grand Paris	
Pesaro	9461 5	n.	n.	n.	Marche	155313 8	n.	n.	Italy	129	n.	2001- 2003	Pesaro futuro con vista. Piano strategico "PESARO 2015 città della qualità"	
Pescara	1170 91	1174 05	1222 36	n.	Abruzzo	133393 9	126111 7	1243 014	Italy	n.	n.	2006	Piano strategico	
Piacenza	1008 43	n.	n.	n.	Emilia Romagna	444635 4	n.	n.	Italy	118,2 4	n.	2000- 2006	Vision 2020: territorio, sviluppo locale e pianificazione strategica	
Praha	1246 780	1186 855	1214 885	18298 43	Praha/S trednice city	124320 1/1302 336	118685 5/1111 354	n.	Czech Republic	496,4	3929	1993 - 2000	Strategy of prague region	
Prato	1871 59	1724 99	n.	n.	Toscana	375051 1	349158 0	3533 095	Italy	97,35	n.	2004- 2009	Piano Strategico (2005); Quattro anni. Verifica sull'attuazione del programma di legislatura	
Riesa	n.	n.	n.	n.	Dresden district	159092 7	172470 3	n.	Germany	n.	n.			
Roma	2638 842	2570 489	2775 250	40080 95	Lazio	587045 1	511932 3	5115 628	Italy	n.	5686	1998- 2001	Roma prossima	
Rotterdam	6162 60	5926 73	5791 79	n.	Zuidholland	355240 7	339774 4	3221 475	Netherlands	n.	n.	2006- 2007	Piano Strategico di Sviluppo di Roma Capitale	
													2030	

Samobor	36206	n.	n.	n.	n.	2840901	n.	n.	n.	n.	n.	2001-2002		
Sassari	125672	120348	122339	n.	Sardegna	1663859	1638573	1637940	Italy	n.	n.	2008		
Sevilla	702355	700716	678218	1421045	Andalusia	8388875	7241668	6896678	Spain	n.	4164	2010-2020		
Skinnstättberg	4448	n.	n.	n.	Östrame llansverige	1605347	1490348	1445640	Sweden	n.	n.	2014-2030		
Sofia	1165503	1142152	1141142	n.	Yugoza paden	2127618	2142700	2216396	Bulgaria	n.	n.	2000-2001		
Solihull UDP*	206674	199518	n.	n.	Solihull UDP/W esmidlands	2773057/5245484	5270792	5245484	UK	n.	180,07	1990-2015		
Šolta	1675	n.	n.	n.	n.	n.	n.	n.	Croatia	n.	n.	2002		
South Yorkshire*					South Yorkshire	1360875	1268131	1299610	UK	n.	1552,1	2001 / 2002		Bottlenecks Study / South Yorkshire Spatial Study (SYSS)
Stockholm	864324	743703	672187	1964829	Stockholm Region	2163042	1803377	1629631	Sweden	n.	7106	2001		Regional Development Plan 2001 for the Stockholm Region
Stuttgart	613392	587152	585604	1954756	Stuttgart Region	3972881	3917305	3609977	Germany	n.	1987	2006 / 2003	/ 2030	stadtenwicklung konzept (Stek) strategie 2006 / StadtRegion Stuttgart 2030
Torino	872091	879285	962507	1747614	Piemonte	4436798	4225083	4324173	Italy	506,56	1781	1998 - 2000/2006/2015	//2025	Piano Strategico della città/Piano strategico dell'Area Metropolitana di Torino/ Torino Metropoli 2025

Trento	1155 40	1031 82	1015 45	n.	Provincia Autonoma di Trento	536237	470505	4459 97	Italy	157,8	n.	2000 - 2003	2001- 2010	Piano Strategico Trento 2010
Toulouse	7143 18	7619 63	6673 46	12173 16	Midi-Pyrénées	296715 3	257825 4	2431 081	France	n.	5242	2011	2030	Toulouse métropol, le projet urbain
Valencia	7970 28	7390 14	7587 38	15705 17	Comunidad Valenciana	495642 7	400999 4	3839 122	Spain	n.	1474	1995-		
												2010		REVISIÓN SIMPLIFICADA DEL PLAN GENERAL DE VALENCIA
Venezia	2592 63	2739 88	3094 22	54169 6	Veneto	492681 8	448505 9	4364 265	Italy	415,9	1089	2004- 2014	2014	
Verona	2534 09	2511 40	2558 24	n.	Veneto	492661 8	448505 9	4364 265	Italy	198,9 2	n.	2003- 2004	2020	Verona 2020
Vilnius	5332 79	5588 16	6055 33	n.	n.	n.	n.	n.	Lithuania	n.	n.	2002	2011	
Virovitica	n.	n.	n.	n.	Kontine nthalna Hrvatska	284090 1	n.	n.	Croatia	n.	n.			
Wien	1687 271	1615 438	1539 848	26832 51	Region wien/Niederösterreich (Confinante, Escusawie n)	176557 5/1626 262	154853 7/1535 083	1492 636/ 1455 968	Austria	n.	9093	2000- 2004 /2005		Strategieplan / STEP 2005
Wittenberg *					Wittenberg	129438	n.	n.	Germany	n.	1930,1	2014	2025	Step 2025

Zaragoza	6796 24	6046 31	5926 86	82583 8	Aragon	133130 1	119602 8	1192 383	Spain	n.	11890	1994- 1998/ 2006/ 2009- 2011	/	2010/ 2020- 2030	Ebropolis, Plan Estratégico de Zaragoza y su Entorno
Sjaelland (Zealand Region)*					Sjaelland	817907	816118	n.	Denmark	n.	2933,9	2008			
Zürich	3769 90	3632 73	3650 43	12063 12	Zurich Region	142553 8	119856 9	n.	Switzerland	n.	1176	1991- 1995			Zürich Cantonal Guiding Plan (Kantonaler Richtplan)
												2010	2010- 2035		Strategien Zürich 2035

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CHAPTER 2

A possible model for territorial development in European cities? Lessons from Rome, Vienna and Paris

ABSTRACT

In this paper I question the effects of strategic planning and strategy making changes in the contemporary context of European cities territorial development. I focus on the processes that shape changes in spatial and territorial strategies in the context of two cities/metropolitan areas – Rome and Vienna – also using the case of Paris as a further example. The development of a strategic effective model is conceptualized as the outcome of the reorganisation of three major sources of decision making: the spatial planning model, the urban governance model and the policy making model. Early research has largely demonstrated how each of these elements influences, often separately, the development of cities in a specific direction, determining the efficacy of the decisions, with special focus on actors' preferences, political regimes and economic models logics. Instead, I propose to investigate institutional and instrumental drivers of the changing relationship between these three decision making areas. Focusing on a specific period of strategies formulation, between the 90s and the 2000s, I try to demonstrate how a specific model of territorial development spring from a particular articulation of the relationship between the three areas and how this model is further structured along projects implementation governance. These relationships are pinned on four indicators of success: land mobilisation and infrastructure, projects' style of governance, degree of functional and economic innovation, government flexibility face to market response.

INTRODUCTION

The literature on urban studies describes a change in the paradigm of how cities, in Europe, are built and governed since the end of the '80s (Harvey 1989, Newman, Thornley 1996). I assume this change influences three disciplines and spheres of action: spatial planning, territorial governance and urban policy-making¹². Moreover, the change regards the construction and diffusion of global issues and best practices, imposing a consequential link between external phenomena and urban systems cognitive reaction.

These changes have been studied in each sphere separately, especially in relation to the alignment of political programs to economic phenomena, like neoliberalism shift or markets' globalisation (see all the critical geography literature, Jessop 1997, Brenner & Theodore 2005). Early researches have demonstrated how each of the spheres steers cities' trajectories in specific directions, although leaving on the table the recognition of a European city model of development (Le Galès 2006), at theoretical level, and the need for a European urban agenda (EU efforts), at normative level. Cities' trajectories can be defined, in the wake of urban policies studies, as "the course which in a given city charts a linear and continuous perspective of the development of urban policies [...] in the medium and long term, of the conditions of their production and of their effects" (Pflieger 2009, p.1427). In the studies on European cities, the concepts of planning, governance and development, when addressing a description of urban trajectories, easily overlap. One applied model of decision making, early introduced in public organisations at the end of the '80s, that tries to take in account the three spheres, is strategic planning. As a practice, it has been adopted by the local administrations to influence cities' trajectories and enhance their internal and external representations – as successful, innovative, efficient, sustainable cities. Although its interpretation has evolved in time and space, strategic planning is a kind of planning activity (mainly proposed by politicians, operated by the public and managed by planners) used to build long term valid (and feasible) economic, but also cultural, social and territorial development objectives, and to deal with the emergence of a plurality of stakeholders and a loss of autonomy of the government (otherwise said, the shift from government to governance (Rhodes 1997; Pierre, Peters 2000)).

The definitions of the strategic planning approach in literature present in different ways the interaction between the three spheres of public action (Albrechts 2004, Sartorio 2005, Bafarasat 2015). The procedural and logic model developed in the first years of its use (both by the literature and by the practitioners), has been replaced by a more recent definition that embeds various approaches aimed at the **management of change** (Healey 1997, 2000, Gonzalez, De Lazaro 2013, Albrechts 2015). I share and apply this broader definition in reading in particular the action of elements and narratives of strategic planning on existing administrative

¹² I derive this assumption from Mazza and Bianconi, who instead distinguish spatial planning, territorial governance and local development (Mazza, Bianconi 2014). For my analysis, policy making better represents a sphere of action and a stage of decisions, meanwhile local development is more a general objective of several different policies.

structures, meaning the several institutional rigidities, both organisational and instrumental.

In particular, I have decided to isolate the level of observation of spatial policies, including: the existing organisation of spatial planning activity in the public administration, the spatial political agenda, the planning objectives and the spatial projects implementation structure and instruments. For implementation structure of urban projects, I here intend the layers of managerial and normative characteristics in which projects pass through after their design phase is over. Although implementation phase can appear too far from strategic planning activity, one can assume a connection based on the just cited broader definition of strategic planning **and its aim to let principles and objectives filter on policies realms.**

With the lens of the strategy making and strategic behaviour literature, in fact, the overall aims in urban strategic planning examples could appear alike. A more visible narrative dimension and the existence of transfer dynamics can explain partly these similarities (see Chapter 1 of this thesis). Nonetheless, strategies are sometimes not unique and explicit and it is possible to read them only through their institutionalised segments – documents, agreements, direct physical interventions (Mazza 2000, 2002). My idea is in fact that, as Mastop and Faludi (Mastop & Faludi 1997) state about policies, strategies “work through” by diffusion into ordinances that follow their adoption.

With aim of shining a light on the characteristics of this “change management”, I have analysed the approaches used in two European (capital) cities, Rome and Vienna¹³, along a common season of reformism and instrumental updates. The description of the two cases departs from the political, economic and planning situation in the chosen period – that vary because of the inclusion of specific turning points. I could therefore discern characteristics of the articulation of the three decision-making spheres (their organisation and elements).

The comparison of case studies has proved useful to characterise an analogous attitude that only in some points overlaps with the European shared conceptualisation of governance shift (Cremaschi 2016), as envisioned in the strategic planning contemporary pre-conditions – or either objectives, in the case of a strategic process used to design or adapt forms of governance. The argumentative part of the paper builds an analytical model of strategic behaviour on the basis of a further comparison with the case of Paris. I use Paris to bring forward the hypothesis of a set of indicators of strategies “permeation”, related to the organisational and political background of the cities and partly to the intentional and relational attitudes of the public actors’ programs.

At the end of this article, I have tried to reply to the following questions:

1. When, why and how does the approach to city planning and growth changed? Related to which questions/problems/opportunities?
2. How can we distinguish specific modalities of strategic planning in respect to its action on organisational institutions in the cities?
3. Which models can we build on the experiences of the three cities?

¹³ The comparison between the cases of Rome and Vienna is the result of an in depth research on both cases that I have conducted through the analysis of official documents, newspapers and interviews in the last three years.

STRATEGIC PLANNING AS MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE

Evolved from a private company procedure and first used in US and Europe as an economic plan-making process, by the end of the millennium, like Healey recognises, “strategic spatial plans, frameworks and perspectives were back in fashion among Europe's planning policy communities, and were actively being promoted by European Union initiatives” (Healey 2004, p.45).

In their general understanding, strategies are defined as solutions (spatial solutions, in the case of strategic spatial planning) to deal with localised problems – either economic, geographical, social or their combination – adopted by governments seeking a stable agreement among stakeholders on development trajectories¹⁴ (see Albrechts 2001 for a synthesis of the many definitions). These solutions can be instruments, values, priorities, spatialised objects and agreements. When talking about strategic plan making, the collaborative decision-making is set for the main purpose of writing the plan. In many of these cases, despite the existence of a “plan”, strategic planning processes produce *a-spatial* results; they have the ambition to stabilise agreements among the participants and create a blueprint process for further decisions.

In a wider understanding, strategic planning is adopted while acting on the existent structure (of actors, institutions and decision making) to steer actors, public opinion and policy/actions towards certain objectives in the long term – either if the objectives are translated from other levels or are contextually produced. In this sense, the strategies and the coalitions are used to act, according to the agreement achieved – and with whom –, on different fields of policy actions, on specific political coalition, on specific institutions or instruments. As Mantysalo states: acting strategically means using strategically existing instruments (Mantysalo, 2015), or better, one could say, available instruments.

Following this theoretical direction, strategic planning, especially in the field of spatial planning, came to constitute a rational method for directing and managing the growth of the city, using sustainable development discourse and governance possibilities, but also helping in facing (in a more or less welcoming attitude) neoliberal and competitive pressures.

In late studies, strategic planning is in fact intended as a profitable approach to those issues that are reproduced both externally and internally to the local system, abandoning part of its procedural status. For Salet: “Strategic planning must, therefore, profile itself more as embodying a development approach to planning than propagating comprehensive zoning and organization” (Salet, 2004, p.1). According to Gonzalez e De Lazaro (Gonzalez & De Lazaro 2013, p. 52), in particular, current understanding of strategic planning is moving from the idea of

¹⁴ It is worth it to establish a main difference between a strategy and a decision: a strategy is a specific sum of combined choices which do not deal with the regular practice of governing the city, but with the general goal of urban development. The strategies put together different interests and various fields of action (we can say different policies) and fix a main path, more or less defined in times and actions, to get to the commonly set goals.

“set goals and identify means”, using fixed plans and solutions, toward an adaptive process involving the management of change.

If goals and means have lost part of their strength, nonetheless dealing with change involves a destabilisation that has to be anchored in structural reorganisation and government ability.

Quoting Savitch (Savitch 1994, p.565-566-567):

Reorganisation is not a simple act in which changes are made and remain like they are. Rather, it is a multidimensional process, worked through a complex interplay of forces, laden with stated and unstated goals with consequences that are often unanticipated – and sometimes contrary to what was intended. The key to understand reorganisation is to view it as a long-term series of episodes through which stages, interactions, and cumulative effects can be traced [...] reorganisation may involve changes in the hierarchical setting of organisation (centralisation, decentralisation), it may include changes in the scope of operations (boundary changes) and it may encompass changes in functions carried out by institutions (division of labor). Reorganisation embodies a depth of strategy designed to realise multiple values [...] To say the least, reorganisation produces outcomes that are difficult to predict. [...] Contrary to the view that minimizes structural impact or insists that personal abilities can override structure, structure counts, and it counts a great deal. Organisational structures define and establish patterns of authority.

At the same time, when the change includes the elaboration of a governance shift – with the inclusion of new actors, the recognition of specific interests, the multiplication of the involved public tiers, or the emergence of existing but previously submerged coalitions – the “actors’ game” cannot be reduced, as it is in the European governance model, to a “synchronisation” of the expectations, ignoring the conflictual aspects (Cremaschi 2016). Coherence between a project and the following successful actions is never only the consequence of the procedures – although they have a considerable effect in hindering or facilitating the process – but the result of the government, in its whole, abilities. The adaptive process is therefore that of building “certain coalition in certain conditions, some governance forms and not others” (Ibidem p.68). Building a strategy means therefore to select certain things and priorities and to exclude many others.

In practice, it is much more difficult to understand the sort of strategies in urban contexts. As said, the spatial development realm is a field of policy-making that is often addressed with strategies. The spatial domain in urban administration embeds many public actors and servants and can be divided in its more bureaucratic dimension and its more political one. Both, though, have often to deal with a thick and obdurate normative and organisational structure that shows an inertia “intrinsic to local systems” (Pflieger et al. 2009, p.1424). Institutional studies (Mahoney 2000) highlight the high costs of changing directions, the rigid set ups and the frequency of path dependency processes – especially linked to recognised stakeholders.

Nonetheless, changes can be pursued or managed, “according to the given space and according to the fabric of elements which enables specific spatio-temporal sequences to be entrenched” (Pflieger et al. 2009, p.1426). In other words: the more there is opportunity for a change, the more is it possible to pursue innovation.

In this “space”, strategies have the possibility to apply their narrative or discursive function – as “boundary objects” (Mantysalo, Balducci & Kangasoja 2011) – on the decision making processes linked to different policies’ areas, and actually manage the change.

As Albrechts highlights in terms of spatial planning (Albrechts 2006, p. 1492):

The capacity of strategic spatial planning systems to deliver the wished-for outcome is dependent not only on the system itself, but also on the conditions underlying it. These conditions—including political, cultural and professional attitudes towards spatial planning (in terms of planning content and process) and the political will on the part of the institutions involved in setting the process in motion—affect the ability of planning systems to implement the chosen strategies.

Planning action and public policies that revolve around the territorial development, the management of growth, and buildings and infrastructures programming, offer a visible stage for observing the relation that is set between the strategies and existing organisational structures. Moreover, although through a non-linear connection, they relate to the visible objects in the city. Only through these bits and pieces, we can discuss strategic planning characterisation beyond strategic-plan-making procedures.

If strategic planning is based on selection of what to govern or not, in terms of wished development and innovation (that is the main difference with the “muddling through” ordinary government), then it is diriment to a further analysis the possibility to distinguish strategic planning models seeing what is actually governed among the several objects of planning (Le Galès, Vitale 2014).

DISCUSSING METHODOLOGY AT THE EDGE OF DIFFERENT DISCIPLINES

In European and Western literature on cities, the analysis of the urban governance models has been based on three main methodologies: actors' preference studies, political culture and regime theories, structural economic theories (Di Gaetano, Strom 2003). As some authors have argued (see Di Gaetano and Strom in the above quoted comprehensive review), those approaches answer to many questions and provide unavoidable information about case studies as well as about theory development. At the same time, though, they necessarily create incomplete answers and, in reinforcing theoretical assumptions, they left aside the development of further research questions.

If pursued with a descriptive rationale, those kind of studies risk to raise as many questions as they solve. When explaining continuity of political cultures and regimes, they fail in explaining, in situations of change, according to which variables and why the change occurs; working with the macro-economic structures, as well, does not help in explaining why a determinate structure fails in a specific situation. Eventually, when analysing actors' preferences – a complex and contested stage of analysis in itself – it is not necessarily taken into account the organisational and instrumental background those actors have to deal with. These analyses are therefore complementary and it is desirable but quite demanding to put them together. One option is to find a proxy, for instance the effects of governance changes on existing institutions (Ibidem), profiting of the parallel renaissance of institutional studies (March, Olsen 1994). How institutions' role and characteristics change, along with the absorption of new paradigms, is one of the main issues concerning the studies of governance innovation and, in general, of comparative studies. When addressing strategic planning, the literature on governance is not only a necessary compound, but also a source of methodological insights, given the many indicators the two disciplines have in common. Moreover, observing strategic planning means describing changes in local administrations that have occurred across many EU cities and are still partially occurring and a comparative perspective is almost mandatory.

Comparative urbanism is at the forefront of the research on cities and is used according to a relational approach, to pose questions on one site, on the base of the examination of other cases (Ward 2008, p.408). It (should) treat the cities as "open, embedded and relational" (Ibidem, p.407), as "strategic nodes within global financial networks, as central to global migration flows, as the laboratories for policy formation, and as arenas for the practicing of state power (Massey 2007, quoted in Ward 2008, p. 408). According to Nijman, comparison should have roots in the comprehension of path dependency processes (a notion derived from historical sociology), in itself a declination of the place-dependant processes. He also stresses the renaissance of this branch of studies as a consequence of the globalisation debate: "Regions and places are influenced by singular global processes, but these processes are mediated in a variety of ways depending on geographical context. Some have postulated basic trends of "urban convergence" in

which globalizing cities are becoming more alike in some aspects. But efforts to identify common trends in the spatial re-ordering of urban landscapes of globalising cities have thus far not delivered clear results” (Nijman 2007, p. 2, quoting Marcuse and Van Kempen 2000).

Strategic planning researchers have developed their findings at the beginning of a new wave of comparative studies, rooting their studies on different levels of analysis (regional, metropolitan and urban entities) and creating a complex panorama of interlinked examples. Entering this arena of research means to intertwine new case studies with the existing paradigmatic examples and continue the process of convergence and divergence analysis, to be pursued among several interpretations and applications of the concept.

In this paper, I observed, in particular, the structural constrictions for the public actors in terms of organisation and instruments of projects implementation, assuming the municipal government point of view. This choice results from a double methodology.

I have chosen my case studies in parallel with the formulation of my questions, combining a deductive approach and an analytical approach. The former allowed me to depart from strategic planning theory and definitions, combining them with governance literature. Moreover, the choice of the cases has roots in the recognition granted to European cities studies (Le Galès, Bagnasco 2000), that allow me to overcome dimensional and contingent diversities and consider similarities at the level of governmental role, planning structure and tradition, and political culture. Through the analytical approach, on the other side, I have developed a successive series of observation of the contextual development of the two cities of Rome and Vienna; the two cities experience in the two decades ('90s and 2000s) different socio-economic situations, composing conditions and trajectories for change that look apparently beyond comparability. Also their planning culture belongs to two different traditions, the Italian and the German ones. But in what concerns spatial narratives and expressed strategies of spatial development, the two cases partially overlap. The related agendas interact, nonetheless, with the local implementation infrastructures, in unpredictable ways.

In this analysis, the level of observation has proved important (Denters, Mossberger 2006) given the visible differences in scale and administrative division (TABLE 4-5 in APPENDIX and FIGURE 1-2-3). The initial comparison of Rome and Vienna bases on the presence in both cities of a reformist period. Initiated by leftist governments and brought forward through a series of policies and actions, with the double aim of ensuring “urban renaissance” and extra-border influence growth, it has given importance to the construction of a new representation for the city as well as to the need of update existing growth management instruments. These actions, on their practical spatial applications, have been taken mostly at urban level, in opposition to a very different treatment of the metropolitan scale. The contemporary status of cities in EU implies, nonetheless, the existence of similar definitions of problems and innovations that pertain the scale of the city and allow feasible comparison.

Eventually, the two cities represent in their urban choices and results (at least visible in the last 25 years) opposite examples in terms of growth, at least when measured on the typical variables, related to structural data of GDP and inhabitants (see TABLE 5-6 in APPENDIX). This opposition has granted to my comparison the

possibility to contribute to the explanation of diverging trajectories, at least highlighting indicators for further analysis. In both cities, though, some kind of governmental action has been put in place (Le Galès, Vitale 2013) and a governance decision-making has implied turning to a general strategy.

In this context, when looking for an emblematic structure of implementation, I have focused on large spatial projects as plausible touchstone for an observation. Projects are, quoting Mazza, at the border between two activities of planning: the normative and the strategic (Mazza 1998). Their implementation is the main area for improving and actualising the strategies through negotiation. Projects, therefore, are the stage at which strategies are more observable and the main integrative instrument of territorial policies at all levels. Although it can be argued that focusing on projects is just one possible insight among the many strategic planning applications, this choice is backed by a literature on strategic projects (Salet, Gualini 2006, Carmona Burgess 2001), used as institutional instruments to realise specific visions of the city. Strategies and large projects is a quite common combination, covering from sports events, urban areas regenerations, accessibility and mobility infrastructures. In our cases, one can find all these three applications. Not least, they are represented as integrative part of the overall vision about the city in spatial and strategic plans, as well as in the political agendas.

The main question of the research, as said, regards the possibility to distinguish other nuances of strategic planning in respect to their use and action on existing structures; the “intermediate” case of Paris has been chosen to test the variables found and to detect the results of these mechanisms, if not of radical change, of adjustment. Paris, in fact, shows a visible distance with both the cases, representing an almost unique scale and organisational logic for a European city, but nonetheless it expresses similar urban level strategies (with parallel delays in the metropolitan scale project).




FIGURE 1 - Rome geographical and administrative territories.




FIGURE 2 – Vienna geographical and administrative territories.




FIGURE 3 – Paris geographical and administrative territories.

THREE CASES OF STRATEGIC APPROACH

ROME CYCLES OF RENAISSANCE AND DECADENCE

Background

Since the first years of the '90s, the action on the territorial governance in Rome tries to restore trust and reliability to the local administrative institution.

The late '80s have been the years of *Tangentopoli* scandal, a period of corruption and delegitimation of politicians in Rome as well as in the rest of Italy. From an economic point of view, these years, ruled by a coalition of centre-right guided by the mayor Carraro, were marked by the strong dependence on the national funds for large infrastructural projects (both in industrial, cultural and sports sectors – for instance, the Football World Cup organisation, in 1990) and for the initial realisations related to the *Sistema Direzionale Orientale*¹⁵ (Cremaschi 2009, 2010). Those funds flowed into the 1990¹⁶ Special Law for Rome (*Legge Speciale per Roma Capitale*), and partly remained at disposal to the next progressive government. Moreover, new funds arrived from the central state for the organisation of the 2000 Jubilee of the Catholic Church and were further increased with the financial support for the change of status of the local institution from *Comune di Roma* to *Roma Capitale* in 2001.^{17 18}

At the national level, the 1994 marks the entrance in politics of Premier Silvio Berlusconi and his rightist government, in coalition with Lega Nord party. Their political decisions head towards a federalist reform of the economic organisation and therefore of the economic development model. Decentralisation policies, devolution of powers and increase of the regional autonomy push the local administrations to look for private investments to actualise their agendas. The national extra funds, though, together with the privatisation of some public local companies (*Centrale del latte* and *ACEA* in 1998, *AMA* in 2000) and the incentives to tourism and culture sectors, through *ad hoc* policies for the historical centre, allow Rome's local economy to grow¹⁹. This positive trend lasts for approximately

¹⁵ Sistema Direzionale Orientale (SDO) is a strategic territorial development project of restructuring and decentralisation of the administrative headquarters in Rome, composed by the creation of two main tertiary poles (a new one in Pietralata and the reinforcement of related functions in Colombo and Eur area) and of a main arterial road running from the north to the south of the highway ring around the city, connecting the new poles along an development axe in the eastern part of the city.

¹⁶ National Law 396/90, envisaging financial transfer from the State to the City of Rome to accomplish strategic interventions at national scale, functional to the role of capital city.

¹⁷ With the Titolo V reform of the Italian Constitution, that confers special powers and funds to the City, without a modification of its borders and organisational structure.

¹⁸ The policies on big events and some public companies privatisation are considered the proofs of a first, although delayed in respect of the other European cities, entrance of neoliberalism in Rome's politics and economy. On this topic, see the contribution of D'Albergo and Moini (D'Albergo & Moini, 2013, 2015).

¹⁹ Unemployment dropped in the urban area of more than 100.000 units in '90s decade and of other 10.000 units in the following decade (data from Eurostat statistics). This, though, did not correspond to an increase in the employed people, but to a general decrease of the population. Tocci analyses the growth in Rome in those years as follows: "Emphasis was put in the visible increase of GDP in the first

15 years, fostering a successful image of the city linked to the leftist governments (Rutelli mayor, 1993-2001, and Veltroni mayor, 2001-2008).

The goals described in the political discourses in the '90s and 2000s decades by the roman politicians and planners, revolve around the need to re-establish Rome as a reference point in city government in Italy and Europe. Those aims are explicit in choices about urban planning and territorial development common to the two (partly to the three) consecutive governments of the analysed period; they acted, on one side, promoting the city as a laboratory for an innovative planning discipline at national level and, on the other, presenting Rome in the international arena as a forerunner of the environmental sustainability and social priorities, over growth and competitiveness dogmas. This representation, although limited to the traditional planning body of rules and spatialized action, tries a confrontation with the various city's political and economic contingencies.

Governance

With the victory of Mayor Francesco Rutelli at the local elections in 1993, the central-left coalition is back in charge of the city government for the first time after the Communist Party period, ended at the beginning of the '80s. It is the first election in Rome with a new electoral law that includes the direct election of the mayor, a condition that allows the administration to be more centred on the person and program of Rutelli. The new government tries to refocus the public action on the peripheries issue, on the cultural funding, on the environmental defence and on the public transportation.

Mayor Veltroni's government (Rutelli's successor) builds, on this new image of the city, the "*modello Roma*" narrative, envisioning a governance model in which the organisational and economic innovations are realised through a collaborative approach between public, private and social actors. This approach is defined by the mayor himself as a dynamic of "economic growth and social cohesion" (Veltroni 2006). The model is rooted on the ambitions of "qualitative" development and international visibility. The introduction of elements of neo-communitarianism in Roman policies, adjusts the urban development governance towards moderated forms of neoliberalism (D'Albergo & Moini 2013). The related slogan of "make the peripheries central"²⁰ testifies the link with some of the spatial principles on which the administration is building the new urban plan. In practice, the model fosters a strategy of redistribution of wealth through an explicit negotiation with the private actors (Cremaschi 2009). When Veltroni abandons its post, in the middle of its tenure, to run for the national political elections, Gianni Alemanno, a spokesman for the central-right coalition, becomes the new mayor (since 2008 until 2013), and governs the city through the late 2000s economic and financial crisis. The choices of the new mayor partly continue the previous councils reorganisation, though using a more populist approach and enhancing in particular the communication

years of 2000, in countertrend to national figures. The growth was attributed to an innovation in the productive systems, because of the increment of small firms in the advanced tertiary sector. This growth, though, in most cases, derived from the externalisation of duties by governments' departments and large public companies. The growth is therefore the result of this diffuse outsourcing due to the organisational and technological restructuring happening in the public sector." (Tocci 2015, p.6).

²⁰ In italian "*riportare le periferie al centro*".

strategies, over the organisational apparatus innovation²¹ (D'Albergo & Moini 2013, p. 16). From a spatial point of view, then, the new government shifts the interest of the municipality towards social housing construction, according to a conservative and corporative spirit. During its mandate, Alemanno consigns to the city its first Strategic Plan (2011), a "classic", economic-driven, strategic plan never actually adopted by the government. On one side, the plan remains a sign of the will to bond the development of the city to the neoliberal economic growth model and to the private actors' interests; on the other side, it testifies the faults of the new mayor in leadership and mediation skills (Ibidem), clearly visible in the impasse of the strategic overall project implementation (in particular, the several failures of Rome candidacy for hosting the Olympic Games). With the mayors' political alternation, the relationships with the central government also vary, resulting in a changeable economic and political support.

Planning and spatial policies

During all this period, though, notwithstanding the economic fluctuation, the cornerstones of the Roman economy remain the land market and real estate sectors, as it had been in the post-war period²². With the drying up of the neo-corporative spirit and the end of the large public companies' action for city development, the importance of real estate acquires, at the end of the '90s, a different perspective (Ombuen 2013, Tocci 2015). In particular, one can underline two aspects of the innovation, concerning: (1) the nature of the relationship between public and private and (2) the relation between the construction sector and spatial planning.

(1) The real estate sector in Rome is characterised by the fragmentation of the land and the parallel presence of few big owners and investors²³, which fulfil also the role of developers. The administration, in this period, aims at building a relationship with these subjects based on a "greater 'social effort' of private initiative in transformation processes" (Comune di Roma 2003). One strategy in this direction is the introduction of project financing for large infrastructures (for instance the metro line construction) but also the collaboration with small and medium firms for the requalification of the existent physical heritage of the city. Then, with the introduction of *compensazione* procedures²⁴, Rutelli's government

²¹ With Rutelli, in particular, a new phase of reorganisation of the administrative apparatus begins, with the creation of new offices (for instance, the office for controlling unauthorised development), the increasing of the efficiency in bureaucratic organisation and procedures, the introduction of new urban planning instruments. The "patto con le periferie" ("pact with the peripheries"), a policy to contrast illegal construction through a social dwellings provision, regeneration plans and local development plans, is started during Rutelli's government and it is resumed, in its rhetorical discourse, by Mayor Alemanno, although without a further organisational effort.

²² Quoting Cremaschi, between 1997 and 2006, in particular, the city experiences the most intense real estate cycle of the last fifty years, secondary only to the post-second-world-war reconstruction (Cremaschi 2010, p.2).

²³ Some local families have traditionally lead the construction and real estate sector (for instance the Parnasi, Caltagirone, Toti and Marchini families) and continue nowadays to be the main interlocutors of the Municipality. This property structure is stable since Rome was appointed as national capital and has lasted along the twentieth century.

²⁴ *Compensazioni* procedure is one of the most discussed procedure introduced by the team of urbanists and consultants for the new plan (with urbanist Campos Venuti as a major supporter). It is a property right equalisation/compensation process, in which the construction rights of land owners are "moved" from their empty parcels of agricultural or green land to mutually defined areas, linked to the

proposes a new public instrument for the land management that should affect building sector directions, steering the private initiative towards the implementation of public services and accessible settlements.²⁵ This initiative can be intended as an experiment of contractual planning, linked to the strategic experiments in Europe and aimed at fostering urban competitiveness. However, it remains rooted in a normative conception of the planning activity, which implies a normalisation of the government action and clear rules for the private actors (Cremaschi 2010).

The period is profitable for the modification of Roman urban planning (Berdini 2008): part of the building sector entrepreneurs as well as part of the political establishment are excluded from the city's construction activities, because of the ongoing corruption trials (related to the *Tangentopoli* national inquiry). The construction sector is therefore paralysed but, at the same time, there are new conditions which enable its relaunch through its financialisation.²⁶

Instruments

The new approach to the urban government is introduced in parallel and in function of the process of definition of the new *Piano Regolatore Generale* (PRG), the development masterplan for the city. This approach is linked to the narrative of the sustainable development and the internationalisation of the city, transferring some components of strategic planning and of the European Commission urban agenda, for instance the territorial marketing, the use of large projects for the developing of new R&D investments and the inter-municipality interaction. The strategy is to link various policies and set some clear lines of action: requalification of existing urban fabric, the maintenance of the diversity and of local characterisation of the Roman territory; the concentration of the development in some denser areas, to avoid the dispersion (sprawl and commuting phenomena). The authors of the plan have, nonetheless, to face bureaucratic and legislative contingent dynamics to get advantage of these above mentioned profitable conditions. The previous masterplan, approved in 1965, had unrealistic interpretations of the future development of the city and envisioned a never realised demographic growth. The last urban planning period, in the '80s, was characterised by the continuous variation of the plan norms. The main objective of the new Rutelli council in 1993 is to reform the legislation and the principles of planning towards a normalisation of the urban changes management (Cremaschi 2010) and the abandonment of the emergency and exceptional approach.

Nonetheless, the period of multiplication of the real estate yields in the following 1990s-2000s (until the 2008 approval of the new plan), linked to contingent phenomena of local market (Tocci 2015, Violante 2008), is managed by the

densification of development poles. At the same time, the administration, declares a strict, no construction, safeguard of these large green areas "freed" by the building rights and now publicly owned.

²⁵ *Compensazioni* have partially failed the initial expectations, although some of their application had long-lasting consequences. An example is their application for the safeguard of Tor Marancia area (Delpirou, Nessi 2011) or the Eur Castellaccio project (analysed in the last chapter of this book).

²⁶ Already at the end of the 80s, new typologies of actors – banks, insurances, service companies – had participated in the diversification of the capital invested in the real estate sector (d'Albergo & Moini 2013).

government through spot agreements, which aim at capturing a part of the income of private investors, leaving part of the realisation of the public good to the bargaining and to unexpected opportunities. During the writing of the document (that has taken up 15 years), the construction sector continues to work, using the rest of the building rights²⁷ derived from the previous plan (of 1962), both for the private buildings and the public services. The administration, though, modifies the destinations, the localisations and the implementation procedures of these volumes, trying to bring forward its strategies in exception to the plan in force and to the forthcoming one. This approach is called "*pianificar facendo*", planning by doing. This happens anyway in the framework of transient instruments that allow the amendment of the zoning plan. In particular, one must consider the 1995 Poster Plan, a document in between a political agenda, listing the main objectives of Rutelli spatial policies, and a structural masterplan (in the style, for instance, of Viennese official maps contained in the development plans); and the 1997 *Variante delle certezze*, a variant of the general masterplan, enlarging the safeguard of urban green areas, in the wake of the previously adopted *Variante di Salvaguardia* (1991-1996).

Projects

Rutelli and Veltroni administrations use this background to redistribute and decentralise the public action at the peripheral areas, with strategic projects on large urban sectors (Cremaschi 2010, p. 5). The spatial strategy implies the adoption of a polycentric growth model, aimed at the restructuring and modernisation of the municipal territory (Salvagni 2005) and linked to a rescaling of the local government at the metropolitan level. This structure is envisioned with the combination of the following elements: a public transport rail system, a system of green and agricultural protected areas, the distribution of main functions for the metropolitan area in specific poles and "centralities" (in Italian *Centralità urbane e metropolitane*). Five *ambiti di programmazione strategica* (strategic areas for the urban requalification) are also set, on the basis of Rome's main geographical (Tevere riverfronts and basins, Roman Fora and Appia archeological and natural park), infrastructural (railway belt) and historical (Ancient Roman Walls, Flaminio-Fora-Eur) systems (see FIGURE 4).

In the strategic projects presentation, the administration tries to emphasise the supportive dimension with the concern on public space, quality of life, accessibility, a protocol for the realisation of social housing²⁸ (even in private initiatives); localisation and functions underline this aspect, especially in the comparison with other coeval interventions in other large cities, more linked to foreign investments speculations. At the same time, though, many actions initiated in the city centre testify a turn, especially during Veltroni government, towards the cultural, touristic,

²⁷ Those "residual" building rights are in part cancelled, with the above mentioned *Variante delle Certezze* (that replaces the previous variant, *Variante di Salvaguardia*, approved by Mayor Carraro in 1991), in part undergo compensation procedures, in part are modified, in respect to their possible functional characterisation, with the *Accordo di Programma*. However, the majority of the building rights confirmed for the *compensazione* procedure are still blocked (from the interview with planner Mauro Baioni, councillor Caudo collaborator)

²⁸ This protocol between the municipality and *Cassa depositi e prestiti* (a loans public fund) put this latter in charge of the agreements with the private developers, without, though, formal quantitative regulation or criteria for the private masterplan's approval.

archeologic and events sectors, on which are concentrated the majority of public funds and growing expectations on the city's renaissance.




FIGURE 4 - Rome polycentric and infrastructural development program.

Despite the discursive and political effort, the action on the peripheries soon drifts from the initial narratives. The architectural and planning decisions on these areas are managed by the urban planning department and an in-house agency created on purpose, *Risorse per Roma*. The role of the latter, though, is to monitor the distribution and characteristics of the projects, and not to manage their implementation, given the lack of bargaining power or financial assets. The larger projects realised before the plan approval are managed through the *piano di lottizzazione*, a traditional operative planning instrument normally used for the realisation of private land development. For this reason, the new general masterplan introduces the *progetto urbano* procedure, which, nonetheless, shifts and enlarges the bureaucratic and normative requests to developers, lowering possible short-term profits. This instrument conditions reflect the will to engage big international developers for the development of these areas, following many European cities' examples. When the procedure is approved in 2008, though, as part of the new general masterplan, administration's expectations clash with the simultaneous break out of the financial crisis. The slowing down of many realisations, both ongoing and ready to start, has high costs for the public, both in economic and accountability terms. It reveals the difficulties of the government to deal with the privates' requirements and, most of all, the weaknesses of the economic strategy in respect to the spatial one.

Also the expectations for the city to emancipate from central government's funds are unattended, as shown by the participation of the city in the bids for international events (World Swimming Championship, Olympic Games). Besides, the choice of the centralities is strongly influenced by the previous plan's provisions, due to the national and regional funding already provided (for instance for Bufalotta and Pietralata projects).

Upward, in the governance scale, the incomplete financial and decisional autonomy developed from the State is built on the compromise and contrast with the region. Meanwhile, the building of a sub-local system of *municipi* is still ongoing, leaving the government with a complex and not cohesive administrative system²⁹. Also, the metropolitan area project is yet to come, due to the delays at the national level³⁰ and the difficulties in the communication among the municipalities included in the perimeter. The large surface of the Roman municipal territory and the centralising power of the historical nucleus makes it difficult to have a direct relationship with the first and second rings of the communes.

The writing and approval of the plan are accompanied by a critique to the incomplete reforms³¹ that nullifies the bottom up planning innovation proposal for a division between a structural, long-term document and an operative, short-term,

²⁹ *Municipi* can be considered as the lower unit of city government, as the *arrondissements* in Paris and the *Gemeindebezirks* in Vienna. Nonetheless, the difference in average population is remarkable: in 2000, the *municipi* in Rome counted an average of 25.185 inhabitants, versus 7.764 inhabitants in Vienna and 7.944 in Paris (OECD Cities statistics).

³⁰ National Law 142/1990 and 625/1999 (on metropolitan areas – not yet applied).

³¹ The national legal framework for the new plan is still the Law 1150 promulgated in 1942. The law has been the object of several innovation trials, eventually never approved. In 1999, moreover, Lazio Region approves a new framework for spatial planning confirming again the traditional urban masterplan structure (Regional Law 38/1999), although the innovation claims coming from the local councils.

second plan. Eventually, a normative traditional plan is approved besides several clashes between the different political alliances in the council (even inside the majority). The plan is already obsolete in some of its parts and provisions (because of the long preparation and the changing opportunities). The rigidities in the operational phase of the plan are linked to the interplay of traditional administrative tools, like the *convenzione urbanistica* (between private and public) or the *piano di lottizzazione*, and innovative instruments, like the *Programmi complessi* – the newly introduced Urban Requalification Programs (PRU) and Sustainable Development Programs (PRUSST) – and the *Accordo di programma*, a specific agreement between different administrative tiers that accelerates the process and the possibility to variate the regulations in case of specific public interest.

VIENNA TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE WAKE OF THE SOCIALIST TRADITION

Background

During the '90s, Vienna finds a way out from a situation of frustrated growth aspirations, characterised by a local government accustomed to solving the city's problems through fragmented and contingent interventions, both in the spatial and the socio-economic field, (Becker & Novy 1996). The opportunity comes from national and international politics and it is developed by the ambitious choices of the local government. At the end of the '80s, the phenomena of de-industrialisation and decentralisation of the local firms, in the context of a general global decline of the manufacturing sector, opens the way to the re-elaboration of the housing and job market policies in the direction of a post-fordist model (Hatz 2008, Novy 2011). The unemployment in the secondary sector, and in the linked local services, is opposed by the local government with an effort to engage international companies and create new business and service poles. The initial success in this direction is followed by an internal and external migration of workers and a correspondent increase in the number of employees in the tertiary sector (more than 20% more between 1993 and 2010³²). The parallel boom in the demand for dwellings and offices provokes an acceleration in the Viennese real estate sector, shifting the market strategy, as much as the housing policies, from a supply to a demand approach.

Part of this acceleration is due to the particular role of the city, in the context of the dissolution of the iron curtain. The city, because of the unique geographic position, can fulfil an intermediary role between the two former blocks. International firms start choosing Vienna as headquarter, getting closer to the East-European markets (Paal 2003, p. 236). With the entrance of Austria in the European Union, in 1995, the city is exposed to further stimuli. Being capital of the country, Vienna receives major responsibilities, which justify the ambition to increase its international competitiveness. The administration starts an intense activity of international

³² Source: Statistik Austria

cooperation, becoming a fundamental partner for the neighbouring countries.³³ With the Centrope project (Centrope Consortium, 2006), in particular, starting in 2003, Vienna makes explicit the new objectives at the international level, repositioning its borders of political influence and reframing its spatial development strategies. The restructuring of the local economy towards new markets, with a strategy of relocalisation of companies and the creation of commercial networks, passes through this collaborative planning experience, shared with cities in Slovakia, Czech Republic and Hungary.

Governance

At the same time, the government tries to react to the claims for a renovation of the political class and a broader participation of the civil society to the decision on the city and, at the same time, for a de-regulation of the financial sector, coming from the entrepreneurial class. The rightist politicians, historically at the opposition, are the spokespersons for these heterogeneous needs. The social-democratic party (SDP) governs in Vienna (the political stronghold of the party in Austria) since the end of the Second World War. In 1994, the socialist Michael Häupl is appointed mayor (just after becoming the new state party chairman of the SPÖ in Vienna, succeeding, in both posts, to Helmut Zilk), starting a long period of political continuity centred on his person – he is still in power. Nevertheless, this period is characterised by a progressive dissolution of the corporative system, the loss of power of the unions and the advancement of other parties (namely the national conservative party, FPÖ). In 1996 election, the mayor is forced to build a coalition with the ÖVP (center-right party), whose head, Bernhard Görg, is appointed vice-mayor and councillor for the “Planning and Future” department. Since 2010, then, is the Rot-grüne Koalition (SPÖ and Grüne) to hold the city council. These coalitions strongly influence the action of the government, especially, for our concern, during the 90s, when new strategies for the city start to unfold.

At the beginning of the 2000s, the national rightist government³⁴ begins a privatisation of some national companies and a broad review of the housing policies (Novy et al. 2001, pp. 136-137), which strongly influences the Viennese party system and the administration’s financial resources. The revenues coming from the selling of energy and bank companies are reinvested in new technology and research programs, to be locally developed through interregional and inter-municipal collaborations, having Vienna as the main node of the network. Moreover, new laws allow the use of public funds, previously allocated for social housing, for the construction of infrastructure, allowing cooperatives and public institutions to sell their residential properties at a market price. This measure persecutes the rests of the Viennese corporative system, which had built its

³³ Many treaties are signed with the neighbouring Länder (regions) and countries: the 1984 Commission for regional transportation (VOR, Verkehrsverbund Ost-Region); the JORDES project 2002-2005 (Joint Regional Development Strategy), for the regional planning cooperation among Bratislava, Győr and Vienna; the Twin City project (2005), for the collaboration between Vienna and Bratislava for the management of economic and cultural resources; the land management program between Vienna and Nierderösterreich (SUM, Stadt-Umland Management, 2006); the Danube Strategy (2010), that links Vienna to the other territories along the river; the Vienna Region, a partnership of business agencies of the three federal states of Vienna, Lower Austria and Burgenland.

³⁴ The two Schüssel governments (2000-2007) are the first governments of a centre-right and extreme right coalition, after a continuous tradition of centre parties coalitions since the end of the Second World War.

legitimacy on social housing policies – traditionally bargaining financial funds for new dwellings construction, in exchange for political support. On the other side, the same measure generates a new wave of private investments, finally finding their space in the real estate market.

Planning

In this economic and political shift, planning regime is partially modified. The particular situation of Vienna, that has both the status of municipality and region³⁵, does help in the reorganisation of its planning approach and with the coordination of different actors in the strategy making efforts. Moreover, the municipality is in a special position in respect to the other actors, owning the majority of the urban land. The Viennese government tradition, though, strongly centralist, partially hinders this innovation. The complex bureaucratic apparatus, in particular, that forms a sort of second decision-making arena, embodies the obduracy against the change (Gielge 2003). The coalition formed after the 1996 elections and the appointment of Görg as Planning department alderman and vice-mayor, accompany a breaking process: the apparatus, especially intricate for the spatial issues, is reorganised through the “New Public Management” model, cutting planning times and procedures; the bureaucratic functions are downsized, through the creation of decentralised institutional companies³⁶; the private stakeholders are included in the proposal and implementation of strategic projects and infrastructures. Moreover, some limited forms of participation are introduced. Participation, intended as confront with the population, is actually a novelty for the administration, which has historically tended to include through co-optation the minorities at the opposition, thus avoiding the social and political conflicts (Novy et al. 2001, p.140). At the same time, with the openness of the planning procedures, the administration searches the support, both financial and in the media statements, of private actors – real estate operators, intellectuals, technicians, architects and planners – modifying asymmetrically the urban policy community (Novy & Hammer 2007, Novy et al. 2001, Novy, Swiatek, & Lengauer 2013) and diversifying the access to decisional processes. In this way, the government weakens its institutional role (Novy et al. 2001, p. 139), although not really scratching its accountability. These changes, in fact, towards a more entrepreneurial administration, do not contrast the top-down policy making model, with the social-democratic leadership that continues to gain electoral support focusing on social welfare actions. In planning terms, these are translated in a particular concern on social housing experimentation, public transport enhancement and public space design.

³⁵ Normally, in Austria, regions are in charge of general development guidelines and take decisions on main infrastructures, meanwhile municipalities make local plans, zoning and land use rules. The regions, moreover, coordinate and monitor the local plans.

³⁶ The process builds three companies in charge of the local spatial development: the Vienna Business Agency (Wiener Wirtschaftsförderungsfond, WWFF) and the Viennese Land provision and Urban Renewal Fund (Wiener Bodenbereitstellungs- und Stadterneuerungsfonds, WBSF), that were born at the beginning of the 80s, but whose influence becomes decisive in the following years. Beside these two, other agencies, mixing private and public funds, are built to implement specific projects (like the WED – Wiener Entwicklungsgesellschaft für den Donauraum Ag). In general, the members of the administration and of the Chambers of Labour and Commerce keep a prominent position in the newly formed development agencies.

There are, therefore, two parallel approaches in the Viennese planning policies of these years: a path-dependant one (Novy et al. 2001, p. 213); and an open and entrepreneurial approach to the territorial governance.

Instruments

The planning instruments gain a key role in actualising the interests and the new priorities of the administration, especially with the updating of the main development plans and the starting of public-private partnerships for the redevelopment of large areas of the city. The general project for the “new” Vienna is expressed in 2000 in the first Strategic Plan for the city: it is the main effort of the “Planning and Future” department and a sort of watershed between the old urban planning and policies and the new ones. The writing of the plan starts in 1998, appointing special offices for the management and monitoring of the process (Hamedinger 2007). The two main goals for the plan are (i) to interpret the present situation of the city and (ii) to build a framework for the dialogue with interested stakeholders for the production of a new image of Vienna. It is the first Viennese document resulting from the cooperation of a large political majority, including opposite parties, and the intellectual élite, traditionally unrelated to the construction of the city. Some participative procedures³⁷ have also been used – although participation efforts in those years are mostly carried on at micro-local scale with neighbourhood actions.

The final document is composed by five thematic areas (each of those presenting related strategic interventions): the increase of the regional cooperation; the creation of new economic and job market perspectives; the investment on knowledge economy, research and education³⁸; the increase in number and quality of green and natural spaces; the guarantee for high quality of life standard. Its importance lies mainly in the capability to integrate different interests and allow the communication both among actors, among different administrative offices and between the municipality and the civil society. Moreover, it accompanies a marketing campaign for boosting the city attractiveness – that has reached its peak in the touristic sector – and for the construction of a representation of the city addressed not only to the domestic context but also to foreign actors and populations (with the translation of the plan in english).

In 2005, the municipality updates the main spatial planning instrument of the city, the Urban Development Plan (STadtEntwicklungsPlan, referred as STEP from now on in this text), building on the main principles fixed in the Strategic Plan, actualising them in respect to the spatial goals and selecting the new main projects for the city. The previous STEP, approved in 1994, shows a traditional approach, identifying aspirations and challenges inside the borders of the city, minimising the demographic growth and facing the main challenges of containing sprawl, maintaining the green belt around the city, and slightly increasing the public

³⁷ For instance, the “Wiener Stadtdialoge” (Hamedinger 2007, p.947): meetings at district level, opened to the population, used to discuss with practitioners and experts some selected topics highlighted in the plan. A central group of representatives, together with a delegate from the mayor’s office, is in charge of the control of the process. The explicit blueprint for these trials is the close in time experience of strategic plan-making in Barcelona and Turin.

³⁸ A sector always prominent in Vienna: the city has nine universities, six universities of applied sciences, as well as various other research institutions.

transport network. It mirrors the approach of the city since the '80s, when the general deindustrialisation crisis and the shrinking of the population was decisive in fixing some main planning guidelines.³⁹ In writing the 2005 STEP, the expectations for the economic development increase, as well as the population that had, in the meanwhile, become more complex (especially because of the stabilisation of immigrated population and migration fluxes).

Policies and projects

In transport and economic policies, the city builds a clear strategy of expansion of the city towards the eastern borders – with, for instance, the selection of the area of Aspern for the creation of a huge new development area⁴⁰ in the direction of Bratislava. The “bridge to the East” strategy (Novy, Lengauer & Souza 2008, p. 17) started at the end of the '80s, with the project of Donau City,⁴¹ further implemented to realise a second administrative centre for the city, with several international companies' headquarters. The project, as other interventions initiated in those years, entered among the main projects of the city together with the brand new ones.

Big investments on the public transportation, especially the renovation of the main stations (four main construction sites between 2000 and 2010, with the large development projects of the South/Central⁴² and the West Bahnhof) and the extension of the metro lines give a new image to many brownfields. At the same time, the plan designs a clear localisation and distribution of the economic activities in the metropolitan area⁴³, with the action on former industrial areas, like the southern area (named Erdberger Mais, famous for the Gasometer renovation intervention in the 90s, that turned four gas towers into an experimental housing project), which is the stage, since 1998, for a series of large redevelopment interventions (like the slaughterhouse of Sankt Marx and several connected warehouses, turned into a theatre and university facilities). The projects define

³⁹ Public transport priority over individual automobile traffic, urban renewal priority over new constructions (two principles still on the forefront of the city's strategies), decreasing density, conservation and functional integration, new development only along existing transportation axes, with creation of green wedges in between. From Fischer, Purschke & Schubert (1985).

⁴⁰ The area of Aspern development project is the largest urban expansion of Europe, as big as the city centre of the city; started at the end of the 2000s, when it will be finished, in 2028, it will host around 20.000 new inhabitants and 20.000 new employees, in a modern and dense city-like environment, crossed by a huge green facility – including an artificial lake of 5 ha – and connected with a brand new metro line.

⁴¹ The area (a formerly swamp zone, exposed to the flooding of the Danube) was initially chosen for the organisation of the Expo of 1995, in partnership between the cities of Vienna and Budapest. In 1991, with the recovery and the infrastructure works already ongoing, the population was consulted about the event with a referendum and expressed its denial. That was a strong political failure, which determined

⁴² The station opened in 2014, after seven years of building process. A new district is planned around the station, with 550.000 m² office space and 5000 apartments, to be developed until 2020.

⁴³ In the Vienna municipality borders, the service sector is dominant, specifically those sub-sectors in need of qualified human capital (for instance linked to education, health-care and creative activities), as well as the historically central administrative, governmental and cultural services. Farther, in the neighbouring communes of the metropolitan area, are situated or relocated the main industrial activities, both traditional and extensive (manufacture of machinery – especially transportation equipment – mineral, oil and chemicals) and more innovative (electronics and mechanical engineering, telecommunications).




FIGURE 5 – Vienna polycentric and infrastructural development program.

several new poles for the city, although grouped into 12 areas of interest, differently characterised in geographical terms or in respect to the presence of specific facilities or opportunities. The polycentrism envisioned by the plan, though, is more about the creation of systems of economic and labour development, than of spots of “urbanity” agglomeration. Those systems include representative large projects, infrastructure, housing complex, all linked through an efficient system of public and private transportation (see FIGURE 5) and characterised by a new image, usually conveyed through commercials and informative events open to the population. The plan localizes the main interventions not far from the city centre, increasing the importance of the integration in the existing urban pattern. The “periphery” of Vienna, in fact, intended as deprived areas, with social inclusion issues, is not far from the doors of the former walls (the “Ring”); meanwhile, the geographical outskirts are mainly constituted by former villages absorbed by the city, hosting middle class, low rise, housing areas – if not villas and country-like landscapes – and urban-scale large facilities (like hospitals, sports facilities and the one-of-a-kind incinerator of Spittelau).

With the new projects, many of Vienna’s previous key rules are overturned, introducing, in particular, high rise buildings (for instance the Donau City skyscrapers) and higher density settlements. From a procedural and instrumental point of view, the implementation of the large projects follows specific rules. The accessibility to the area with public transport has to be guaranteed in advance to the construction of the project as well as the realisation of the public spaces; large interventions are divided into smaller sub-sections, which have different timelines and are subordinated to different planning and architectural competitions. In particular, the procedure of *Bauträgerwettbewerb* (see Scavuzzo 2001, pp.45-47), a combination of an architectural competition and a developers’ tender (that started to be used in the ’90s as an instrument of subsidized housing promotion) is now the norm for the projects implementation. It favours a period of design experimentation, involving, under the administration guide, designers, entrepreneurs and non-profit agents, asking for the cooperation between the bidding developers, the planners and the architects⁴⁴ already at the moment of the land development proposal.⁴⁵ As said, social housing⁴⁶ is one of the main requisites in every project and, for mainly residential complexes, it has to be 80% of the total dwellings.

From the organisational point of view, every process of project development is entrusted to a specific department of the administration and to a specific person in charge. Because of the land ownership, the municipality has normally a strong leverage both in publicly and in privately managed projects, for instance in the decisions about the new functions, that have to be conformed with a general localisation program. In general, though, the requirement is to pursue mixed-use areas, even in quite small projects, like the redevelopment of Kabelwerk (a former

⁴⁴ Important architects have participated in those years to the construction of the city new image as a contemporary capital city, like Foster, Perrault, Hadid, COOP Himmelblau, Gehl, to cite few, together with local and young offices often invited to the bids.

⁴⁵ It also requires a prearranged, binding valuation of construction costs and a program of management for the social housing, including an estimation of rents and selling costs.

⁴⁶ Social housing in Austria has several nuances, from municipality built dwellings, to non-profit association projects, to subsidised rents and purchases (Scavuzzo, 2011)

cable factory turned into a residential complex) that shows also one of the most interesting efforts of the municipality in small participative processes.

PARIS' EXPERIENCE AS A BENCHMARK

Background

One character of the strategic behaviours of Rome and Vienna is the trial to change the role of the governments, acquiring major responsibilities and autonomy, both economic and political, from the State. This happens in the context of several changes at the global and national level.

Before the 2000s, French national policies and laws were directed in contrasting the economic strength and the cultural hegemony of Paris and all the efforts of central urban policies were in building a balance in the territorial development with the other metropolitan areas of the state. At the beginning of the new century, the new goal of the central government is to create an international role for Paris in the global market. This goal implies a reconfiguration of Paris as a competitive metropolis and a mediation of the contrasts between Paris, historically isolated from its surroundings, the regional tier and the other communes (Subra & Newman 2008, Savini 2012). The *Grand Paris* project⁴⁷ is the main initiative in this context, envisioning a new metropolitan train line and a densification of the nodes around the new stations. In 2007, President Sarkozy announces this new project for the city and follows up its proposal with an international design context, involving famous French and non-French star-architects, and the proposal for a new Strategic Plan for the city. The French parliament ratifies this initiative with the Loi 2010-597, 3 juin 2010, modifying the norms for the implementation of the large metro-train infrastructure. Grand Paris is a proof of the periodical interference of the central government in Paris's issues and, especially, in Île-de-France politics, but this time in the direction of what was, until Sarkozy stance, a traditional claim of the leftist national and local parties (Subra 2009). In parallel, in fact, the new Paris mayor, Bertrand Delanoë and his council had started an autonomous activity of self-promotion and regional collaboration (together with participations in several international networks). The main changes in this direction happen with the drafting of specific agreements with the neighbouring municipalities and with the creation of the *Syndicat Grand Paris Métropole* (see FIGURE 6, p.), a new territorial entity (*intercommunalité*) formed by the mayors of Paris and 130 other communes and, although lacking juridical and normative powers, increasing the communication and action in the region. This initiative opens up a new metropolitan dimension for the city, based on a horizontal collaboration that pushes Paris' interests out of its borders (Subra & Newman 2008).

Governance

⁴⁷ We will not go in depth in Grand Paris project, but we refer to the following readings: Gilli, Offner 2009; Gilli 2014; Subra 2009, 2012, Subra, Newman 2008, Lacaze 2009, Enright 2014.

Bertrand Delanoë (Jouve 2007), in charge between 2001 and 2014, is a politician of the socialist party at the head of a coalition of socialists, greens and communists, the first “red” mayor since the autonomy of Paris municipality from the central state control (occurred only in 1977). As for the other case studies, new elections can be seen as a turning point also in the formulation of innovative strategies. In Paris’ case, we observe the shift of political colour, as happened in Rome (coupled with the same contrast with the national government, held, during Delanoë mandates, by two centre-right presidents, Jacques Chirac and Nicholas Sarkozy) and a major concern with social and environmental policies. Nonetheless, the global pressures and an overall capitalistic approach of western governments, show also in Paris the struggle between progressive policies and the seeking for market investments and transversal consensus. Differently from Vienna and Rome, the collaboration between local administration and other actors in Paris is evident in the formulation of the strategies as well as in the inclusion of stakeholder’ resources and in consensus building efforts. In the three cities, nonetheless, it is evident a strong path-dependency for what concerns the choice of the actors to include and, in France, also a tendency to recycle existing instruments (although packed in new narratives) especially in regeneration projects (Dormois, Pinson, Reignier 2005, Nappi-Choulet 2006).

Consensus building aims at avoiding the contrast with the population; this happens especially in the French capital, exposed to complex and intense social claims, with the aim of reinforcing social mix and housing policies (Subra, Newman 2008). The decision making phases during policies’ formulation and implementation are stages for bargaining with the higher tiers of public government and with the private actors. The choices on the short-term goals, and the modalities to achieve them, are usually made through the creation of ad hoc moments and places. Governments struggle to find the “appropriate setting in which to stage the decisional exchange” (paraphrasing Hajer and Wagenaar 2003 (p. 96) on discursive arenas), especially in a moment of restructuring of urban boundaries – although in Rome it is a post-poned reform and in Vienna a non-administrative, but geo-political, innovation.

An effort to redistribute the decision-making arenas includes also reforms at the micro local level, with the rescaling of the social and participative initiatives. In Rome, although an historical political presence of district associations, the role of *Municipi* is still embryonal in dealing with participative efforts, showing a mixture of tolerance and co-optation (sometimes, but in other forms, blamed also on Vienna governments (Novy et al. 2001)). Paris starts a process of citizens’ engagement with new efforts at the level of the arrondissements (Rullier 2004). Although, again, not proposing a proper redistribution of the powers, this action demonstrates the presence of more participative experimentation at the level of specific projects implementation, then at the strategic planning level, as it is recognisable in Rome and Vienna. Need of communication and agreement, therefore, is a much stronger argument in Paris in relation to vertical institutional relationships.

At the same time, the seeking for the agreements with non-public actors presents, as in Vienna, a strong public leverage. A rooted tradition of territorial development agencies has institutionalised the intermediate figure of the *aménageur*, in charge of public and public-private projects’ implementation. Despite these actors cannot be considered a peculiarity of the last decades, the increased use of *Société d’Economie Mixte* (SEM) (whose use started in France in the ’80s) since the 2000s

and the further introduction of *Societes Publiques Locales d'Amenagement* (SPLA) in 2006, have definitively institutionalised a specific organisation of urban development practice.

Planning

The territorial development in France concerns, more strictly than in other European capitals, the interplay of three powerful actors: the State, the Region and the City. As in Rome and Vienna, the City of Paris has a special status, but suffers from a long-standing dependence on the State, especially for the strategic projects localisation and definition, recently amplified by a subordination to the Regional government in respect to the economic and transport networks decisions.

Recent changes in planning activity in Paris are therefore marked by the modification of the planning discipline at the national level. After the 2000s reform,⁴⁸ the French communes must produce a masterplan, the PLU (*Plan Local d'Urbanisme*), approved in Paris in 2006, after five years of preparation. The Plan is defined by the Municipality "partially a strategic document" (Paris Municipality website), because it involves the orientations for the city's development on the horizon of 10 to 15 years and the main integrated objectives on the environment, housing, landscape protection and accessibility.

Nonetheless, the Île-de-France (the region of Paris) is in charge of the main structural document, the SDRIF, a strategic document previously produced by the State (only for this capital region), and controls the STIF, *Syndicat de Transport Ile de France* (again, in partnership with the State), the authority in charge of transportation management. The main project of polycentrism in Paris, formulated in the last decades, is linked to the regional scale⁴⁹ and aims at the decentralisation of important functions (from universities, to technological clusters) in the communes around the urban core.

I can recognise a convergence in the spatial model adopted in the three cities, partially coherent with the seeking of autonomy pursued by the governments. Expansionistic and territorial-marketing aims are packed in the narrative of supportive and social policies and spatialized in the polycentric structure. The spatial strategy corresponds to the will to create an organisational and administrative network, both downscaling the decision-making processes and upscaling the influence of the decisions, introducing metropolitan scale innovations and intermunicipal agreements.

Instruments

The main planning instrument at disposal to french actors is the *Zone d'aménagement concerté* (ZAC), a tool, firstly introduced in 1967⁵⁰, used in the management of large development public or mixed projects, in particular for urban

⁴⁸ The 2000 SRU Law (*Loi Solidarité et Renouvellement Urbains*) changes the main spatial planning instruments, introducing new characteristics in the regional and local planning responsibilities; moreover, it introduces an obligation for the municipality exceeding a certain number of inhabitants (1500 in Île-de-France, 3500 for the other regions), and being part of a specific agglomeration (more than 50.000 inhabitants) to set up a percentage of 20% of social housing in the overall dwelling provision. The law points as main objectives of the urban planning, the sustainable development, the solidarity and the enhancement of democracy and decentralisation.

⁴⁹ It is worth reminding that Paris municipal area is just 105 sqkm, meanwhile Rome is 1287 sqkm and Vienna is 415 sqkm. The Gran Paris Métropole (Paris plus 130 communes of the *couronne*) sizes 814 sqm, but in this area live more than two times the inhabitants of Rome.

⁵⁰ Loi d'orientation foncière, 31/1967.

redevelopment processes. The ZAC is a kind of public-private partnership (although this formula, in France, is more used to *partenarial* instruments addressed to smaller scale projects) in which the local government has the role of the client and entrusts its interests and resources to the aménageur, in charge in particular of land movement and acquisition and of the bargaining with private actors (the *promoteurs* of the specific interventions inside the ZAC). While allowing a direct control of the development activity to the public, this procedure is also used to promote holistic public policies, mixing infrastructural, social and cultural policies.

The origin of this instrument characterisation can be recognised in the land property system, a stage of necessary reflection in comparing the selected cases. Vienna has a large share of the urban land among its properties; on the contrary, the lack of this resource has pushed the City of Rome to engage in land mobilisation efforts, the above-mentioned *compensazioni*. In France, there are similar instruments – the *transferts du coefficient d'occupation des sols* (TCOS) – that allow the transfer of land property to the municipality in case of natural and protected areas (without any payment from the public) – but also powerful juridical instruments for the creation of public land resources – like the *droit de préemption*. Nonetheless, the organisation of development agencies in Paris and Vienna show a recognisable ability in prioritising public interests in a context of multiple actors, providing, beside knowledge and project-management resources, financial support. As Savini underlines: “Local politicians occupy chair positions within the public-private partnership, allowing a direct link between policy objectives and implementation. Indeed, in Paris, the municipality often owns the majority of shares in the partnership” (Savini 2012, p.1881). *Risorse per Roma* is a first step in this direction but doesn't provide financial support; it acts, on the contrary, as a sort of filter between the administration and the private owners, and, at the same time, has monitoring functions on some large specific projects (the *Centralità Urbane e Metropolitane*, for instance) – facing thus possible conflict of interests. Also, the nature of the private actors is different in the three contexts, the role of the developer being almost absent in Rome, as well as proper public-private partnerships. The *promoteur*, usually different from the land owner, is on the contrary deeply rooted in French law, which provides a distinction between “*ius edificandi*” and “*ius urbificandi*”, intended as the right to promote a urban transformation, apart from the land ownership.

Projects

A period of national large strategic projects (as the well-known La Défense) has defined the city's new landmarks in the '80s and '90s, engendering a sort of polycentric urban system unbalanced towards the eastern side of the city and focusing on traditional tertiary sector (office, banks). Lately in the 1990s, with projects like La Villette and Rive Gauche, the strategy was to shift the attention on the western side, investing in large redevelopment projects of former industrial and infrastructural areas. During the 2000s, with the new council, the government's action start focusing on a smaller scale, with the reconnection of urban deprived areas along the municipal borders. The social and political dimension is even stronger than in Vienna or Rome: the city borders, in particular the northern and the south-eastern ones, constitute specific areas of the city, with facilitated political relations – the chosen areas border the “red belt” municipalities, traditionally

governed by socialist mayors – but also with a concentration of the main problems of integration and accessibility to job and rents in the city⁵¹.




FIGURE 6 – Paris polycentric and infrastructural development program.

⁵¹ Specific data are available on the PLU report, 2000.

Paris' *Grand Projet De Renouveau Urbain* (GPRU) (see FIGURE 6) operation affects around 200.000 inhabitants, manages redevelopment intervention in 11 districts and, between 2002 and 2007, has a public funding of 160 million euro. The development of the areas follows an agreement among the State, the Region and the Municipalities, together with the *Caisse des Dépôts et Consignation*, and is managed by the City of Paris. These interventions are at the heart of the *Politiques de la Ville* and the more recent *Programme National de Renouveau Urbain*, the initiative in partnership with national and local institutions for the spatial and social recovery of deprived neighbourhoods, with a special focus on housing policy. Different from Rome, but like Vienna, the majority of these interventions insist on brownfields and already built areas, easily accessible with public transportation. The first and more obvious difference in the forms of polycentrism or urban project redevelopment in the three cities is evidently in the prior presence of a strong transportation structure that is incredibly underestimated, although not disregarded, in Roman initiatives.

In all the cases, nonetheless, these trials for the enhancement of urban, underdeveloped fringes pair with an activity of urban marketing. The candidacy of Paris for the Olympic games of 2012 has caused several critiques to the mayor, especially from the socialist party. The failure of this possibility, nonetheless, has left on the planning department desk many urban projects. First of all, the Clichy-Batignolles area, 50 ha of underutilised train deposit and peripheral station, property of the SNFC (the national rail transport utility), the biggest project of redevelopment in act in Paris⁵². Also the northern areas around Saint-Denis, Porte de La Chapelle and Aubervilliers, previously planned to be the new "Olympic area", with sports facilities and an enhancement of the public transportation, are still priority focuses for Paris urban development. Again, as the failed Expo in Vienna and the failed Olympic Games in Rome (first in 2020 and then in 2024), the large event becomes an important planning opportunity, although deprived of the implementation resources and, most of all, of the national funds. The condition is, apparently, to overcome the financial and organisational problems that are at the core of the implementation of these grand interventions. Rome case, for instance, with the Olympic Games failed opportunity in the context of the development of Tor Vergata area, underlines the inefficiency both in the localisation choices and in the capability to build a feasible project team, with the municipality at the core of the project⁵³. Nonetheless, also Rome is able to profit from event opportunities when a proper organisation is set up, as during the brand new leadership of Mayor Rutelli: the Church Jubilee event in 2000 is a good example of Rome capabilities, engaging in a series of infrastructural and public space upgrading, although far from the scale of Paris and Vienna ambitious projects.

⁵² The project starts from an agreement between Paris Municipality, SNCF and RFF. The area constituted a sort of enclave in the 17th arrondissement, enclosed by the peripherique, the highway ring around Paris, and totally dedicated to railway functions. It was first chosen for the Olympic Village and successively developed as a tertiary and residential project, with a 10 ha green park and several infrastructural and cultural facilities, among which the Tribunal de Grande Instance (TGI).

⁵³ The national government took the reins of the projects on the area, partially excluding the city from the process and showing the weakness of Rome in departing from her dependency to the central state. During the Prime Minister Monti government, the state itself to withdrew the 2020 candidacy.

TABLE 1 – Three realms of decision making articulation in territorial policies, as built along a strategic re-thinking of urban governments’ priorities.

Cities	Spatial planning project	Policy making infrastructures	Urban territorial governance
Rome (1993 election of Rutelli – 2008-9 approval of the new PRG and election won by the right)	Polycentrism, decentralisation, physical requalification of peripheries, green areas protection, transport networks enhancement (railways and metro), important architectural projects, low rise, residential development	Changes are mainly realised in the framework of traditional normative instruments; Public-private partnerships are set through administrative contracts, related to specific projects.	Incremental (there is no direct redistribution of powers, the partnerships do not create a stable network of decision making; intermediate decisions are taken not distancing from status quo)
Vienna (1994 election of Häupl, EU, STEP update – 2014 last STEP)	Polycentrism, decentralisation, transport networks enhancement (railways and metro), requalification of industrial areas, division of the city in interrelate geographical and functional areas, important architectural projects, high rise development, social housing.	Public-private development agencies; new priorities are set and completely new areas of action are initiated (headquarters, international financiers) using new decisional platforms (workshops, expositions); metropolitan and interregional dimension of the territorial development is enhanced.	Corporative (the power is centralised but there are many and different actors mobilised according to the issue at stake)
Paris (2001 election of Delanoë and SRU – 2014 new elections)	Regional polycentrism, Industrial and deprived areas requalification, public transport enhancement (tram and bike), decentralisation and “demusealisation”, large projects at the city’s border, important architectural projects, social housing.	Public-private development agencies; metropolitan dimension of the territorial development is enhanced through inter-municipal agreements; existing social policies structures (public housing, cultural integration) are used for the physical transformation of the city.	Dirigist (the decisions are taken in a continuous conversation between the public tiers, managing the private actors’ actions towards social and integrative policies) - concertation

TABLE 2 – A model of urban development

Spatial planning project	Policy making infrastructures	Urban territorial governance
Polycentrism, decentralisation, requalification	Negotiation, clear rules, public-public and public-private partnerships	Strong mediator and leading role for city's administrators

SIMILAR TRENDS AND STRUCTURAL DIFFERENCES

The three cities show an effort to produce strategies for their development that imply the combination of economic innovation, governance and administrative update and spatial new approaches. This behaviour of the local governments is embedded and forced in the structure of existing norms and institutions. This process implies the interplay of existing systems and political and administrative actions. Some organisational and instrumental innovations, that are only partially visible in the discourses and in the official documents, must be recognised along the processes of decision making and policy implementation. The selection and use of resources, together with the agreements produced by the public, add other segments at the overall, composite, strategy, although also generating controversies and adjustments to the initial objectives.

When confronting my cases with the literature on strategic planning, one of the main distinction is that the decisions and strategies in spatial terms for Rome, Vienna and Paris are still mainly expressed in their non-strategic plans (although Vienna had a first, politically important plan and Paris has a different level of strategy formulation in its regional counterpart). Therefore, one of the issues at stake when analysing the development strategies in these cities is that the presence of a strategic plan is not crucial in the definition of strategies, at least for those intended to a re-thinking of the spatial development. On the contrary, it is the renovation of the traditional plans and the use of implementation instruments in the field of public-private and public-public partnerships that is used by new resourceful governments to steer a different image for the city. Those plans constitute the traces of the actors' actions, the segments of the strategies that have been institutionalised.

The large development projects, then, are used to redefine, in their image and in their weight in the local and national economy, the space and population of the cities, especially in areas that have major possibilities to be improved (because of private actors' interests, of geographical opportunities, etc.).

Also, the implementation structure, in this project-driven reorganisation, has a strong and recognisable characterisation. The negotiation is the main approach, with experiments of participative and inclusive processes, or public-private partnerships. The leadership and capacity to avoid the contrast is therefore a priority for the local government in order to obtain results and successes, although sacrificing part of the democratic political struggle.

When the chance comes in the wake of an accountability tradition of the government, as happens in the socialist and communist governments in Rome and Vienna, it seems even "easier" to introduce innovation. Though, innovation "easiness", according to a part of the literature, is more linked to the exceptionality of an event, able to kickstart a path dependant change (Pflieger 2009), than to the existence of a strong tradition of consolidated policies. In Rome, in fact, the link with a welfare driven, cultural concerned and autonomous leftist government approach has been only partially maintained, with a deviation towards an incremental and opportunistic behaviour of the administration, still partially depending on other

tiers of the public and unable to organise the large Roman territory and to manipulate the private actors' resources. On the contrary in Vienna, the more radical combination of New Public Management innovations, welfare tradition and land mobilisation has given not only a major autonomy to the municipality but also better instruments to deal with controversies and turning points – a “resilience” able to accompany the unroll and unpack of strategies.

The distance between the political choices and the organisational and implementation structures acquires thus in the analysed cities very different length. This model of spatial development, in which the strategies formulation at spatial level is used neither to enhance democracy nor efficiency (as it was in its expected aims and normalised plan-making) but to manage a process of reorganisation of enlarged and transitional actor-networks, shows several nuances when observed in act.

Some clear differences can be underlined through specific indicators related partially to the obdurate structural characters of the cities and partially to the specific style of projects' management and implementation. These variations can suggest a distinctive declination of the model.

I have selected four possible indicators (that, nonetheless, should be proven with further in-depth analysis of the cases) that diversify the approaches:

- the land mobilisation and infrastructure
- the style of governance in large projects' implementation
- the degree of functional and economic innovation
- the degree of government flexibility when facing market response.

As we have seen, the case of Paris and Vienna show similar conditions – mainly in the land ownership and in the characteristics of land development agencies – while Rome's situation requires to the government different degrees of flexibility and “creativity” for the use and management of the land, producing more complex bargaining with the land owners. In Vienna, a tradition of public land-ownership has assured (until a certain extent) the possibility to use more complex and public-driven decision making tools – like the developers' competition. At the same time, the pressures coming from private actors to implement economic innovations and open up to new markets has provided contents for the newly built residential and office complexes. The absence of similar conditions in Rome made counterproductive the use of land compensation procedure to steer private interests, given the lack of substantial economic incentives, as well as the scarce public financial autonomy.

The style of governance in large projects is different in the three cases, although presenting similarities regarding the search for an intermunicipal, horizontal governance, both in the conception of the projects and in the will to maintain a core leadership role for the city. The case of Paris allowed me to consider the important role that mixed development agencies can bear, being a developed and working reality of the city. The private actors' requests are therefore already embedded and limited in the intermediate planning moments. Moreover, Paris' tendencies towards metropolitan scale development and an effort to collaborate with other municipalities has led to a reconsideration of its resources and to their use for more

integrated economic-social-spatial policies. The experiments with public-private partnerships are almost inexistent in the Italian capital and the stakeholders' interests are unveiled in the bargaining of trade-offs during contractual phases. An adaptive flexibility to land-owners requests is evident in Rome and invalidates the role of intermediate actors (like *Risorse per Roma* agency) and of project design variables. The three cities display a general alignment towards neoliberal trends, for instance in the idea to act on the public management and on the entrepreneurial role of the government or in the participation to international events bids. Nonetheless, they maintain an instance of path-dependency from welfare governments, with the effort to steer real estate market and to balance competitive efforts with social-related policies. In Rome, especially in respect to the other two cities, is visible an abandonment of the plan regulation possibilities and normative power, not flanked, as it happened in Vienna and Paris, by a conscious re-elaboration of projects procedure and aims.

This approach is therefore linked to the possibility to enhance a major degree of functional and economic innovation, enlarging the funds, the opportunities and the appeal of the intervention, integrating different economic opportunities and attracting international foreign capital on an innovative and shared project. This could be considered less impressive in the case of Paris, although the financialisation of the city has always, in the past, been kept under control with ad hoc state intervention; in Vienna, on the contrary, the foreign investment is a totally new resource that has been caught by Mayor Häupl's administration with an important organisational and political effort. In Rome, despite the impressive analytical and forecasting work of the municipality in defining new spatial strategies, the centralised style of governance and the incapacity to create a unique path of development, unifying the different decisional moments and creating a unique policy platform, has hindered the possibility of change, leaving the innovation to the conservative construction- and real estate actors. Not only the functions are not updated, keeping a leading role for the private residential functions – far from any housing experimentation happening in the meanwhile in Paris and Vienna – but also the economic innovation has, with interesting exception (the Ostiense project process, although not completely realised), missed a proper spatialisation and localisation scheme. This happens despite the ad hoc sectoral policies set by the government, encouraging the most promising sectors – the research and education, the culture and tourism, the event and the hi-tech.

The last characteristic that intercepts different efficacies in the strategies realisation is the relationship between the government and the private actors, in particular the government leverage and response facing the market demands and offers. In the analysed circumstances of large project management, partly as a consequence of the above-listed characteristics, Rome's response is passive and partly powerless. The reasons for this lack of leadership are not clear and are not the core of this analysis, but in the comparison with the other two cities, we can underline few hypothesis: the incapacity of the administration to realise, despite the electoral support demonstrated along four elections, an effective communication with the public about the large projects and the polycentric model; the decision to overlook the dangers in the detachment between the ownership of

the land and the public interest on it; the dependency to private investments once accomplished a major autonomy from the state; and eventually, the difficulties in controlling the “planning by doing” process. In Vienna, the problems in territorial management, although present, have been overcome, despite a complex and over-bureaucratised administrative body (and thanks to the New Public Management efficiency efforts), having a clear design of the public interest and of the desired role for non-public actors. Similarly than in Paris, an operation of deregulation on planning norms and rules and on projects’ schedules has enhanced a certain degree of projects’ reversibility. This has been achieved through incremental changes that have not invalidated the initial design and objectives, fostering, on the contrary, the use of innovative instruments (from the division in meso- and microlevels of action, to the subordination of contracts to mandatory competitions).

TABLE 3 - Indicators of permeability of strategic approach in large urban development projects

Cities	Land mobilisation and infrastructure	Style of Governance of project implementation	Degree Functional and economic innovation	Degree of Flexibility in facing market response
Rome	Land rights compensation, used as alternative to compulsory purchase; the majority of the land used for development projects is privately owned	The municipality is in charge of individuation, management and control on the implementation (including various city departments and municipi); projects are managed through a mix of new and traditional instruments (piano di zonizzazione, convenzione, progetto urbano); Risorse per Roma agency is in charge of specific areas monitoring.	Scarce economic innovation inside real estate sector; priority to residential and commercial complexes; traditional private partners (Roman builders companies)	High dependency on private capitals and initiative; infrastructures and services realisation depends on private developers; low flexibility in adapting to real estate market trends.
Vienna	The City of Vienna uses its own land for large development projects	The local administration appoints specific city departments for the management of	High degree of economic innovation; new functions (research and technological clusters); capacity	Limited dependency on private actors: agreements lean towards public

		the main development projects; there are also specific public-private agencies for singular projects, in charge of a further phase of lands collection and sell, or for the organisation of planning competition; use of competition-tender procedure	to steer local and international investments; real estate as a bridge to innovative economic areas of development	administration benefits; strong central control of the projects and clear perimeters of adaptability to private stakeholders requests
Paris	The administration normally chooses areas with a large amount of publicly owned land; land management and acquisition is up to a private or public company (SEM or PLAM) in charge of the specific project (amenageur); the instruments of droit the pre-emption and of transfert de COS	State, administration and other horizontal public tiers participate to proposal of the development areas; the aménageur acts as an intermediate actor in charge of the management of large development projects (in particular the ZAC), selecting the promoteurs (the companies that act on the area); the administration remains in charge of projects control and building rights grant	From office provision to housing provision; internationalisation and privatisation of aménageur and private developers	Mainly local public funds are invested for development areas infrastructure, aiming at an ex-post economic gain through public-private bargaining; flexibility of procedures but strict coherence with administrative regulations and public program.

CONCLUSIONS

In the period analysed, Rome and Vienna withstand the external changes happening in their international and national contexts, including a recognisable trend of economic growth. The two cities' strategy consists in grabbing these growth opportunities and direct the new resources toward public interest. They select specific guidelines to modify their territorial competitiveness, increment their economic innovation and translate the discourses coming from the European Union. These goals are fostered with a reorganisation of the three realms of: spatial planning, territorial governance and urban policymaking. The adopted administrative innovations are partially coherent with the overall strategies, which are nonetheless often not explicit, fragmented and evolving quickly.

The cases analysis testify that also traditional spatial planning and the related actions – the revision of the main instruments, the proposition of new territorial priorities, the choice of a specific scale of action, a deregulation of the construction norms, new implementation instruments – channel these changes and represent a crucial part of the management of change.

The contextual comparative exercise unveils aims and modalities shared by the two cities. Approaching the broad framework of administrative reorganisation, we can characterise the specific model of strategic management expressed by the two cities as follows:

- Use of polycentrism and decentralisation spatial models
- Strong negotiation in between clear rules and transparent partnerships with the market
- A strong role of the municipal government

The case of Paris is used as a verification of the existence of similar trends in very different cities that are facing similar changes (neoliberal economic pressures, cities' competition, etc.). Nonetheless, the consequences of this hypothetical model are different and can be analysed, must be analysed (Mazza & Bianconi 2014), using variables related to the model of implementation of the strategic actions. In particular, on the base of the cities' large projects implementation modalities (a stable proxy for local planning action in '90s and 2000s period, as Mazza (Mazza 2002) suggests), I have determined the following indicators:

- the land mobilisation and infrastructure
- the style of governance in large projects implementation
- the characteristics of functional and economic innovation
- the degree of government flexibility in facing market response.

The result is that actions are implemented differently in the three cities: certain things are governed, and certain are not (Pierre 1999, p.374). The chosen indicators depend partially on specific characters of cities' background that persist in their effect, notwithstanding the innovations, and partially on characters coming

from governance, organisational and political choices. The discriminant is therefore not in the existent of one peculiar character, but in their coherent combination.

Nonetheless, in the application of strategies, the flexibilisation of planning (with deregulation and, sometimes, a re-thinking of the instruments, times, procedures, internal organisation) and its relationship with the governance plays a fundamental role. Finding a balance, maintaining the accountability of the public, is discriminant in the development project and deserves further, in depth, analysis of the relation between new strategies and their translation into urban planning traditional processes.

APPENDIX

AREA (SQ KM)

CITIES	Municipal ¹	Metro area ²	Province/ department / region (NUTS 3) ¹	Region (NUTS 2) ¹
ROME	1.287,36	5.686,4	5.363	17.332
VIENNA	415	9.093	415	23.563
PARIS	105,4	12.089,3	105,4	12.012,3

¹Data from Eurostat.

²Data from OECD Regional and Metropolitan statistics.

TABLE 4 – Municipal, metropolitan, provincial and regional areas.

INHABITANTS

	Municipal area 2014 ¹	Municipal area 2014 (urban core) ²	Metro area 2014 (Functional Urban Area - FUA) ²	Province/reg ion 2014 (NUTS 3) ¹	Province/reg ion 2014 (NUTS 2) ¹	Urban pop var.20 00- 2014 ¹	Urban pop var. 1990 - 2014 ¹	Regional pop var. 2000- 2014 (NUTS 2) ¹	Regional pop var. 1990- 2014 (NUTS 2) ¹
ROME	2.86 3.32 2	2.638. 663	4.149. 364	4.321. 244	5.870. 451	11,4%	3,2%	14,7%	14,8%
VIENNA	1.74 1.24 6 (201 3)	1.789. 588	2.793. 631	1.765. 575	3.679. 155	7,8%	13,1%	9,5%	14,3%
PARIS	2.24 0.62 1	9.532. 016	12.03 7.889	2.220. 445	12.02 7.565	5,4%	4,1%	8,9%	12,8%

¹Data from Eurostat.

²Data from OECD Regional and Metropolitan statistics.

TABLE 5 – Inhabitants in Rome, Vienna and Paris.

GDP (MILLION US DOLLARS)²

	GDP_ metro o_20 12	GDP_ p.c._ metro _2014	GDP_ metro _share on nation al GDP_ 2012	GDP_ var_ metro _2000- 2012	GDP_ p.c._ var_ metro _2000- 2014	GDP_ provin ce/de partm ent/ Land_ 2012	GDP_ var_ prov_ 2000- 2014	GDP_ reg_ 2013	GDP_ var_ reg_ 2000- 2014
ROME	189. 919, 29	46.58 0,67	9,44%	7%	-3%	153.7 48	39%	183.27 9	36%
VIENNA	129. 515, 54	47.30 7,24	35,63 %	17%	4%	93.26 3	62%	-	-
PARIS	707. 134, 27	59.61 1,07	30,75 %	21%	12%	198.4 44	34%	631.30 1	50%

² Data from OECD Regional and Metropolitan statistics.

TABLE 6 – GDP figures.

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CHAPTER 3

Between strategy and practice: the example of 'centralità' in Rome.

ABSTRACT

The last comprehensive strategic project for the city of Rome trace back to the 'model' devised and pursued, during the '90s, by the center-left local party, in parallel with the construction of the new urban spatial master plan. Observing the physical interventions allowed in those years, it is possible to reflect on the selection of discourses and practices that gave birth to the city's late urban development. I have analysed, in particular, the polycentric spatial strategy proposed for the city, focusing on one of its structural components: the urban and metropolitan 'centralità'. The analysis, which has roots in the sociology of instruments, has showed the differences between strategies 'as told' by the government and the plan, and strategies 'as acted' through the implementation tools. The realized 'centralità' which I have further analysed as case studies (Bufalotta, Eur Castellaccio and Tor Vergata), shed light on the interplay between the eroded role of these new urban poles and the public administration delays in updating the implementation process in line with the strategic objectives.

INTRODUCTION

Rome case is rarely linked with the literature and records on urban strategies and strategic planning⁵⁴. Actually, the last four Roman administrations have been blamed for being unable to formulate a strategy of coherent development (Tocci 2015). At the same time, though, the last spatial masterplan, *Piano Regolatore Generale* (PRG), initiated during Mayor Rutelli's council and brought forward, until the approval in 2008, by Mayor Veltroni, has "strategic" components, despite being formally a traditional spatial plan. It formalises and gives normative weight to the spatial strategies coming from the coeval european studies and urban planning trends (polycentrism, requalification, participatory planning and large projects planning) and produces, together with a normative framework, a specific representation of the contemporary city. During the years of the new PRG construction, these strategies are tested directly in the definition and implementation of projects of territorial development using the "planning by doing" approach (therefore in variation to the regulation in effect until 2008). In this specific technical-administrative situation, it is possible to observe strategies-related decisions enacted directly during the processes of operative planning, without any official structural or strategic plan filter. The specific political and economic moment in which these transformations are happening – from 1993 and throughout the alternation of growth and decline economic phases – generates an overlapping of a strong rhetorical effort (brought forward by the mayors) with a trial of re-thinking urban development spatial strategies.

Recently, the processual and technical abilities of these years' governments have been the objects of literature and national and local press reflections. Former protagonists of Rome's administration have stabbed at the lack of city's resilience in policy implementation and labelled as "counterproductive" (Tocci 2015) certain choices and instruments. This combination of spatial policies and administrative dispositives had, according to academic observers, "perverse" effects (Delpirou & Nessi 2011) that highlight the criticalities in the successes claimed by Rutelli and Veltroni governments. The accusation of political failure blamed on the adopted spatial strategies, though (for instance, by the urban planners Paolo Berdini and Vezio de Lucia in their writings, as well as in the articles of Francesco Erban in the most diffused Italian newspaper), with a direct attack to the new masterplan for the city, is not based on its envisioned "application". The narrative about the fallacy of the plan, in fact, is built on the outputs of the strategic projects that precede its

⁵⁴ There is a Strategic Plan for the city of Rome, published in 2011, but it has never been used by the City Council and, therefore, can be considered only an analytical and rhetorical document, expression of the coeval administration (with mayor Alemanno). This document, nonetheless, resumes some considerations and priorities expressed from the new general plan and tries to intertwine its objectives with the evolving path of the ongoing large development projects (for instance, the candidacy for the Olympic Games and the Tor Vergata project area).

approval, but also on the choice of instruments, actors and resources on which the fragmented strategies grew.⁵⁵

Notwithstanding these critiques, it is neither clear how those intermediate choices have acted on behalf of the strategies, nor the direction of the ongoing policies.

To understand this contested relation, I have deconstructed the intentionality that seems to guide the activity of “planning through strategies”, normally conceived as unique and unidirectional. Leaving untouched the possibility of multiple actors’ rationalities, I have decided to focus on the intrinsic (and sometimes inertial) capacity of instruments to bound administrative decisions. The administrative instruments, in fact, as visible segments of a transient logic, can be the keys to clarify this part of Rome’s history.

This research discusses the strategies related to the polycentric urban planning model and its main components⁵⁶: the *Centralità Urbane e Metropolitane*. The observation of the centralities of Bufalotta-Porta di Roma, Eur Castellaccio and Tor Vergata shows a link between the implementation results and three initial hypothesis: the existence of a strategic approach – partly implicit and reconstructed through an inquiry in official statements in documents and press; the complexity of the strategies’ actualisation machine, scarcely correlated to the general objective (Oliva 2017), both in efficacy and efficiency terms; although several reflections on the priorities and the general planning instruments, the implementation engine has not been governed, producing opposite (but not surprising) outcomes and a general standstill of the related actions. An increased, deliberated flexibility (a key word in the literature on strategies) has thus modified the city construction *iter*. The result is the constant exception to the masterplan and to the recourse to bargaining episodes that have tended to lighten private actors’ obligations. The critiques that have accompanied the realisation of the polycentric project, thus, stand up to examination especially in respect to a claim of renovated accountability for Rome’s administration.

Nonetheless, along these last 25 years, the initial strategy has persisted and has evolved in its spatial effects, and produced a specific kind of city.

⁵⁵ I am referring, for example, to Berdini (Berdini 2007, 2008) and Salzano (Salzano 2008) critiques and to the De Lucia and Erbani book published in 2016 (see the antithetic reviews of Brenna (Brenna 2017) and Oliva (Oliva 2017) for the “Casa della Cultura di Milano”).

⁵⁶ The polycentrism is used in Rome as a model for the realisation of several operations, implying the use of specific instruments – as zoning plans and renovation projects – but in this article I will mainly treat the “centralità” projects.

LITERATURE AND METHOD

The term “strategy” (Mazza 2000) allows mentioning a sum of actions linked to a processual innovation aimed at managing changed development conditions. It can relate to a path of efficiency enhancement of the decisional phases in general or, in spatial planning case, to the structuring of territorial interventions, according to specific priorities and expectations⁵⁷. In general, in the contemporary European context, the strategy includes the selection of coherent instruments, actors and resources, for reaching an economic and territorial growth, in a way that guarantees stability to the political coalition in charge. The term is therefore related to the shift between government and governance and used in local contexts to characterise projects, operations, policies and meaningful decisions expressed by an enlarged arena of stakeholders. However, the majority of governments formulate strategies in their political agendas, turning them into narratives to generate a larger consent.

Strategies though are not equivalent to discourse. Along with the strategy, a model is translated, defined by actors’ coalitions and spatial characteristics and paved with multiple integrated actions. At the same time, the strategy does not correspond to a generic administrative decision, or sum of decisions, taken in continuity with the status quo, but implies a will to introduce long-term updates.

Scholars have talked about the strategic approach in Rome context, when they have addressed a specific attitude, elevated at political approach since Mayor Rutelli government. This attitude refers to the pursuing of a stable partnership between political actors and market, allowing collaborative planning forms (D’Albergo & Moini 2013, p.11) that are typical of the ’90s strategic planning.⁵⁸

From the territorial government point of view, the strategy is represented by the coeval structural modification of the urban growth spatial dynamic. The construction of a polycentric model aims at the restructuring and modernisation of the municipal area (Salvagni 2005), through the concentration of physical growth on selected areas and the enhancement of mobility and accessibility infrastructures. This model has its main formal applications in the design of large strategic projects, a novelty in the post-fascist Roman development. The model is also linked to the rescaling of the local powers at the metropolitan scale, as

⁵⁷ Strategic planning is a public organisations practice developed in United States in the 80s, as a translation of efficiency-related methodologies created for private firms. The diffusion in Europe in the 90s, allows a distinction, both at theoretical and practical level, between a more company-like and economic-driven approach (parallel to the introduction of New Public Management in the administrations) and, in the context of spatial planning, an approach based on collaborative planning and democratic governance enhancement (Innes 1996, Healey 1998, 1999, Albrechts 2001). In Italy, the theme of strategic planning is developed mainly inside the urban planning discipline, in particular by the Milan school (Mazza 2000, Balducci 2015). The absence of a strategic plan, and the following debate on “how much strategic” is the new Rome masterplan are recurrent topics, starting from its initial writing and the will to distinguish a “structural” and an “operative” part.

⁵⁸ Meanwhile Rutelli tries a collaboration with landowners and construction companies, mayor Veltroni, his successor, tries to open the collaboration to other local actors, getting closer to more collaborative forms of strategic planning.

envisioned by forthcoming national innovations. The link between spatial structure, modes of city construction and governance is undeniable and, for the sake of this research, integrative in the definition and characterisation of the strategy. The approach, confirmed and normed during the preparation of the new urban general plan, PRG (1993-2008) from a team of prominent planners,⁵⁹ is linked to the narrative of sustainable economic development, with the transfer of some of the strategic planning and European Commission urban agenda components.⁶⁰

In the next paragraphs, I describe these positions both in their discursive dimension, linked to the representation of problems and solutions for the city, both in their technical one, in respect to specific instruments, norms and procedures.

I use hereby Lascoumes and Le Galès definition of instrument: “A broad-spectrum technical dispositive, carrying a concrete conception of the relationship between politics and society and supported by a certain conception of regulation”⁶¹ (Lascoumes & Le Galès 2009, p.4). Although various distinctions in the characteristics of the dispositives, the instruments can be conceived as a social institution, “a more or less coordinated ensemble of rules and procedures, governing actors and organisations interactions and behaviours” (cit. North 1990, in Lascoumes & Le Galès p. 5). An enlightening part of the work of the two scholars concerns the conception of every instrument as carrying a “history”, to which are linked the permanent characteristics of the instrument itself. The instrument is therefore flexible, but not neutral: it conveys a specific representation of the problems and the solutions. Administrators choose the instruments also in relation to these characteristics, and adapt it to different contexts, according to their judgement. In this sense, discussing choice and instruments use in public organisations implies, also in contexts of multi-actor governance, to recognise a role of main agent to the government. To keep notice of the nuances that instruments can have, it is important to observe them from the point of view of the effects they generate, that is: watching them in act.

The main instrument for the realisation of the urban strategy in Rome is the large spatial project. The importance of large development projects in the realisation of the strategy has been addressed by several scholars (Carmona & Burgess 2001, Monclus 2003, Salet & Gualini 2006, Albrechts 2006). In general, the '80s are considered a period of renaissance of projects' role in European cities. The reasons are usually individuated in two mechanisms: the de-industrialisation of urban areas, that generates the need to requalify those territories and allows the introduction of new functions, more attuned to the new economic environment (business districts, R&D clusters, residential enclaves, etc.); the new role of cities in the global economy and their entrance in the financial market, with the emergence of place marketing and territorial competition. In this latter sense, the rapid changes happening at the national and global scale, with the decrease of the

⁵⁹ The main consultant is Giuseppe Campos Venuti (Director of the National Urbanism Institute), with a contribution of Federico Oliva, meanwhile the Directors of the Planning Office are, first, Maurizio Marcelloni and then, during Veltroni government, Daniel Modigliani.

⁶⁰ I here refer to the trial to link the topic of social sustainability of the city with redistributive policies, which imply an explicit bargaining with the private actors – a model that will be fully used also in its rhetorical dimension by Mayor Veltroni.

⁶¹ My translation.

sectoral-base national funds for the cities and the increase of the place-based international ones, in particular by the European Commission, have pushed the cities to become active producers of their richness and promoters of their image. In a context of major competition, becomes in fact necessary to “manifest an intention, some vocations, with the aim to mobilise actors inside and be visible to the actors outside” (Pinson, 2009, p.123). To do this, the “project” can attract foreign investments, but also mobilise local actors, both private and public, on common interests.

As we have seen, the existence of a broad “project for the city”, another definition for urban strategies (Pinson 2009) represents the reply to these pressures at the planning level. On the other side, at the level of instruments, the project, intended as the design of a large area of the city, has acquired in the same years a wider significance. Projects are more similar to spatial policies, conceived, starting from the 2000s, as complex operations that includes not only several actors, but also the efforts for the spatialisation of stable or temporary economic engines (like large sport, market and cultural events (Fainstein 2008, Monclus 2003)). The growth of the cities in this fragmented way has become a blueprint for a new spatial model, based on two principles: the potentiality of effects multiplication (Bricocoli & Savoldi 2010) that a project has on its surroundings and on the entire city; the end of land consuming growth, with the possibility to concentrate the existent resources on specific areas, moreover in a more flexible and pragmatic way in respect to the traditional planning instruments (Macchi Cassia 1991).

Italian cities, in particular, at the beginning of the '80s, were in a situation of decay (Aymonino et al. 1990). The diffused evasion from planning normative provisions, leading to phenomenon of sprawl, and the fragmentation of the discipline had been addressed as the main causes of this phenomenon. The use of projects had historically concerned infrastructural policies, or other specific policy areas (like social housing). In the '70s, the introduction of the notion of *recupero* in planning practice (Pinson 2009) opens the way to a reconfiguration of projects as a way to act on the existing pattern of the city (Aymonino et al. 1990), allowing the entrance of the practice in urban policy realm. At the beginning of the '90s, then, the introduction by the national legislation of specific instruments for the requalification and regeneration of urban areas (PII, PRU, PRUSST, Contratti di Quartiere) has pushed further interventions at the scale of the district and focused on the integration of social and spatial actions. The parallel diffusion of participative and collaborative processes, and of public-private partnerships has given birth to several nuances of projects governance.

In Rome, the lack of a predominant industrial background, has delayed the use of strategic projects. The introduction of the polycentric strategy is therefore a novelty for many reasons. The use of projects has been diversified according to different functions. The requalification of the existing city is delegated to the previously mentioned requalification instruments, acting on the “peripheries”; the creation of the new image for the city is, on the other side, appointed to architectural objects, with cultural and touristic functions, in the city central areas. The new poles, on the contrary, are interventions on different types of areas, for the majority brownfields, with the aim of structure and provide services to larger portions of the cities. In this way, they combine the expectations typical of the large urban project diffusing in Europe, related to international competition; and the

redistributive effect of economic, organisational and social restructuring at the local level.

In the analysed roman context, strategic projects have come before the plan. They are, then, not only an operative instrument of superimposed levels of decision making, but have a decisional autonomy and very distinctive implementation paths. Their implementation process is characterised by several tools, chosen or newly introduced by the administration. The instruments' action, thus, can be read as a possible power leverage for the different governments of the Italian capital in the '90s and 2000s, in the absence of a coherence between strategies and planning framework.

This inquiry is based on three successive steps of data gathering, in which I have used different sources. Starting from official documents, the academic literature on Rome and the newspapers, I have analysed the explicit narratives of the city, especially those linked to the polycentric approach and to the chosen interventions. Afterwards, I have retraced the history of the projects inquiring in administrative contracts, operative plans and council ordinances. I have observed instruments and strategic aims to determine turning points, disequilibria and contradictions in their interplay. It seemed worthwhile, for this scope, to consider more than just one instrument and thus focus the analysis on a selected "toolbox" of the administration. In this way, one can value how the instruments combination modifies the (i) general projects' goals (in respect to localisation and functions), (ii) the quality of the built city and (iii) the power balance among actors. Eventually, I have collected original information through interviews with selected actors, as projects responsible, bureaucrats and city planners. I therefore could produce some conclusive remarks.

POLYCENTRISM, RHETORICS AND STRATEGIES IN ROME

Polycentrism, in the analysed period, appears as one of the “characteristics that define the urban landscape of advanced economies” (Kloosterman & Musterd 2001). It is a paradigm that unifies an economic development model to a spatial structure composed of multiple centres. In Rome, this model is intertwined with the political objective to intervene on the social, economic and governmental structure of the city. Polycentrism, “iron cure”⁶² and a system of protected green and agricultural areas are the three engines of this structure and are strongly bonded, both in the rhetoric and in the spatial, physical projects. The first general strategic goal for the government is to identify, using these three engines, the structural and coordinated elements (“model”, “condition” and “limit”, Delpirou 2009) for the sustainable development of Rome. Polycentrism, moreover, is useful to tie the new projects with the history and form of the city. With the sprawl growth, allowed by the 1931 masterplan, developed in Rome, starting from the second post-world-war, a “naturally polycentric” urban system (Comune di Roma 1998, p.60), characterised by disequilibria from environmental and life-quality points of view. This system intertwines with the double narrative of “spontaneous” and “programmed” polycentrism, both results of the reflection on centre and peripheries relation in Rome.

In fact, Rome’s territory has acquired a sort of polycentric structure as a result of the redistribution of inhabitants occurred with the development of regional railways (Caudo & Coppola 2007). This territorial distribution did not create poles of economic development but centres characterised by demographic densification, representative of specific identities, something more similar to satellite cities than to urban *foci*.

This polycentrism suffers, nonetheless, the dependency from the central core as much as the “frontier” condition between municipalities. This sort of “spontaneous” polycentrism is proposed again, in its two dimensions of significant alternative to the city centre and correspondence with the public transport, in the “programmed” polycentrism that I am analysing.

In the poles narration, it is underlined a diversification of the economic vocations, that should depend on existing resources in place, characterising them as projects, functions and landmarks multipliers, the place for the grand infrastructures for the city. Cremaschi summarises the large projects season and the Roma Capitale narratives, including SDO, the World Cup project and the new PRG Centralità, as the repetition of the “obsessive features of a quantitative growth policy, that uses agreement, real estate promotion and national resources capture” (Cremaschi 2013, p.19). One can notice a will to not interrupt this market excitement, but to curb and manage it.

In particular, in polycentrism project construction, the government tries to enhance both the economic development and the requalification of peripheries. The

⁶² A renovation of the public rail and metro transport system in Rome and Lazio Region.

planning narrative builds a specific periphery⁶³ and sprawl conceptualisation. In the governance, at the same time, the most used forms are the metropolitan city and the urban solidarity, together with a large use of the “rules” rhetoric, in particular when referring to the relation with private actors (for instance, the *piano delle certezze*, the “certainties plan”). In the discourses, the polycentrism becomes therefore a requalifying activity aimed at mending the peripheries in nodal points. Those should become magnetic poles for the outskirts dispersive fabric (deriving from the sprawl and illegal building phenomena) or for the hyper-dense, lacking public functions, settlements (as the social housing intervention of the ’70s). The nodes should also have the physical, spatial and architectural status of real “urban fragments”.

In these terms, the diffuse polycentrism can be considered the main strategic novelty proposed by the new model and the new plan in respect to its predecessors. This model fulfils “two basic choices weaved together: from one side, the relationship between Rome and the metropolitan area, diverting the monocentric trend of the city; from the other side, the polycentrism can and should allow a further qualification of Rome as capital city, with national and international level functions” (Salvagni 2005). The poles’ importance relies therefore both in their localisation and in the objects and functions foreseen. In the definition of these areas are included the main stations, the urban and metropolitan centralities, the new university campuses, the technology clusters, the urban regeneration intervention, the big public-private partnership projects and the new archeologic parks. Even when the political alternation steers the city’s development toward different priorities, the creation of the urban and metropolitan centralities remains the most ambitious moment of the polycentrism narrative in the ’90s and 2000s. In the process of choice and definition of the centralities, though, rhetoric becomes actual strategy.

We can distinguish two moments for the definition of a strategy linked to the polycentric model: before and after the approval of the new masterplan. Before, some centralities (those linked to the financial funds provided by the Law for Roma Capitale, 1990) are individuated in 1997 by the “poster plan”, Rutelli’s programmatic document, as “area projects”. Afterwards, in the amendment to the 1965 masterplan called *Variante delle certezze*, the chosen areas appear as part of *Città della Trasformazione*, the “City of Transformation”. Those are projects whose executive instruments have been already approved or in ongoing approval, localised in “places already provided with relevant transformation potential” (Ricci 2009, p.53) or rather “which host a set of metropolis-related functions and rare services for a large basin of population” (Garano, in Ricci 2001). The experimental process on ten centralities starts in 1995, with the urban project for Ostiense centrality and is formalised in 1999 with a first official ordinance. Those areas are already regulated and available for construction according to the current plan and involve both complex public intervention, already ongoing since the 70s, like Tor Vergata project; both the most discussed speculative real estate operation in the last decades, like Bufalotta and Porta di Roma complexes. The planned centralities

63 Peripheries are in this period the main object of political discourse in Rome, as it was during the Communist and Socialist governments in the 70s and 80s. The same concept of polycentrism was first used in the debated inside the local Communist Party (Mario Castagna, in his presentation for the conference “Roma in transizione”, L’Aquila 3-4 April 2017)

are actually realised as a variant of the 1962/65 masterplan, but also are implemented in variation of the new masterplan, that is: explicitly out of the centralities' dedicated regulation, and eventually qualifying their role and characteristics.




FIGURE 1 – Rome's centralities

In 2003 adopted PRG, the centralities are institutionalised and the 18 poles are individuated (FIGURE 1). The administration's choices are motivated with the selection of public and private areas (FIGURE 2) picked for their accessibility and connections with the public metropolitan system, either existent or programmed, and for their proximity with peripheral neighbours lacking public services and qualifying functions. Moreover, practical and political criteria in the government and planners' choice can be added (Marcelloni 2012a). The practical issues refer to the inclusion of already designed areas or projects inherited from the previous plan (for instance the Pietralata lots), or, again, proposed by private actors as a consequence of the building rights market, kick-started by the land-compensation initiative. The political reasons concern, instead, the governance model proposed with the polycentric model. To reach the foreseen goals, the spatial action is linked, at least in theory, with the activity of administrative decentralisation, the support to district administrative levels and the coordination with bordering municipalities. Quoting one of the official documents (the *copianificazione* report), the centralities are the new official districts' centres, able to provide a unifying identity for the inhabitants (also in Campos Venuti 2012).



FIGURE 2 – Land property

Centralities characteristics and potentialities, anyway, are multiple and tend to set up heterogeneous poles, some of which have a special commitment (like the Technology Pole, the Rome Fair, Tor Vergata University Campus, Cesano military complex) meanwhile some others are characterised by a functional mix (Bufalotta, Ostiense, Alitalia-Magliana). The trial is therefore to give a general vision of the city, although not holistic, based on thematic elements capable of organising the various parts (Cremaschi 2010). In the regulative part of the new PRG, centralities are two-dimensional objects: they are described formally through their perimeter and the building volumes allowed [see TABLE 1] and procedurally through the method and the instruments for their realisation, distinguishing between “planned” and “to be planned”⁶⁴ centralities (FIGURE 3). In 2005, in fact, the Municipal Council (Del. C.C. 227/2005) declares the importance to substitute the executive administrative procedures, typical of the traditional instruments in use, with the Urban Project⁶⁵

⁶⁴ Marcelloni (2012a) gives a different possible reading, useful to comprehend the territorial transformation effort: he distinguishes between multifunctional centralities, with structuring functions (for the majority, urban voids in peripheral areas: Romanina, Torre Spaccata) and centralities that imply existent urban fabric regeneration (as the Ostiense case).

⁶⁵ The Urban Project procedure implies a specific sequence of operative instruments and decisional steps, normed with the articles 15 and 16 of the new masterplans technical standards.

procedures, as normed by the 2003 masterplan (and eventually approved in 2008), starting from the organisational and investigation phases” (Ricci 2009, pp.54-55). The rules fixed for the centralities “to be planned” allow Rome Municipality to use 50% of the private owners’ areas for the construction of public services; at the same time, only low densities are allowed, with the idea to concentrate the built area in a small proportion of the land and keep the rest as green (either public or private) areas. The general idea suggested by these rules is that of the envisioned “new city”, green and rich of infrastructure, moreover, a flywheel for the residential market.




FIGURE 3 – State of implementation

With the mayor turnover (the plan is approved with Mayor Veltroni) some changes are observable in the general characterisation of centralities. With Veltroni the contrasts inside the political majority in council shine a light on the discords on the topic: quantitative definitions of the projects, indicators and variables replace the broad lines of reasoning and the rhetoric starts to focus on different areas and problems of the Roman territory. In particular, the building volume allowed in centralities’ areas is reduced of 40.000 public services units⁶⁶ and the expected land compensations are cut of 1700 ha (Campos Venuti 2012, p.129), causing the rejection of the plan by Campos Venuti (the chief consultant in charge of the plan

⁶⁶The plan is sized in *stanze equivalenti*, “equivalent rooms”, each of it corresponds to one inhabitant’s need – one room is around 120 m³.

design)⁶⁷. As a second main update to the centralities design, it is worth mentioning the increase of 50% of the territorial maximum building volume in the areas (those not in their implementation phase), enacted by the Urban Department councillor Corsini, during Mayor Alemanno's government; this change is motivated by the need to give a "reward" percentage of volume to the land developers, that could raise the promoters' interest in the areas, and that could generate and adequate corresponding volume of public services.

On these premises, I can summarise the initial strategies proposed during the plan writing path and, therefore, during Rutelli's and Veltroni's governments, in few choices. Those relate to the *localisation and functionalisation* of the areas, that implied: a different rate of priority given to the projects according to the reaction of the private land market; a status of centrality, and therefore exceptionality, to already planned areas; the urgency to conclude the projects in advance of the infrastructures; the choice of different areas from the ones of the spontaneous polycentrism; the decision to not individuate thematic macro-areas (for instance, the GRA zones, where many projects eventually are) but autonomous spots instead. Other choices reflect an expected *typology of city*: mainly quantitative and top-down decisions, in respect to building volumes and density; a net distinction between public city's and private city's projects; a selection of medium to large scale size interventions; the allowance of further agricultural land consumption, despite the narrative of requalification and against the sprawl (although strongly diminishing the previous masterplan provisions).

I also recognise specific choices in the context of *governance and stakeholders*, testified by the absence of classic participative processes (roundtables with associations and citizens, workshops, etc), but the high consideration of the administrative democratic procedures (the *controdeduzioni*, the civic actors' remarks and oppositions), besides an intense informative work, in Rome, and a promotional effort abroad (Campos Venuti 2012); I also recognise the choice to collaborate and bargain with the main actors of the roman construction sector (the sole in the city able to propose unitary projects at the envisioned scale) and to consent a rich building rights market.

I would like to underline, eventually, that the polycentric paradigm, already very "open, inconclusive, ambiguous" (Cremaschi 2006), is used in Rome to describe a series of very heterogeneous concepts and strategies. It is difficult to narrow the cities' strategies in a more concise formula but at the same time it is worth enriching their descriptions, inquiring in turning point and controversies when translating in operative decisions.

⁶⁷ The changes are a consequence of a political compromise, implying the acceptance, for the sake of the plan approval, of the requests of an obstructionist part of the Municipal Council, which included also members of the majority.

TABLE 1 – Centralities main characteristics (Data source: Risorse per Roma)

Centralità	Area sqm	Private building area sqm	Public building area sqm	Built-up area sqm	Implementation state	Land property	Land owners	Developers - designers
Acilia Madonnaletta	1.361.662	157.408	194.174	351.582	Planning ongoing	private	Pirelli Real Estate	- Progetto urbano Studio Gregotti Associati International
Anagnina Romanina	926.166	148.532	204.403	600.000	Planning ongoing	private	Sergio Scarpellini	Scarpellini/Immobilfin
Bufalotta	3.314.605	657.027	-	657.027	Implementation ongoing	private	Parsitalia/Lamaro appalti	Parsitalia/Lamaro appalti
Cesano	377.004	28.612	41.494	70.106	To be planned	private		
Eur- Castellaccio	620.940	243.750	-	243.750	Implementation ongoing	private	Europarco/Imef	Europarco/Imef
Fiera di Roma	2.231.926			497.485	Implementation ongoing	private	Lamaro appalti	Confcommercio con Fiera di Roma spa e Aga srl - Studio Valle
La Storta	676.775	53.203	96.797	150.000	To be planned	private		
Magliana	601.895			155.784	Implementation ongoing	private	Alitalia	Acqua Marcia
Massimina - Casal Lumbroso	1.084.866			191.493	Planning ongoing	private		Consorzio Centralità Massimina
Ostienze	2.048.277			268.983	Implementation ongoing	public		

Pietralata	1.820.000				403.696	Implementation ongoing	public		Ufficio progetti metropolitani
Polo Tecnologico	720.078				410.287	Implementation ongoing	Mix public-private	Chamber of Commerce, public enterprises, <i>Enea</i>	Società per il Polo Tecnologico Industriale Romano (Camera di Commercio, Enea and multiple local bodies)
Ponte di Nona	652.340				198.273	Implementation ongoing	private	Caltagirone	
Ponte Mammolo	603.263	-	45.132		45.132	To be planned	public		
Santa Maria della Pietà	522.401	-	-		-	To be planned	public		
Saxa Rubra	655.689	46.299	86.367		132.666	To be planned	private		
Tor Vergata	5.591.618	12.574	371.133		508.503	Implementation ongoing	public		Tor Vergata University
Torre Spaccata	569.357	156.232	31.268		187.500	Planning ongoing	private		
Tot.	24.378.862	590.286	699.635		5.072.267				

THE INSTRUMENTS IN ACTION

The administrative instruments used in Rome urban planning in the '90s are several, as the initiated interventions. A hierarchical analysis would be insufficient to explain the twine and the responsibilities of these tools; some structural distinctions, for instance (perimeters, zones, areas of interest) are formally introduced by the new PRG 2003-2008, but they start to be in force earlier in the plan writing period, although in a transient modality and as a variance of the coeval masterplan. At the same time, the urban projects operative planning is realised before the plan normalises their *iter* and therefore is based on the traditional instrument of *piano di lottizzazione* (normally used for private land residential development).

I have selected three projects of centrality started before the plan approval: Bufalotta – Porta di Roma, Tor Vergata and Eur Castellaccio [FIGURE 4]. The three areas have very different characters and implementation paths [TABLE 2], but share a similar use of the instruments. A first redefinition of the strategies occurs with the choice of the variables for the centralities localisation and functional characterisation. The operative plans picture a further image of the rising city (to some extent different from that given by the plan), but I would rather use the two instruments of *Accordo di Programma* and *Convenzione Urbanistica* to observe the level of bargaining among actors and the borders of private and public actors' influence [see insights in APPENDIX 1]. I infer that along this process is revealed the evolution of strategies, their fragmentation and reconsolidation in new modalities, only observable collecting small segments of decisions. [Projects processes and maps are reconstructed in APPENDIX 2].




FIGURE 4 - Bufalotta, Tor Vergata and Eur Castellaccio

TABLE 2 – Bufalotta, Eur Castellaccio and Tor Vergata characteristics (Data source: Risorse per Roma)

Centralità	Area sqm (ST)	Zoning PRG 62-65	Zoning PRG 2003-08	Project proposal (year)	Construction start (year)	Landmarks	Built up area (SUL) sqm	Public building area sqm	Private building area sqm	Public services area sqm	Total volume cubic metres	Et (Sul/ST) Sqm/sqm
Bufalotta (Municipio III)	2.919.817	Public service at urban scale - road vehicles park and deposit	Centralità – Public business area; commercial facilities; hospitality sectors; residential; health centre	1993-1997	2002	Porta di roma shopping mall	657.027 (644.718)	-	657.027	167.186 (mixed public and private business buildings)	2.102.486	0,22
Eur Castellaccio (Municipio IX)	620.940	Public infrastructures; Protected agricultural areas (<i>Ager Romanus</i>); private	Centralità – mixed public and private business area	2000	2001	Europarco and Eurosky towers; the largest shopping mall in Rome	243.750 (251.520)	-	243.750	120.271 (mixed public and private business buildings)	780000	0,39 (then 0,40) ¹

¹ Almost twice the average for the centralities not yet planned: 0,28 for private owned areas

Tor Vergata (Municipio VT)	5.591.618	green areas and archeological remains (Casale Castellaccio)	Public services at urban scale	Centralità – Public business area; education and research infrastructures; commercial facilities; residential	1995 ²	1988 - 1997	World Swimming Championship infrastructures	508.593	371.133 (university buildings)	12.574 (commercial facilities); 21.259 (residential)	686.762 (University and research); 27.269 (sport)	1.627497	0,09
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² The first program dates back to 1972, with the University institutionalisation; then, in 1987, the administration approves the first area plan.

THE PROJECTS LOCALISATION

Bufalotta

Bufalotta centrality is located north of the city, at the exit of the A1 highway, between the district of Serpentara, Fidene and Val Melaina. The position has constituted the main reason to destine a large part of the area (intended for private services by the '62-'65 masterplan) to road vehicles parking and deposit, to manage the entrance and exit fluxes on the city. Also in the Program of Interventions for Rome Law (*Programma di Inverventi per Roma Capitale*, Law 396/1990), the infrastructure and realisation of the car park is intended as a requalification project and includes a quote of public funding for the transformation. The Office for the new General Masterplan for the City of Rome defines it as part of the "Area Project - Bufalotta and North-Eastern Periphery". The localisation characteristics, though, promote the area as "the Gate of Rome", a landmark for the incoming city users as much as for the surrounding residential districts' inhabitants. The landowners in Bufalotta come up in 1993 with a program of interventions that overturns the car park infrastructure into a real estate development project. The proposal is motivated to the administration with the changed situation in the surrounding areas, invalidating the possibility of that scale of traffic node and infrastructure. The perimeter of the final proposal of the landowners includes also bordering areas, marked by the zoning plan as public and private green zones. In this way, the project appeals on the possibility to realise a functional mix, especially offices, commercial and congressional services, with a minor quote of private housing surrounded by a green, infrastructured public park, guaranteeing high architectural and environmental standards. The outskirts in which the project is embedded is formed by dense social housing complexes from the 70s and vast agricultural and green open areas, as the Sabine Park, dotted by Ancient Roman archeologic remains (the old Roman settlement of Fidenae), juxtaposed to more scattered private housing.

When the public allows the programs, the initial aim is not only to fill the gap of services for the area, but also to characterise it with a "metropolitan" appearance. As the other two centralities I am considering, Bufalotta is a rather accessible area⁶⁸ with public transports, in which the railways are totally absent. The proximity with the ring-highway (the GRA, *Grande Raccordo Anulare*, separating Rome from its external districts), though, is discriminant in the private cars accessibility, both from the rest of the city and from the regional centres along the A1 highway. Moreover, in parallel with the program examination by the urban planning office, an extension of the B1 metro line up to Bufalotta area, is added to the new mobility plan for the city and among the required infrastructure in the new masterplan. Along with the new development plan, other interventions have been allowed in the area: an adjacent plan of public housing (Casale Nei), a redevelopment plan for the Fidene-Val Melaina area, another private development area, Cinquina Bufalotta,⁶⁹ on the other side of the ring-highway.

68 The regional railway FR1 is opened in 1991, with the construction of Fidene and Nuovo Salaria strations (that are, anyway, more than 1 km far from Bufalotta area).

69 It is one of the several zones where the land-rights of Tor Marancia compensation have landed. It is promoted by Parnasi construction company, one of Bufalotta landowners.

Eur Castellaccio

The other privately developed centrality that I consider is Eur Castellaccio. The development proposal follows the subordination to environmental protection of some private areas through the Variante delle Certezze normative. The compensation of landowners building rights is used to realise a new settlement in this rural area of modest dimension (around 62 ha), despite being entirely destined for public services by the 19962-65 masterplan zoning normative. The proposed development plan is accepted with the parallel election of the area as one of the centralities of the new masterplan, allowing the construction of public and private management functions. This complex is part of a set of development projects envisioned in the way towards the sea⁷⁰ and that represent one of the main development directions for the City of Rome also in the coeval effective plan. The adjacent area is the Eur district, the second main directional and tertiary urban centre in Rome, hosting administrative offices and international firm headquarters. Eur Castellaccio uses the existing transport facilities (bus and B metro line), although remaining far from the stations – a further tram link to the closer one is envisioned in the project – and represents a sort of functional and formal annex of the Eur district, along Cristoforo Colombo Road, toward the connection with the ring-highway.⁷¹ The project is close to other expected private developments, embedded in the broader Laurentino Urban Regeneration Program (formulated in 2007).

Tor Vergata

Tor Vergata area is situated just outside the GRA, alongwith the traditional Roman eastern development direction. It is larger than the other two areas (with its 560 ha is the largest centrality) and is dedicated to public services and infrastructures in the 1962-65 masterplan. Contrary to Bufalotta and Castellaccio, it is publicly owned and managed and therefore the public service character is maintained. Since 1972, with the institution of the second University of Rome, “Tor Vergata University”, the area is expropriated for public use and planned to host an Anglo-Saxon style campus. The project is the result of the collaboration between the Ministry of Education, City of Rome and Lazio Region. The long and slow realisation of the complex implies the restoration of the existent illegal settlements and the realisation of the connective services with the city and the metropolitan area. Tor Vergata, in fact, borders with Frascati Municipality and fills the space between the important Casilina road and the Southern branch of the A2 highway, in correspondence to one of the GRA interchanges. Also in this area, the main connections are by road, despite the design of two junctions with the existing metro lines (the A metro line and the forthcoming C metro line). The new stations,

70 Acilia-Madonna and Dragona, Alitalia Magliana and Fiumicino centralities.

71 The centralities of Bufalotta and Eur Castellaccio are located at the vertexes of the arterial road of SDO, the Eastern Management System. The SDO is a urban large development project proposed by the 1962-65 masterplan, including the realisation of: this new urban arterial road, linking A1 northern junction and Cristoforo Colombo road, in parallel with the GRA, plus five road branches heading East; a new administrative headquarter between Pietralata and Centocelle-Torre Spaccata neighbourhood (integrated in the centralities set); the enhancement of Eur pole. The planned centralities, our case studies included, partially trace SDO directions, because of an obvious adherence to the masterplan, but also change the general projects, towards a different polarisation of the urban structure.

anyway, are planned to be more than 1km far from the buildings of the campus. In the adjacent plots, the urban planning department has allowed three different social housing interventions, another centrality (Romanina) and the Tor Bella Monaca Urban Regeneration Program.

THE FUNCTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS, THE EVOLUTION AND THE PHYSICAL RESULTS

Bufalotta

Bufalotta area is first highlighted in the masterplan variance called *Piano delle Certezze*, published in 1997. The construction starts before the new masterplan adoption (2003). The project, as we mentioned, concerns private lots and is the result of the bargaining between the Urban Planning Department of Rome and the company Porta di Roma Srl, on the base of the development plan proposed in 1993 [see FIGURE 6-7 in APPENDIX 2]. The final accepted operative plan is followed by an administrative contract (*Accordo di Programma*) between different public actors for a quick modification of the zoning provision. In parallel to the necessary expropriation processes, the administration signs the administrative contract with the private owners' association and kickstarts a multiplication of market investments in the area.⁷² The administrative contract allows the realisation of the buildings with a minimum land occupation,⁷³ providing a large part of the area for public services, the new Sabine green park in particular. The new settlement fulcrum is represented by the private services: several office buildings, a shopping mall (the biggest so far in the city), a congressional centre with a hotel, a health centre, assembled in the masterplan in a way that would suggest and recreate "a piece of the city" (with a boulevard and an open air square inside the mall). About 37% of the built surface is planned to be residential, hosting a final population of 10.000 residents. The developers (the landowners) provide, in addition to the mandatory funding and management of the infrastructural works (sewing, water supply, electricity networks, plus the so called *standards*, meaning quotes of parking lots, green areas, streets, school facilities and public services, calculated on the future inhabitants), the realisation of the Sabine Park, with the related structures, and of the Marcigliana Park⁷⁴, the restoration of the ancient farmhouses of the area, and connections with the primary transport network (namely the A1 highway). In 2003, Rogedil, a private company that owned some of the areas inside the perimeter of the project, becomes one of Porta di Roma Srl business partners, asking for a first integration to the contract; this change, consisting of increasing

⁷² In 2001, Edilmoderna srl (owned by Parnasi family) sells its properties to Porta di Roma srl.

⁷³ Around the 16% of the area, with a maximum share of built surface of 0,22 sqm/sqm.

⁷⁴ The green area is extended outside the city's borders, towards Monterotondo municipality. Some of the building rights concerning the area, cancelled with the current land protection restrictions, have been transferred, through the land right compensation, in Bufalotta area.

the residential share up to 40%⁷⁵, is approved by the Municipality. In the meanwhile, the first works in the area begin, starting with the preliminary archaeological investigations and digs – which slow down the construction and determine a further variation of the zoning plan in 2009 (accepted via *Conferenza dei Servizi*⁷⁶) – and the highway junction and mall constructions. The mall, in particular, is inaugurated already in 2005 and becomes the new district magnet⁷⁷. The most important variation of the underway project dates 2011, coeval to the economic crisis trigger, and is requested and motivated by the promoters – in the meanwhile passed from a landowners' company to a mixed public and private investment fund – because of a decreasing interest of the investors towards the non-residential functions. The proposal passed under the City Council scrutiny concerned the increasing (through a land use variance) of 50% of residential building volume, that is around 124.000 sqm (30%) of the total amount of building area that shift from a non-residential to a residential use. In the first place, the administration approves the variation, mentioning the “anti-crisis” measures advocated by the Regional government and the local government itself. New residential buildings normally imply more efforts by the constructors in the provision of urban infrastructures, and the above mentioned measures encourage the creation of norms able to “re-activate the economic system, aiming at realising new urban infrastructures that could improve urban settlements functioning” (Del. CC 127/2013). In the same year, moreover, Mayor Alemanno's administration modifies, again as a provision to face financial and real estate crisis, the administrative contract for private-public development plans (for the second time during his mandate). Although presented as a transient modification of the norm, this decision has important consequences: it streamlines the project administrative evaluation procedures and introduces a division of the construction process in multiple phases, allowing building permits, related to up to the 40% of the entire planned private buildings stock (and therefore, the collection of the related bank guarantee funding) in parallel with the starting of the primary infrastructure works. The Bufalotta project variation falls, in theory, under this temporary regime, that is retroactive until October 2009.

For this extreme overturn of the functional shares (the volume for touristic and accommodation functions, and for the health centre are completely cancelled in the new project, while the residential share takes 56% of the total volume) the administration imposes to the private owners further public services requirements: more *standard* (green areas and parking lots), traffic facilities, the new pedestrian and bike path inside the Sabine Park, and 2.5 million euro for structures external to the project perimeter – to be specified at the moment of the new contract ratification. Despite a first green light by the city council, the modification of the contract is never allowed, due also to the government alternation and the firm opposition of the new Planning councillor Caudo to the

⁷⁵ An addition of 81.900 cubic metres of residential volume and 4100 cubic metres of non-residential building.

⁷⁶ A procedure that implies a multiple local institutions joint ordinance.

⁷⁷ From a 2003 official public document (edited as “Analisi della mobilità presso i principali centri commerciali di Roma. Indagini conoscitive e modello previsionale dell'impatto sulla mobilità”) results that the catchment area of Porta di Roma Mall is (in 2012) of 1.189.000 inhabitants.

land use variance – lacking, according to him, the “public benefit” necessary to sign an *Accordo di Programma* (an agreement on the modification signed by all the public stakeholders) and a variation to the newly approved general masterplan.

Eur Castellaccio

Eur Castellaccio project, presented to the planning department a few years later, was designed while the above-mentioned debate on the “public benefit” and the private actors’ obligations was ongoing. The private⁷⁸ land development process, initiated in 2000, invokes the transfer on the area of 780.000 cubic metres of “building rights”, an institution derived from the juridical separation of several ha of agricultural land, subordinated to environmental protection restrictions, from the relative owners’ building rights. In this case, the rights concerned the areas of the newly formed Volusia and Pratone delle Valli parks, now property of the City of Rome. This exchange process, included in the *compensazione* policy, is recorded as one of the most lucrative, firstly because of the localisation of Eur Castellaccio area but also because it allowed the aggregation of several landowners’ building rights. The landowners’ company, formed on purpose, has realised, in the area, a settlement with twice the volume of buildings than the one previously allowed in the safeguarded areas.⁷⁹ The “compensated” building rights add up to the onsite ones, initially intended for public services and eventually maintained in number, although modified in function. The *compensazione* rationale – moving building rights in more central and accessible areas, shrinking them in respect to the higher value of the land – has only partially worked because the income possibilities for the private actors in Eur Castellaccio have actually increase, but the amount of built surface has remained the same (eventually further increased). The management of the building rights transfer (and of the general implementation of the centralities) is entrusted to Risorse per Roma, a City of Rome in-house company.

The project approval process implied a *Conferenza dei Servizi*⁸⁰ and the *Accordo di Programma*, for the variation of the current general masterplan (a zoning shift, from public to private services). During the *Conferenza dei Servizi*, the municipality requires the realisation of: a road and a bike and pedestrian path, between the area and Laurentino Park (a first example of newly acquired public areas integration); a municipal museum for the archeologic remains found in the area, located inside the onsite farmhouse (Casale del Castellaccio), whose renovation is financed by the developers. The administrative contract is signed in 2003, few months after the adoption of the new PRG – where the intervention is registered as wholly non-residential, with tertiary functions, both public and private. The final program, as designed in the operative plan (repeatedly modified since 2001) envisions a high-

⁷⁸ The proposal for the development project comes from Parsitalia s.r.l. company (owned by Sandro Parnasi, also embedded in Bufalotta intervention), which includes the following firms: Erev s.r.l., Pifer s.r.l., Tor Immobiliare Uno s.r.l., Girev Cassia s.r.l.. The main company owns 97% of Eur Castellaccio areas (bought in 2002), meanwhile the remaining 3% is public property.

⁷⁹ The Variante di Salvaguardia halved the densities initially allowed in those agricultural plots, but this determination was cancelled by the following Variante delle Certezze.

⁸⁰ The decision-making roundtable takes place between June and September 2001, with the following participants: Rome City, Tevere River Basin Authority, Lazio Region, Environmental and Architectural Assets Authority, “Roma Natura” Regional Body.

rise settlement including office buildings, a shopping mall⁸¹, a hotel and sports facilities. Besides the primary urbanisation infrastructure and part of the trolley bus connection (Eur-Tor de Cenci) – shortening the distance between the new district and the closest metro station (Eur Fermi, on the B metro line) – the developer must undertake the furnishing and maintenance of Volusia and Pratone delle Valli Parks. Only after these realisations, the contract allows the release of the building permits up to 60% of the construction's volume. The total amount of administrative urbanisation costs is fixed at 44 million euro.

In 2006, the urban planning department in charge of the process, “following up an in-depth analysis of the area transformations, as foreseen by the forthcoming general masterplan update”⁸², asks for a substantial modification of the project, with a variation of the land use functional zoning: 10% of the entire volume proposed (more or less 80.000 cubic metres) must shift from a non-residential to residential function, “aiming at improving the functional mix of the centrality, with destination not envisioned in the original contract, to attenuate the possible ‘draining’ of the neighbour users after the offices closing time”⁸³. In 2008 the contract model is again modified (choosing a multiple phases procedure for the building permits release), prolonging the infrastructure realisation schedule for the compensated areas in the parks (from 1 year to 5 years). The final project includes two skyscrapers, one for luxury housing⁸⁴ and one for offices. In the meanwhile, works have started and, as was for Bufalotta, the shopping mall is the first completed building, inaugurated in 2008. Parsitalia Srl starts signing renting and selling contracts for the re-localisation of several public institutions headquarters – the Ministry of Health building, the Province offices, and, although still in negotiations at the time, the Roman public transport company (*Azienda per il Trasporto Autoferrotranviario del Comune di Roma*, ATAC) headquarters. “Europarco Business Park”, still under construction, is therefore the flagship project in a vast process of territorial marketing, investing the whole Eur district, with metropolitan scale buildings and archi-star involved.

Tor Vergata

Tor Vergata is different from the other projects for multiple reasons: the public ownership of the area, the heterogeneity of the geographical setting and of existing building, the territorial extent, the plurality of the decisional phases and of the new functions. The first project (proposed through the *Piano di Assetto Generale* instrument) is presented in 1987 with an enclosed contract signed by the Tor Vergata University⁸⁵ and the Vianini Lavori company (a construction company owned by Francesco Caltagirone, one of the most important protagonists of the local real estate market). The open-ended signed contract implies the assignation

⁸¹ Euroma 2 shopping mall is so far the largest in Rome, overtaking Porta di Roma one.

⁸² From Eur Castellaccio supplementary administrative contract.

⁸³ From Eur Castellaccio supplementary administrative contract.

⁸⁴ The residential skyscraper, named Eurosky, is designed by Purini Thermes Architecture Studio and constitutes a new landmark in Rome's skyline. It is 28 floors high, hosting apartments that cost between 300.000 and 3 million euro.

⁸⁵ Tor Vergata University hosts more than 2000 employees and 30.000 students.

of the totality of the construction works to the company, in charge of all the subcontracts on the entire university properties. The campus is realised step by step, with the first works starting in 1988 and completed, for the most part in 2016, passing through several changes to the initial plan. The buildings are therefore different, in style and age, and realised in a fragmented process. The street network is mainly composed of either wide, fast roads, or narrow paths flowing in a twisted way, both often interrupted by construction sites and surrounded by non-infrastructured green areas. The campus construction happens in parallel to the regeneration of the surrounding settlements. In 2000, the north-eastern area, in front of the main building of the campus (the teaching general hospital of Tor Vergata) is chosen by the City to host the World Youth Day, organised by the Roman Catholic Church in the context of the Catholic Jubilee. In the same period, the perimeter of the area is slightly reduced, increasing in parallel the volume-on-surface rate allowed (from 0,5 to 0,56 mc/sqm), aiming to increase densification and saturation. Multiple project variances reported in the writing of the general masterplan testify the will to invest and improve the general layout of the area, involving also the neighbouring Frascati municipality in the decisions.

The real turn intervenes with the provision of a new direction and function for Tor Vergata: the City of Sport project. The occasion is again the possibility to host a big international event, after the Vatican one, the World Swimming Championship in 2009. The structures are localised in the same area used for the Youth Day but with a larger perimeter. The University too is involved in the event organisation⁸⁶, not only for the plots provision, as landowner, but also for the professionals' technical support, meanwhile the administration transfers on the project an initial 60 billion euro investment – moved from the Rome Intervention Law fund. The first *Accordo di Programma* is signed by Rome Municipality, Lazio Region and Tor Vergata University in 2003, followed in 2005 by an agreement involving also CONI (Sport Italian Organisation) and Public Infrastructures Ministry. The expectations on the area thus increase, increasing at the same time the stakeholders, the interests and the actions. The decision of the City of Sport marks the start of a new phase for the area, characterised by the alternation of different bargaining processes between the local and the central governments. The national government declares in fact the World Swimming Championship 2009 a “big event” and appoints a commissioner; another *Accordo di Programma*, and a coherent administrative contract update (in 2006), are signed to change the operative plan. In the meanwhile, the commissioner subcontracts the new open-air metropolitan line, linking Anagnina station of A metro line to the forthcoming Tor Vergata station, to be realised in parallel with the event preparation. In March 2007, the City Council put into effect another update of the operative plan, with the introduction of the City of Sport and the Museum of Sport. Despite the efforts, the construction works are not completed in time for 2009. The partially built infrastructures and the architectural design are therefore refiled for Rome Olympic Games candidacy, first for 2020 turn (but the option is cancelled by the central government in the context of the austerity actions

⁸⁶ The City of Sport infrastructures are intended to be part of the university facilities, as well as the athletes dwellings.

following 2008 financial crisis), and afterward for 2024.⁸⁷ The sequence of delays, the failure of the Olympic Games expectations and the exorbitant construction costs increase, leave in the area ruins of the unfinished buildings, designed by the Spanish architect Santiago Calatrava. In the last years, the City has re-proposed the area for a new Olympic Games candidacy, among political and environmental controversies. The current mayor, Virginia Raggi, has eventually withdrawn the name of Rome from the bid, postponing again any recovery project.

In the meanwhile, the University campus construction goes on, with further variations to the operative plan, for instance the transfer in the area of the Italian Spatial Agency and the construction of students' housing buildings. The public space, the green areas and mobility infrastructure realisation and organisation have been stopped; the Museum of Sport has been transferred in another area (the Foro Italico zone, where the Swimming Championship also took place).

ACTORS AND GOVERNANCE

Bufalotta

For Bufalotta's case, it is possible to distinguish two precise decisional phases⁸⁸. In the first, two subjects, the Administration and Porta di Roma Srl bargain for the definition of the interventions in the area. In the first moments, considering the administrative and technical dimension of the actors' relationship, the public government has a predominant position, through which can choose and enforce instruments and rules. The instruments' character allows, during the negotiation, two different alterations: the first, is the allowance to waive the coeval PRG norms, the second is the possibility to adequate the project and the contractual specifications in time – in particular, in respect to the envisioned functions. The functions, as we have seen, represent one of the fundamental components of centralities' definition. Their modification is the concern of the second decisional phase that I have individuated. In the 2009-2013 period, in particular, is enacted a dispute between public and private actors, concerning a land use change proposed by the second. The public administration response uses as argumentation the new centrality role for the area, legitimated by the approval of the new plan. An initial green light, for the modification of non-residential buildings into residential ones, is motivated clinging to the economic crisis and consequent private landowners' shrinking assets. Afterwards, the same modifications are denied (even when reduced from 30% to 18% of the total volume) for lack of public interest and insufficient functional mix. We can infer that the private actors' requests are due, in part, to constructors' traditional background, centred on residential buildings market; but mostly, to their need to obtain credit from the banks. This credit, which could only be guaranteed through the administration's building permits release, is

⁸⁷ The Strategic Plan for Roma Capitale, proposed and never officially approved by Alemanno Council, revolves around this perspective.

⁸⁸ The structure for the analysis of the decisional phases is borrowed from: Dente, B. (2011). *Le decisioni di policy: come si prendono, come si studiano*. Il mulino.

necessary to refund external financial supporters – that had provided funds for Bufalotta as well as for other investments of the company.

It is important to underline that the building of the new district coincides with the period of maximum expansion of the property bubble in Rome, attracting many family savings. Despite the inadequate spatial quality in the area, the costs of dwellings (sold, to a certain extent, before the construction works have had ended⁸⁹) are similar to those of more central areas (around 5000 Euro/sqm⁹⁰). The built apartments lack variety in respect to typology and do not correspond to any demographic forecast (despite a housing emergency developing in the city), but the architectural specifications (garages, terraces, interior design) rise the prices, limiting the population to a specific middle-to-high income bracket (Violante 2008, p. 134). The urban development taxes, paid by the developers, amount to 172 million euro, comprehensive of the maintenance expenses for all the public services and infrastructures, although only for two years after the installation. All of those are proposed and realised inside the perimeter of the area, except for the highway junction that connects GRA and the shopping mall, though realised by ANAS (the public-private company in charge for traffic infrastructures). No long-term evaluations of maintenance and management costs (for instance, the yet not-realised Sabine Park facilities) is implied by the contracts. Therefore, the financial guarantees kept by the administration, are released, and returned to the developers, following the economic contract resolution.

Eventually, the new B1 metro station realisation is not borne by private developers, despite that it is a fundamental part of the centrality *raison d'être*, especially after the new PRG is published⁹¹. In general, there is no trace, in the administrative contract, of any economic participation of Porta di Roma Srl in public transport facilities construction in, and for, the area. The endemic difficulties in the completion of metro lines in Rome matters in the new inhabitants' quality of life and in the governments' consensus, urges new compromises with the constructors. The urban planning department is examining the proposal for a further residential complex in the area, the so-called Case dell'Aeronautica⁹², in a public service zone⁹³. The administration declares that the taxes required for this new urban transformation will be finally used to fund the B1 metro line extension up to the area⁹⁴.

⁸⁹ The issue is raised when Urban Planning Councillor Caudo in 2015 updates the administrative public-private contract model: "it is not allowed, not even on the receiver's request, the delivery of private portions of the real estate complex realised without the proof of usability and functionality of the necessary services" (Del. C.C. 32/2015).

⁹⁰ The figures have been collected through an online inquiry on real estate agencies prices.

⁹¹ "Urban and Metropolitan Centralità implementation is subordinated to the previous or contextual realisation of the railways infrastructures (metrolines, tramways) envisioned in the new PRG." (Art. 65, NTA, Prg 2008).

⁹² The project of this military housing complex (for air force affiliates), was approved by Planning Councillor Corsini (Alemanno council), but blocked during mayor Marino council. It includes a participative process, started in October 2012, and envisions 270 rent-controlled dwellings (divided in 15 residential units), a kindergarden and sport and park facilities (8800 sqm of green area). (From City of Rome website: <http://www.urbanistica.comune.roma.it/partec-bufalotta-area-a.html>)

⁹³ Article 84 of the NTA of the PRG states that those zones can be also be used for military facilities.

⁹⁴ "Il cemento cala su Roma Nord. Nuove case per 97 mila abitanti" La Repubblica, 21 dicembre 2012, online newspaper archive.

Eur Castellaccio

The definition of the compensative areas, in the case of Eur Castellaccio, weights on stakeholders' choices in respect to project localisation. We can distinguish a first phase in the project, concerning public-private bargaining for the attainment of the first results in *compensazione* and Piano delle Certezze manoeuvres (a significant value in the government reputation, especially in respect to the related green areas attainment), plus a quote of needed public infrastructures. Because of its formal characteristics and the economic expectations, the project attracts investments from several local and international financiers⁹⁵.

A second decision-making phase attains a change in Eur Castellaccio initial public-private contract: the urban department requires a share of dwelling units, which increases Europarco company's value and, with the construction of an iconic residential skyscraper, enhances the area's symbolic meaning. While private actors' economic interests become fragmented, Roman public administration has to select its priorities though the trade-offs. It is a choice on whose interests defend, at whose expenses. The public-private bargaining proceeds according to certain variables, contained in the contracts. The need to obtain further public infrastructures paid by the private sector generates compromises. With Eur Castellaccio contract modification, the municipality gets 14 million euro of tax revenues, destined for the area urbanisation, but also for the renovation of the neighbourhood church, the set-up of the archeologic museum and the valorisation of the archeologic area (emerged during the preliminary construction phases). Nonetheless, the contract structure does not allow intervening on architectural quality, on construction work schedule (to a certain extent) and does not provide a direct public procedure of monitoring. While the building complex is almost finished, the public services, in charge to Parsitalia, are partially cancelled – the park facilities around the farmhouse – and partially unrealised – Volusia and Pratone delle Valli parks facilities, despite the contract determinations⁹⁶. The realisation and maintenance costs of the plots in Volusia park costs are now on the shoulders of the public administration (in 2006, Lazio Region has allocated 1 million euro just for the renovation of three ancient farmhouses in the area).

Neither in the planning phase, nor in the contractual one, there is trace of a preliminary agreement between the local government and the public companies, despite the zoning of Eur Castellaccio area envisioning public directorial functions (both in the general and local masterplans). In this way, the Health Ministry, the transport utility company and Rome Province pay higher costs to the private developers⁹⁷, the same surplus costs due from private firms that have moved here their headquarters.

⁹⁵ In Bufalotta, this process starts when Allianz insurance company buys Porta di Roma shopping mall and as MPS (Monte dei Paschi di Siena Bank) and two national social security bodies (INPS, ENASARCO) entered the developers' fund. In Eur Castellaccio, in parallel, we assist to a diversification both of the economic weights, both of interests, with the selling and renting of Europarco buildings to international companies (for instance Engie and Procter&Gamble) and the entry of new promoters (banks and international management firms).

⁹⁶ From the website: <http://www.vasroma.it/la-vera-storia-delle-vicende-che-hanno-portato-alla-inaugurazione-del-parco-volusia/> (last visit: 10/03/2017).

⁹⁷ The purchase of the new building costed to Rome Province around 263 million euro. The payment is channelled through a financial fund, containing several assets in the city owned by the institution

Tor Vergata

In the three interventions I am describing, the use of *Accordo di Programma* is complementary to all the variations of the initial project. In Tor Vergata's case, moreover, it is motivated by the evident public interest linked to the University campus updates. This approach, implying University, local council and Lazio Region agreement, has characterised the decision-making in the first two implementation phases: that of the Campus project realisation, and that of the World Youth Day organisation. When, though, the project had a real turning point, with the City of Sport localisation in the area, the national state has taken the wheels of the process, selecting a commissioner. The motivation rests in the need to accelerate the decisions and reduce the bargaining procedures among the different government tiers. From the local council point of view, the governance of the changing projects on the area is increasingly complex, also due the three election turns in the period between 2003 and 2015. The choices, moreover, have always embedded functions and investments involving multiple government bodies' decisions. Every step of the area development has been managed in a distinct and parallel way. Without inquiring further in the two events failures, or in the unfinished infrastructures, we can at least assume that the Tor Vergata strategy evolved suffering, more than the other two centralities here analysed, from organisation and coordination difficulties. In particular, the obvious complexity of big events realisation is amplified by the faults of the public in providing public transport facilities and basic services. Tor Vergata is a metropolitan and regional scale project, but does not engender any agreement and collaborative investment out of the usual bureaucratic procedures. Being a focus of city's development strategies since the '80s, the decision to transform Tor Vergata into a node of the polycentric spatial structure unveils the will to take advantage of its geographic possibilities, accounting for the exceptionality of one-of-a-kind large, transformable rural areas in Rome. The use of public funds, mainly coming from the State (first the University and then 2000s Jubilee related-event support, and eventually the sport events) has not favoured Rome's interests, delaying the creation of a metropolitan governance of strategic projects (Marcelloni, in Mazzoni & Tsiomis 2012b) based on local municipalities' priorities and accountability.

(source: <http://www.romatoday.it/politica/indagini-nuovo-palazzo-provincia-eur-.html>) (last visit: 10/03/2017).

THE IMPLEMENTATION, BETWEEN ACTIONS AND POSTPONED DECISIONS

Rome's politicians and practitioners have justified the use of the plans' variation in the city's development processes all along those years with the inadequacy of 1962-65 general masterplan predictions. Though, even when, in 2003, the new plan is adopted, the variation is almost automatically accepted. We observe its use every time it is not possible to implement the projects according to the centralities' strategy prescriptions, either due to private actor's financial problems, either because of public administration lack of authority (especially during the 2008 financial crisis).

Instruments' influence is visible when, in an unvaried planning context, large projects' management is entrusted to new specific rules, by way of dispensation from the masterplan in force. The effectiveness of the governance, related to the initial strategy of polycentrism, is applied and observed thus on projects whose implementation is ongoing (like Tor Vergata) and where the municipality tries to adjust contrasting interests (in Eur Castellaccio, for instance, the localisation responds to the criteria of building rights compensation manoeuvre but not to centralities' needs). The specific administrative public-private contracts, though, are not conceived for large development projects, but for lower scale and less important interventions. Therefore, the realisation of the initial public interests is based on the parallel (i) imposition of strict rules on few variables (perimeters, volumes, standards) and on the (ii) bargaining with private actors regarding the trade-offs. For what concerns the latter approach, the risk is to contribute, in this way, to the unbalance between public and private interest, in favour of the latter. The formula "for public benefit" (or "interest"), assured with the use of the *Accordo di Programma*, for instance, does not imply any justification or either argumentation, by the public executors, for the approval of substantial project's modification – not to mention any open consultancy with the inhabitants. The decisions on land use changes are taken without any reinterpretation of the overall provisions or consideration on the coherence between various resolutions, inside the area or among the different nodes of the (polycentric) structure. At the base, there is the fragmentation of the decisional moments and the contingency of every public-private bargain.

In respect to the imposition of strict rules, the built results raise many questions on the criteria that informed their selection. The evident lack of spatial quality in the built environment of Bufalotta and Tor Vergata is paired by a poor reorganisation of qualifying functions, visible also in Eur Castellaccio (so far, the most integrated, of the three projects, within the existing urban area). This phenomenon does not happen only in private building but especially in public services and infrastructures, which are the local planning department's direct responsibility. Public housing policies are totally left aside these interventions; large green areas (rarely infrastructured) and shopping malls represent public spaces conceptions in governments' as well as developers' designs. In the analysed interventions, the administration renounces any cultural policy effort outside the historical centre,

delegating to bottom-up unorganised and unlinked initiatives. The receivers of large projects related housing and services are mainly middle-high class populations while the targets of labour market incentives are the traditional tertiary and retail sectors. Those areas' tractability seems thus limited, today. On one side, because of the public implementation difficulties to interrupt processes drifted in market actors' hands (at the cost to block or nullify the projects, as in Bufalotta's case). On the other side, one can assume as deliberate the governments' choice to perpetrate the above-described dimensions of urban development.

Centralities' first experiments suggest an endemic incapacity to release the initial strategy from the bottlenecks in which it has entered. One of the problems, in this sense, concerns the simultaneous realisation of the new poles and the large infrastructures, in particular the metro lines. A strong public local control appears fundamental for an implementation coherent with the strategic direction and combined with the real estate market ambitions. In the case studies here analysed, though, the delays in the construction of metropolitan lines and stations have invalidated a large part of the initial propositions.

This evident failure in the schedule and coordination of major interventions is mirrored in the implementation. No contribution is required to the private developers for the new stations to be located in Bufalotta or Tor Vergata areas. Even when it is required, as in Eur Castellaccio's case, the private realisations are not subordinated to the infrastructure completion – which is repeatedly overlooked by developers. In Tor Vergata's case, the realisation of a new important function (the City of Sport) that should further qualify the area as a future metropolitan node, is planned with a very close deadline (4 years). Although it is clear the aim to profit from the big event (first the Swimming Championship, then the Olympic games) and to hurry up the area upgrade, the economic and decisional local government's resources are limited and there is no possibility to fill the transport network gaps in time. Those delays have thus been recognised as the main cause for the gradual abandonment of centralities' construction, although not of the polycentric model. The projects have been progressively disowned by the governments that succeeded Rutelli and Veltroni councils, and replaced with actions at a lower scale or located inside the existing metro transportation system.

However, it is in the broader responsibility recognition that one can see the exacerbation of the contrast between discourse and strategies, and eventual realisations. This is again evident in the analysed instruments, especially in public contracts. The delegation of single actions, both to the State and to the real estate market protagonists – without the creation of a permanent table, or decisional arena, or intermediate agent – has complicated the fulfilment of the local public goals. Nonetheless, on the same projects is still measured the accountability of the local administration. This last has tried to put some distance between itself and the accuses of failure by delegitimising the projects of their strategic dimension. Bufalotta centrality, for instance, because of inhabitants' demonstrations and unsatisfied claims, is criticised already by the Veltroni's administration officials: according to a common explanation, the intervention has been realised outside the new plan's regime and does not reflect the centralities' expectations. The main goal of a new entrepreneurial role for the local administration is still far, if looking at these first applications of the polycentric system, especially with respect to the redistribution of real estate market incomes, absorbed by few big developers.

How would then a modification of the implementation instruments help in saving the strategy from doom?

Some of these deficiencies are mentioned in a Municipal Council ordinance already in 2005 (Del. C.C. 227/2005), when the councillors underline the need to adequate, in moving to a less “experimental” phase of polycentric project construction, the implementation instruments. Those, in fact, are burdened with a fundamental responsibility for future centralities’ success. With the introduction of the *Progetto Urbano* procedure there is the main trial to avoid the delays in public services provisions caused by private developers, get through all the land compensation procedures and upgrade the public transport network coordination. All of this should be also achieved, according to the ordinance, with two main changes. First, by building a technical leading commission that should manage all the procedures in this sense. The organisational problems are evident: for the “planned” centralities, the planning department control does not consider any investment plan but it only checks the conformity of constructors’ tax payments and the infrastructure completion; the monitoring of the projects’ implementation is entrusted to an intertwining of offices, with different bureaucratic procedures and contact persons depending on the project typology, in charge of checking the agreements requirements observation⁹⁸.

Secondly, the ordinance claims for realising a further flexibility of the process⁹⁹, in particular, in dealing with private developers delays. With the flexibility introduced so far by Rutelli government, the City has shortened decision-making times, with the automatic use of *Accordo di Programma*, fastening, for instance, the take-over of the green areas undergoing environmental protection (an important goal for the council’s public image). Despite this time-saving improvement, though, the efficiency in terms of outputs has not directly been enhanced. The vague and superficial interpretation of functional mix, accessibility, sustainability, land consumption concepts, and, most of all, of qualifying and attractive facility should be, on the contrary, the object of a coercive regulation of projects and of a constant monitoring activity. Instead, of acting on process definition, the flexibility efforts has helped the finalisation of private land development processes, lightening the conditions applied to the private actors, in particular in relation to the localisation (as we have seen in the parabola of Parsitalia before landing its building rights in Eur Castellaccio).

Other steps in this direction overlook the risks of a structural dependency of the public from the private initiative. This dependency would be caused not only by the progressive lack of financial resources, but more importantly by the increasing expectations and responsibilities on the local government. In Rome, in fact, the private actors (constructors, developers, distributors of real estate assets) did not

⁹⁸ In the private land development processes that I am analysing, the district councils, where the intervention is set, monitor the private buildings construction; one of the Urban Transformation Departments of the City (Operative Instruments Office) controls the correct implementation of the related public works. This ex-post control is juxtaposed to the building permits issue, exercised by yet another office, which is in charge of the ex ante conformity of specific architectural projects.

⁹⁹ “It seems appropriate to consider the difficulties that the private subjects could encounter if they had to provide by themselves the public services and, in particular, it must be contemplated the fact that the infrastructural public interventions, of metropolitan scale, could take different, or longer, construction times than parts of the centralities.” Del. C.C. 227/2005 (author’s translation from italian).

evolve, refusing to share the burden of city's economic and spatial modernisation. The unique change, during these last twenty years, seems to have been a basic degree of financialisation of the developers' companies, which has increased the horizontal interdependency among private actors. Moreover, it has generated a twine of interests, not easy to unbind, between public, private, local, extra-local subjects – for instance, public-private funds like those used in Eur Castellaccio. Those considerations apply to the explanation of strategies “failure” in implementing the selected projects according to the initial propositions. Or either, how the chosen path of implementation has led to a transformation of the reality of the city that cannot be easily reversed towards those that seemed rational expectations. However, according to my sample of practices, Roman administration has eventually accomplished one side of the polycentric model of governance, related to the creation of an interactive system of actors, through the collaboration with private stakeholders in the construction of the city; an endeavour that has merged with a trend to avoid the contrasts, flattening the governance expectations on the mere construction of consensus. The instrument of *Accordo di Programma* showed useful, in this sense, to cut the richness (or redundancy, depending on the point of view) of political confrontation, allowing a fast mediation among several public actors and partly evading public control. In the three analysed processes, though, is the constant extension of deadlines, in public-private *convenzioni*, that can shed light on the advantages granted to constructors. In this way, the inconsistencies with the construction schedules, contained in the contract itself, have not been considered an issue, and the private actors could withdraw the economic warranties initially deposited in City's treasury – this is for instance the case of Bufalotta – leaving the construction unfinished. In the same contracts, the missing justification for the projects' “unexpected” evolution exposes a political *modus operandi* that has not to do with spatial culture, but concerns the public management of intermediate decisions – as highlighted in the differences between Alemanno and Marino administrations concerning Bufalotta land use change determinations.

In a sense, thus, we can individuate an implementation approach that is inherently contradictory, that drifts apart the initial discourses on spatial objectives, not only, like many commentators have observed before me, adding a major flexibility in facing market will, but also giving priority to opportunity and effectivity over outputs control. This tendency to steer public action towards pragmatism, in which “what is feasible comes before what is desirable” (Pinson, 2009, p. 116), represents a characteristic of strategic planning. Rome approach, though, has underrated the importance of a parallel reorganisation of the resources at disposal, especially of the administrative instruments that could have helped in solving these contradictions. Only with the updates of the public-private contract model there has been a trial to re-prioritise public interests. In the last update,¹⁰⁰ in particular, it is possible to recognise a balance between building schedule flexibility, a variety of operative options (for instance, the division of smaller intervention units, for

¹⁰⁰ The last contract model update, approved though a 2015 Council ordinance, has not yet been applied: the ongoing processes are still realised on the “delibera 70” base (a 2011 update), a transient model, aimed at the mitigation of the economic crisis effects on construction sector.

better management of the projects' processes) and trade-offs, introducing, eventually, a technical monitoring of the implementation process.

CONCLUSIONS

This article examines the coherence between orientations and operative instruments used in Rome's spatial development in the period between 1993 and 2008, during two "reformist" local governments.

The starting hypothesis is the existence of a strategic approach in Rome, outside the conventional strategic plan-making procedures, contained in a re-elaboration of a first level of normative spatial planning. Nonetheless, my argumentation lies on the need to consider also the other structural conditions that influence the government's decisions, concerning implementation instruments. I have chosen to analyse the operationalisation of spatial strategies through the development spatial projects, coherently with a part of the literature on strategic planning and with the city's growth development. Through the analysis of the three urban projects of Bufalotta, Eur Castellaccio and Tor Vergata, I have reconstructed how strategies have been translated into specific actions by the administration, observing the instruments in act.

While highlighting turning points, bottlenecks and trade-offs in respect to the initial narratives, I have outlined specific behaviours of the administrations. The strategies "acted" by administrative actors through the implementation instruments followed up the "narrated" strategies, till a certain extent – that regarded the involvement of private actors in the city's construction. This happens despite a general standstill of the developers that hinders the success of the project and generates an inherent contradiction between strategic objectives. The physical realisation of the poles is instead interrupted and doomed by more recent city councils.

From my point of view, the existing instruments of implementation, according to their function and characters, have determined part of the criteria and reasons of the action, not always being aligned with the initial objectives: they have generated more or less expected lateral effects (Pinson 2009). Only a coherent action of the administration in codetermining the different instruments and governance organisations at all the levels of action – planning, project design and contracting – is able in Rome to absorb and prioritise strategic objectives. More recent updates of contractual tools in this direction have shown more fructuous examples of the capacity of the instruments to characterise, ease or hinder, certain paths of development.

This results contribute thus to highlight the importance of the phase of normalisation of the strategies to account for strategic planning different efforts and to enable a further path of research on strategic planning evaluation.

APPENDIX 1. Instruments

Accordo di Programma and Convenzione

The rigidities and incongruities in moving from strategies to actions are also the result of the intertwining between well established operative administrative tools (as the *convenzione*) and innovative instruments (like *programmi complessi* and *Accordo di Programma*). This interplay happens in the phase in between the two spatial masterplan (1962-65 PRG and 2003-2008 masterplan). Indicators, areas of interest, subjects and objects of the actions, individuated through these instruments, add degrees of movement for the stakeholders, in respect to the initial intentions. They represent a further phase of confrontation between actors, not necessarily “operating” previous decisions.

According to its supporters, the use of *Accordo di Programma* (AdP) has shortened the times for the operationalisation of masterplan resolutions and contributed to give concreteness to the foreseen actions. The AdP¹⁰¹ is described, in Rome legislation, as “a contract between the administrative authority in charge of a specific sector and an institution or public authority holding an interest on the same sector”¹⁰². The private parties are excluded from these agreements; they can indirectly take part to the determination promoting instances in parallel public-private contracts. Those are aside the AdP procedures, but can integrate the discussion among public bodies. A fundamental character of AdP is that it entails a declaration of public benefit (or public interest), therefore binds the related interventions as mandatory and urgent, and implying, if in contrast with the current regulation, an automatic variant. Because of its decisional weight, AdP contracts have to be approved *ex ante* by the Municipal Council Assembly, that appoints to the mayor to sign it.

Some observers have noticed an effect of AdP on the increasing flexibility of the general spatial regulations (Berdini 2008, Cellamare 2013). The AdP is, in fact, often used for the approval of complex renewal programs (PRUSST, PRU, PII) and for the new procedure of Urban Projects. According to these studies, the frequent use of a combination of these instruments (around 150 complex programs forecasted and over 100 AdP established in the decade that precedes the new PRG approval) has determined visible variations to the current plan and a consequent difficulty of the administration to keep under control the dimensioning of the forthcoming general masterplan. In particular, the lack in qualitative knowledge to calculate urban requirements, juxtaposed to this dynamic, jeopardises the availability of housing and the furniture of public services, worsening the existing discrepancy between demand and supply. Moreover, the possibility to waive directly from the masterplan with an authoritative determination loosens zoning provisions. This is valid both for the urban masterplan, both for preemptive plans, as the landscape protection plan¹⁰³. With AdP, in fact, the hierarchical approach of

¹⁰¹ The norms that initially envision the use of AdP are: Law 241/1990, art. 15 (providing the possibilities of public bodies to sign agreements on any typology of activity characterised with public interest); L. 142/1990, art. 27 – now D.Lgs 267/2000, art. 34 (more specifically addressed to local administrations for the realisation of infrastructures or building interventions) (from City of Rome website: http://www.comune.roma.it/pcr/it/prog_spec_01serv_adp.page) (last visit: 16/06/2017)

¹⁰² From City of Rome website: http://www.comune.roma.it/pcr/it/prog_spec_01serv_adp.page (last visit: 16/06/2017).

¹⁰³ Quoting Berdini (Berdini 2008, p.82) “With two 2004 Laws (n. 2 and 4), Lazio Region states that ‘the AdP, having as objects urban recovery plan (from Law 398/1993) or other intervention of public residential development funded by the Region, can imply variation of the current landscape plans’. The

the traditional planning is flanked by a vertical subsidiarity principle related to administrative authority. For this reason, a municipality's ordinance is not necessarily subjected to the super-imposed regulations, if all the involved authorities agree on it. At the same time, the local government can adopt higher level authority determinations (like from the EU level) or autonomous decisions, without the obligation to pass through all the tangles of legislation – this is the case, for instance, of the compensation procedure, which implies the use of AdP.

In the private land development procedures, the AdP council ordinances are followed by the public-private contracts that operationalize the decisions. This contract is normally the *convenzione*, an administrative tool that regulates public-public and public-private bargaining¹⁰⁴. In the latter case, it registers the private actors' interest to define a land transformation, the public authorisation to act and a requested payment corresponding to a redistributive tax. It is, therefore, not an exchange contract; on the contrary, it is part of the building permit procedures, in which the public authority practices its discretionary power. The *convenzione* includes both the private's program, both the indications of the Urban Planning Department in charge of the operation (checking the coherence with the masterplan and the building norms and fixing invariances). Moreover, it contains the land infrastructure costs and, using reference tables, the corresponding infrastructural cost, both to be payed (and realised, in the latter case) by the privates. The land owners/developers propose a program of these infrastructures, meanwhile the planning department verifies the economic correspondence with the asked payments in terms of construction – the management and maintenance costs are, instead, except if differently specified, in charge of the public. The administration declares the public interest on the base of these trade offs, in the phase of project approval, and registered, in case of a masterplan variant, directly with a AdP. The monitoring of private land development interventions happens, therefore, uniquely through the economic-quantitative coherence between the *convenzione* and the realisations. The intertwining between offices in charge controlling contract application is complex, not to consider the fact that the administrative path changes according to the typology of the project. For centralities case, the presence of heterogeneous interventions could lead to an overlapping of several contracts, and therefore of different schedules and offices procedures (pushing many observers to invoke a unique body in charge of an integrated implementation).

The administrative contract embeds also indications on building schedules, amount of the guarantee fund, implementation modalities. Those elements have been reformed several times in the analysed period (2004, 2009, 2011, 2013 and 2015). In particular, building schedules and issuance of the economic guarantee (owed by the private actors to the public administration) have been the object of political conflicts, because of their effects on public control capacity. In 2009, the model is modified to embed the principle of "privatisation", declaring the obligation of private developers to fulfil public services and infrastructures construction. The need to control, and eventually sanction, the private stakeholders, is directed then to contrast non-fulfilments and inefficiency episodes, which hinder the quality of the results. With the 2011 update, the *convenzione* has been used to simplify implementation processes, showing the government's will to help private developers during the financial crisis. With this aim, infrastructures and services

following clause asserts that 'AdP finalised at public acquisition of natural areas land, with high environmental value, can imply variation to current municipal masterplans''.

¹⁰⁴ There is a difference between *convenzioni urbanistiche* related to general public-private development projects, and those contracts related to Area Plans. In this text I will always refer to the former.

building schedules have been postponed and the private actors' financial obligations loosened. In some cases, the consequences of these measures have diminished the, already problematic, normative leverage of the administration, increasing the dependency from the market. The debate, apparently technical, on the contracts contents has become a reflection on the government's leadership. In relation to the policy outputs, as much as to the outcomes, meaning the consequences in respect to political will and long term results. In this sense, the action on the contracts has distinguished the last two mayors' conduct, Alemanno and Marino.

With the last update, in 2015, planning department Councillor Caudo has tried to harmonise flexibility need and norms, rethinking the implementation modalities. He added the possibility to divide the project in different building block-sets (*comparti*), keeping the previously introduced separation of construction phases; however, he increased the percentage of infrastructures to be built at each phase, for the land developers to have back their guarantees. At the moment, though, we still cannot test the consequences of these updates, because, due to the bureaucratic delays, it is not yet been used in practice.

APPENDIX 2. Projects

Bufalotta Porta di Roma




FIGURE 5 – Bufalotta implementation process




FIGURE 6 – Bufalotta masterplan




FIGURE 7 – Bufalotta realisations (Summer 2017)




FIGURE 8 – Bufalotta main actors

<i>Problem</i>	ACTORS TYPOLOGY					
	PHASE 1 1991-2009	Politicians	Bureaucrats	Experts	Special interests	General interests
First plan of interventions and <i>convenzione</i> contract: What to build in Bufalotta area? What are the trade offs?	International		Ministry of infrastructures	Architects	ANAS	
	National		Archeological assets central directorat			
	Regional	Lazio Region				
	Local	City of Rome			Land owners Residents associations	Local environmentalist associations
<i>Problem</i>	ACTORS TYPOLOGY					
Contract update and clash between stakeholders and inhabitants and associations: Which updated to the problem can be justified with the market crisis? How much is it reasonable to waive project quality to face market actors' economic difficulties? Whose interest the public must defend?	PHASE 2 2009-2013	Politicians	Bureaucrats	Experts	Special interests	General interests
	International				Allianz insurance	
	National		Ministry of cultural assets and activities		MPS Bank Social security body (INPS) Air force	
	Regional	Lazio Region				
Local	City of Rome - Roma Capitale				Land owners Residents associations	Local environmentalist associations

FIGURE 9 – Bufalotta main decisional phases




FIGURE 10 – Eur Castellaccio implementation process

E. Carraro F. Rutelli W. Veltroni G. Alemanno I. Marino



FIGURE 11 – Eur Castellaccio masterplan




FIGURE 12 – Eur Castellaccio realisations (Summer 2017)




FIGURE 13 – Eur Castellaccio main actors

		ACTORS TYPOLOGY				
	<i>Problem</i>	Politicians	Bureaucrats	Experts	Special interests	General interests
PHASE 1 2000-2007	<p>First Plan of interventions and <i>c ommissione</i> contract: What to realise in Eur Castellaccio area? Which mutual benefit to pursue? How to concentrate the building rights in a newcentrality area?</p>	National assets authorities Tevere basin authority Lazio Region City of Rome District Municipality	Architects Risorse per Roma	Land owners	Roma Natura authority	General interests
PHASE 2 2007-2016	<p>Construction and change of contract: How to combine a higher revenue for the private and better services for the public? How to optimise the area use and complete the construction without further conflicts?</p>	International companies Banca Bnp Paribas ATAC Land owners	International companies Banca Bnp Paribas ATAC	Land owners	General interests	General interests
International						
National						
Regional						
Local						

FIGURE 14 – Eur Castellaccio main decisional phases




FIGURE 16 – Tor Vergata masterplan




FIGURE 17 – Tor Vergata realisations (Summer 2017)




FIGURE 18 – Tor Vergata main actors

		ACTORS TYPOLOGY				
<i>Problem</i>		Politicians	Bureaucrats	Experts	Special interests	General interests
<p>Creation of the University: How to realise a University in a peripheral and scarcely infrastructured area? How to qualify the area to make it more attractive for the investors? Where to localise an institution of regional scale in Rome?</p>	PHASE 1 1972-1997					
	International					
	National	Ministry of Public Education		Architects	University of Tor Vergata	
	Regional	City of Rome			Developer (Caltagirone)	
	Local					
<p>Construction works, events and modification to the General Plan: Where to find the funds to increase the areas' infrastructures? Which other vocation suggest for the area, besides the university?</p>	PHASE 2 1997-2003					
	International					
	National	State			Vatican Church	
	Regional	City of Rome		Public transport company (ATIAC)	University of Tor Vergata	
	Local	City of Frascati				
<p>City of Sport: How to give importance to the area and gather more funds, especially national? How to optimise and redistribute the gains of the upcoming international events?</p>	PHASE 3 2003-2009					
	International					
	National	Ministry of Infrastructures	Commissioner	Architects		
	Regional	Education agency	Region	Civil Protection	National sport association (CONI)	
	Local	City of Rome			Developers	

FIGURE 19 – Tor Vergata main decisional phases

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